

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
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
By

A. HAZARD DAKIN, Jr., Ph.D.

SOMETIME CHANCELLOR GREEN FELLOW
IN MENTAL SCIENCE AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

"*Il n'y a pas d'ennemi plus profond et plus dangereux du Christianisme que tout ce qui le rapetisse et le rend étroit.*"—HUVELIN.

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MADE AND PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

TO

LADY MARY BARONESS VON HÜGEL

ABBREVIATIONS

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E. L. for *Eternal Life, a study of its implications and applications*, New York (Scribner's), 1929.

G. S. for *The German Soul*, London (Dent), 1916.

L. N. for *Letters from Baron Friedrich von Hügel to a Niece* (1918–24), edited, with an introduction, by Gwendolen Greene, New York (Dutton), 1928.

M. E. I. and *M. E.* II. for *The Mystical Element of Religion as Studied in Saint Catherine of Genoa and her Friends*, New York (Dutton), 1923, Vols. I. and II. respectively.

R. G. for *The Reality of God* and *Religion and Agnosticism*, being the Literary Remains of Baron Friedrich von Hügel, edited by Edmund G. Gardner, London (Dent), 1931.

S. L. for *Selected Letters*, 1896–1924, edited, with a memoir, by Bernard Holland, New York (Dutton), 1928.

For first editions of these books and for a list of von Hügel's other writings, see the Bibliography.

PREFACE

THE main facts of Baron Friedrich von Hügel's life and massive, saintly character are too well known to be reviewed here.[1] The influence of his thought, noticeable by 1897, marked by 1908, and prominent before and since his death in 1925, shows every sign of vitality and increase, in Great Britain, the United States, and Germany. With deeper, more genial conviction and greater intellectual openness and ability than that of probably any other man of our time, he quickened faith in the reality of God for many in whom the sense might have been stifled but never replaced by current indifference to the supernatural.

It is hoped that this study of his concept of the supernatural, which involves an examination of his religious and philosophic position, may be useful to beginners as an introductory outline and to advanced readers as a reference manual.

For generous and delightful assistance in the preparation of this book I am especially grateful to Dr. Paul Elmer More. I wish to thank Professor Robert Scoon and Professor Edward Gleason Spaulding, both of Princeton University, and Dr. D. F. Bowers, for helpful criticism; Mrs. H. Plunket Greene, Mrs. Stuart Moore, Mr. W. N. Pittenger, and, above all, Miss Maude D. Petre, for suggestions and bibliographical information; and others, too many to be named, for valuable but less extensive aid. The hitherto unpublished excerpts from von Hügel's correspondence with the Reverend Canon George E. Newsom, late Master of Selwyn College, Cambridge, who died in February 1934, are printed through the courtesy of the latter's son,

[1] See *S. L.* and *L. N.* for biographical material, and Alfred Loisy's *Mémoires*, Paris (Nourry), 1931, for von Hügel's part in Roman Catholic Modernism.

Mr. G. H. Newsom, and by leave of the Baron's literary executor, Professor Edmund G. Gardner. The frontispiece is a gift for that purpose from Baron von Hügel's widow, to whom it is a pleasure to be permitted to dedicate this volume.

Wherever indication to the contrary is lacking, none of those whose interest is acknowledged above should be regarded as necessarily approving the contents of the following pages.

A. H. D. Jr.

Oxford,
May 1934.

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EPISTEMOLOGY

SYNOPSIS

Positivism and scepticism dismissed—The " trans-subjective significance " of human consciousness—Reason and feeling rise and fall together in satisfactory knowledge, which involves the whole personality—Roughness of von Hügel's psychology—The rôle of character in religious knowledge; special virtues and vices—The devotional " creatureliness " of the Baron's mind —Knowledge a process of continual discrimination within experienced reality—Three ranges within consciousness differ chiefly in degree of articulation—Subject and object; fact and value—Critical realism—This applied to relation of fact to theory—Clarity, as a criterion of knowledge, suitable only in relatively abstract fields—Obscurity and vividness increase with richness of reality—Von Hügel's criterion of fruitfulness—His relation to pragmatism, individualism, etc.—The personal point of view and the impersonal—The nature and the place of science —Its middle position between petty individuality and mature personality; the purifying power of preliminary pantheism; its practical utilization—Religion's primary importance—The inevitability of " twilight " and " tension "—Life abundant the motive of von Hügel's interest in epistemology and the supernatural.

CHAPTER I

EPISTEMOLOGY

" To trust the soul's invincible surmise
Was all his science and his only art." [1]

As a satisfactory understanding of another's religious convictions is difficult without first knowing what are his opinions about knowledge and human nature, we are obliged to discover von Hügel's assumptions about these matters in order to appreciate fully his discussion of the supernatural. The title of this chapter should lead nobody to expect a closely knitted series of technical arguments. Primarily a religious man, von Hügel was a philosopher only in self-defence. Accordingly his views about knowledge will here be presented not in an artificial isolation, which was never theirs, but as developed by friction with opposing positions, and only far enough to differentiate them roughly from their rivals. The purpose of this chapter being more to indicate the general pattern of his thought than to trace its chronological vicissitudes, he will here be introduced as at first without any sharply defined thesis of his own, yet dissatisfied with certain theories which he felt misrepresented the limits of knowledge and the relation of thought to feeling, emotion, and other aspects of personality. We shall observe how he combated these theories and what he offered in their stead. As in any study of the supernatural, interest centres much on religious knowledge, it seems appropriate next to examine some attitudes and qualities of mind which are ordinarily prerequisites of that type of experience. We shall then be prepared for a more direct

[1] G. Santayana, " O World, thou choosest not."

exposition of the Baron's view of the nature of consciousness, usually designated as " critical realism." Such a view as his, which, as a cautious expression of the conflicting demands of the whole personality, is necessarily as experimental and obscure as life itself, is generally opposed on the ground that it is neither sufficiently clear nor objective. Von Hügel was driven, therefore, to appraise those fundamental presuppositions of scientific method—clarity and the impersonal—; to consider the relation of science to truth; and to discover what rôle science can best play in his wider, personalistic *Weltanschauung*. A few of the objections inevitably aroused by such a course as has just been outlined will remain to be met before the chapter closes.

One theory that the Baron frequently encountered, which, though philosophically rather threadbare, still tramps the streets, is what he termed the positivist limitation of objectively valid knowledge to " direct sense perception and to the laws of the so-called Empirical Sciences." [1] As this theory, essentially a reaction against deductive reasoning and the discordant suggestions of feeling, virtually reduces to insignificance logic, religion, human intercourse, æsthetic appreciation, and everything else not strictly sensuous and submissive to scientific method, by cutting them off from their source of life in contact with ultimate reality, the Baron felt impelled to discover the ground for what seemed to him to be an unwarranted mutilation.

He had no difficulty in noting that sense experience, its apparatus, and data, cannot be made the sole source and standard of objective knowledge. They cannot be divorced from the reason and the feeling which the strict positivist too narrowly confines. Though in many respects reason may be admitted not to be immune to distrust, is sense experience any better off? Zeno's paradoxes, Descartes' dissolving doubt, Berkeley's analyses, the recent scientific ostracism of the " secondary qualities," the ever-growing need of finer instruments to supplement the raw

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 275. For an outline of von Hügel's epistemology, see Chs. II., III., and IV. of *The Religious Philosophy of Baron F. von Hügel*, by L. V. Lester-Garland, New York (Dutton), 1933.

and changing testimony of the senses,—the problems here involved, although frequently born in science, have grown to such proportions that they require the assistance not merely of sense experience but of the entire personality for anything approaching an adequate solution.

And what, indeed, is this allegedly self-subsistent sense experience? What would its objects be were not reason working for their recognition, extension, communication, and assimilation into organized experience?[1] Perhaps they could exist as some kind of barely perceptible, orderless flux, which, to say the least, would be difficult to demonstrate. More likely, sensation undefiled by reason, like reason unrelated to sensation, exists for us only as an abstraction. The concrete starting-point, the Baron asserted with the principal tradition of his day, is in this case perception, wherein thought enters and exceeds sensation, incorporating and interpreting it, so that the two, although abstractly distinguishable for certain purposes, are functionally inseparable in the process of knowledge.[2]

Knowledge, von Hügel claimed, must be greater than a scientific positivism. But, once admitted, how is reason—the part played by the mind in its logical and intellectual exercise—to be treated? Are we to suppose, as some realists have done, that observation is always indefinitely complicated by the "interference" of reason? Although reason may be indispensable, is it not vitiating? To find things "as they are," should not the mind distrust itself and discount continuously its own contributions?[3] But if that is impossible to do in regard to the knowledge of simple physical objects, how can it be done in regard to the knowledge of ourselves, our fellows, and God,—types of knowledge wherein, more than in the physical sciences, our whole personality colours our experience?[4] Once we

[1] *E.* I., p. 69. [2] *M. E.* II., pp. 112, 276. [3] *Ibid.*, II., p. 113.
[4] Cf. "Holding, as I do, with the Realists that it is to contradict the very notion of Knowledge to suppose its object created by the subject in the act of knowing it, I would at the same time insist that the mutual independence of subject and object is at its maximum in the lowest, at its minimum in the highest kinds of Knowledge. It is where the knowledge makes the least difference to the thing known that the knower is least interested in the existence of the thing outside of

have chosen this uncertain path, what will prevent us from reaching complete scepticism?

But complete scepticism, if taken as entirely satisfactory, the Baron rejected. The old, maligned argument appealed to him: serious scepticism is born of faith. A serious doubt can always be shown to rest upon beliefs which presuppose the validity of thought in regions other than those immediately doubted; for unless this doubt rested upon a basis of supposed truth it would be no more than pose or whimsey.[1] Universal scepticism, the logically ungrounded distrust of everything, itself included, never existed nor could exist except as a metaphysical nightmare.

Must we go, on the other hand, all the way with Volkelt, whom the Baron quoted approvingly? "*In principle* the entire range of reality, right down to its last depths, lies open to cognition, proceeding according to the principles of the necessity of thought. For he who recognizes this principle, thereby admits that the necessities of thought have trans-subjective significance. . . . Everywhere our principle leaves us only the question whether thought, as a matter of fact, does or does not react, under the given problems, with the said logical constraint and pressure." [2]

Aware of the abuses of his principle, should it fall into the hands of dogmatic rationalists, Volkelt, in the last sentence, hedged it to such an extent that, although omnivorous in theory, it becomes toothless in practice. And von

his possible experience of it. In what may be called (if we ignore for the moment the knowledge of God in Religion) the highest kind of Knowledge, the knowledge which we have of our fellow-men in social intercourse with them, we find that such intercourse makes all the difference to those who are the parties to it, and also that we are profoundly interested in the independent existence of our friends."—C. C. J. Webb, *God and Personality*, 1920, London (Allen and Unwin), p. 206. Cf. also: "The more our minds are active, the greater the assurance that our knowledge is objective; and the stronger and the more direct the impression of the reality, the more our minds are stirred to activity concerning it."—J. Oman, *The Natural and the Supernatural*, Cambridge (University Press), 1931, p. 111.

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 276. Cf. E. G. Spaulding, *The New Rationalism*, New York (Henry Holt), 1918, pp. 405 ff., 17, 19, 132 ff., 140, 222, for a discussion of presupposition by denial as a criterion of truth.

[2] *Ibid.*, II., p. 277, quoting J. Volkelt, *Immanuel Kant's Erkenntnisstheorie*, 1897, p. 244.

Hügel, in the general tenor of his work, toned the principle down still more. He agreed with Volkelt on the "transsubjective significance" of human experience: alert human consciousness is always in contact with reality, always in various ways better apprehending it; but, since reality is inexhaustible, we are never actually able to reach "right down to its last depths." Consciousness is thus ever feasting, never sated. As it is man's entire personality at its best, however, which is to be satisfied, no one aspect of it is glutted to the hurt of the rest. Even should reason ever succeed in deciphering the necessities of thought and manage to conform itself to them, it would only begin to know a boundless fraction of reality; for as consciousness is more than intellectual ratiocination, so is reality more than the rational.

Positivism, we noticed, looked askance upon feeling and emotion. Von Hügel found the spirit of popular, uncritical science similarly imbued in its frequent, over-reaching attempts to stigmatize human joys and values as "subjective." In part he sympathized with the positive point of view, realizing that, from that voluntarily chosen and hence subjectively determined standpoint, feeling is the quintessence of subjectivity. But that in itself does not prove feeling to be superior or inferior to scientific abstraction in cognitive quality and human significance.

Both reason and feeling, for the Baron, had as great liabilities as assets. Reason suggested to him primarily the universal and the abiding. At best it is capable of "co-ordinating, unifying, explaining the material furnished . . . by experience of all kinds; at worst, of explaining it away; at best, of stimulating the purveyance of a fresh supply of such experience; at worst, of stopping such purveyance as much as may be." [1] Contrasted with feeling, reason is easily transferable [2] yet notoriously weak

[1] *M. E.* I., p. 3.

[2] The ease and the accuracy with which it is transferred probably depends, however, more upon training and conventions than does the transference of feeling. Even Oriental art, for instance, can often evoke in the Occidental beholder a feeling akin to its originator's, although the Westerner may be unversed in the "public" significance

in moving the will. Feeling, hovering about the concrete and the contingent, the apparently individual and evanescent, draws from this very particularity of circumstances its power "to touch or startle, to stimulate or convince." [1] Just as the splendour of a Turner sunset makes one more aware of the incommensurably greater perfection of that which he tried to suggest, so poetry, music, sympathy in grief, reciprocation in love, exhibit by their very success how far they fail to convey more than a hint of the feeling behind them. Not merely untransferable and peculiar to the individual, feeling is also unrepeatable and unique for the same mind; it has to be to some extent rationalized in order to be remembered and in the largely vain attempt to transfer it. Thus we encounter "the apparently insurmountable individuality of all that affects us, and the equally insurmountable non-affectingness of all that is clearly and certainly transmissible from any one man to another . . . in exact proportion as the importance of the subject-matter increases." [2]

But if von Hügel is going to adopt both feeling and reason, he must find some way of persuading the two to dwell in unity. One may be considered superior to the other, or an attempt may be made to keep the two harmoniously together without such subordination (by evading the issue, or by division of labour, or by blending the two in the pursuit of some common cause). Kant chose the first, the hierarchical, solution, when he fixed an impassable gulf between the existential, quantitative, scientific, rational realm of fact and the ought-to-be, qualitative, ethical realm of appreciation, faith, and practical action. But it is embarrassing to say which realm he

of the latter's technique and symbols. But "Newton's discovery of the law of gravitation would have been, and is, incommunicable, except as a dogmatic formula, to men whose lack of mathematical insight or training disqualifies them for intelligently following the proof of it."—C. C. J. Webb, *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, London (Nisbet), 1924, p. 82.

[1] *M. E.* I., p. 4.

[2] *Ibid.*, I., p. 5; cf. pp. 10–49, esp. pp. 48–9. Cf. Warner Fite, "The Impersonal Point of View and the Personal," in *Contemporary American Philosophy*, ed. Adams and Montague, New York (Macmillan), 1930, Vol. I., p. 372.

considered superior. One may argue, as has frequently been done, that only the pure reason approaches as near to reality as possible in its grasp of phenomena and that the second Critique was an indulgent sop for Lampe; or that Kant pierced through the phenomenal world by moral insight and at heart was an intuitionalist; or, finally, that he was an agnostic or a pragmatist and reached reality neither by pure nor by practical reason.

By his choice of the hierarchical alternative von Hügel felt that Kant sacrificed one half of our being to the other, reason to feeling, or feeling to reason, thus deforming rather than enhancing human nature. Such a solution presents a scientific world with no place for religion, or an ethical and religious world with no room for science. This results from taking reason and feeling not as they appear in the daily round, inextricably blended with one another, increasing and decreasing together, but as the unimpeded simplification of abstraction finally portrays them, as separate, incompatible entities. The weak point of Kant's procedure, von Hügel wrote, "lies in the contrast, established by him and pushed to the degree of mutual exclusion, between Reason and Will. For the contrast which we find in actual life is really between the deeper reason, ever closely accompanied by deep emotion, this reason and emotion occasioning, and strengthened by, the action of the whole man,—and all this not directly transferable; and the more superficial reasoning, having with it little or no emotion,—the action of but one human faculty,—and this action is readily transferable." [1]

For the Baron, then, the real contrast is not between reason and feeling, each of which has superficial and deeper levels, but between the whole, unified personality and the partial or distracted self. He does not ask, "Which reveals reality, reason or feeling?" Even at best neither reason nor feeling reveals reality without distortion. It is only in proportion to the harmonious functioning of one's entire personality that one apprehends reality.

[1] *M. E.* I., p. 43.

As von Hügel never pretended to be a systematic philosopher, it is not surprising to find his psychological outlines confused. Under feeling, supposedly, should be classed both affective and conative elements, although the latter often involve reason also. But perception, what is that? It certainly has affective, cognitive, and conative aspects; it may include both feeling and reason to indefinite degree. The Baron also defends a moral sense, a conscience, as against those who would say that morality is a by-product of science or can be determined upon purely intellectual grounds.[1] As perception reveals a certain physical quality of reality, so conscience contributes a moral flavour not elsewhere derivable. But curiously enough von Hügel claims that religion, although it is autonomous, possesses no specific religious sense, no direct faculty of mystical apprehension.[2] Here the contradiction is more apparent than real. Religion has a flavour elsewhere underivable, the note of adoration, the sense of the holy. But this sense is not granted *in vacuo*; it is not unmediated by, or unconnected with, our ordinary processes of knowledge. Our knowledge of persons, for instance, is something unique, something different from mere perception or inference; it is in this sense autonomous, but it could not be said to be an independent faculty—it is conditioned by our whole nature. But some people have claimed for mysticism an apprehension able to function apart from the mystics' normal sources of knowledge, some sort of supernatural insight unaffected by human limitations. It is against such pretensions that the Baron asserts that there is no direct, independent mystical faculty, while maintaining that a religious man can sense through the proper use of his human constitution, if not God vividly, at least a dim "numinous" quality in the universe of which the non-religious are unaware. In the end, von Hügel seems to treat the moral sense and religious autonomy according to the same general pattern.

And what is the significance of all these senses, physical, æsthetic, moral, religious? Do they represent differences

[1] *R. G.*, p. 83. See pp. 55 ff. below. [2] *M. E.* II., pp. 283 and 308.

in the object to which the human being attends, or do they represent differences within the human subject, or differences within both subject and object? The Baron does not bother with these questions, although he would naturally tend to make both subject and object as richly complicated as possible. But does not one of these senses reveal reality as it really is? Does not religion, all by itself, paint the true likeness? No, the Baron answered, even religion itself is not the whole of life, although it may be the most important part of it. To say that religion alone, apart from morality, science, philosophy, history, gives the whole truth is the error of exclusive mysticism. And all these senses, feeling, reason, cognition, volition, conation, and the rest, must remain jumbled together? They exist only as features of a whole, living process; outside of that whole they have no real independent existence, except as abstractions. It is certainly important to unravel them, but that is the business of the psychologist, whose burden, on this occasion, the Baron did not attempt to bear.

Not merely his psychology but almost all his works suffer, as well as gain, from his predominantly personal and practical absorption in religious interests. This appears in his scattered remarks about the dispositions of mind requisite for religious understanding—remarks frequently tinged with infantine annoyance and as frequently characterized by mature spiritual insight. Although anybody must be aware how much the health of his religion depends upon the state of his emotions, sentiments, and actions, nevertheless, and in spite of the just warnings of pragmatists and psychologists, many people all over the world continue to write as if both philosophy and religion could be properly appreciated in a purely formal, logical fashion, without reference to the possession and development of philosophical and religious temperaments and virtues. Those who would make of philosophy or religion an impersonal science unaffected by the vicissitudes of its students' lives have at least this much to be said for them: some subjects are either in themselves, or for their examiners, so limited and arid, or else so remote from the usual system of human

interests, that they can be entertained by one part of the mind without arousing much curiosity in the rest of it. The understanding of a page of mathematics, for instance, certainly requires moral perseverance and accuracy, but needful above all is a technical proficiency relatively so unconnected with the bulk of a mathematician's other human activities that he can virtually assume his mathematics to be an impersonal science. In contrast with this, even a so-called object of fancy, Milton's "Il Penseroso," for example, which may be less intricate than a mathematical problem, but which has many more ramifications throughout the usual system of human interests, and hence can be considered as a richer reality than abstract mathematics, such a poem, or any other notable work of art, for its full appreciation makes much wider demands upon the whole being of a man. Yet how far less are the exigencies and the rewards there contained than those involved in making the acquaintance of another person. Thus, if the more complex and valuable an object is, the more the whole personality is called upon in order to appreciate it adequately, then the perfect object, the most complex and valuable of all, God, should require the response of the whole personality as a first step to its least inappropriate apprehension.[1]

If, therefore, it seems to be inevitable that "such as men themselves are, such will God appear to them to be," [2] one cannot avoid considering to some extent the part played in religious knowledge by the knower's general attitude towards life. Naturally the Baron presupposed a fostering of those virtues cultivated by Christianity and some of the other major religions of the world, and also suggested some conditions and virtues peculiarly suited to our present mood. If it is years that bring the philosophic mind, enough of them will be necessary in order to realize that the supernatural cannot be discussed like "Sargent's

[1] Cf. C. C. J. Webb, *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, p. 59.

[2] John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist, quoted by W. R. Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, First Series, London (Longmans, Green), 1920, p. 278, —and often elsewhere.

portraits or Drinkwater's plays"; that, being a matter of apprehension and not of clear comprehension, it cannot be trapped in proofs [1] or disposed of by cheerful arguments.[2] Not the keen mind, impatient with obscurity and the coarse beliefs of common people, clever, fastidious, and distinguished, but rather the one endowed with a "certain contentment in dimness," [3] with ordinary sympathies, simplicity, childlike openness, humility, peace, and patience, is likely to harbour a strong belief in the supernatural.[4] Brilliance, indeed, is no deficiency nor an obstacle to Grace, but the limited, unspectacular mind is more apt to be marked by "naïveness, recollection, absence of self-occupation, gratefulness, which dispositions are necessary for the soul's union with God." [5] As in the case of Darwin, "disoccupation with the petty self" may set free a real love for the object towards which the mind directs itself, a love akin to religious devotion and zest, without which the activities of life become stale, dry, ingenious, sentimental, or even impossible.[6]

These qualities of peace, patience, love, and trust, might be almost unintelligible were they not based upon a fundamental optimism, a feeling that "at bottom, and in the long run, all is well." [7] Persons not possessing this "emotional unity," [8] this "profound consciousness of 'the strange but very certain and in the long run delightful interaction of any one thing with everything else,'" [9] generally respond more quickly but more partially in a spiritual crisis. They cannot be "patient [10] over a difficulty and lay it aside in

[1] "Ce que les autres appelleraient des preuves, n'est pour vous qu'indication, ébauche, échantillon." Huvelin, *S. L.*, p. 61; cf. p. 238.
[2] *L. N.*, pp. 135–6.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. xvi.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. xxxvi; *E.* I., pp. 98–101.
[5] *L. N.*, pp. 95–6.
[6] *E. L.*, p. 281; *E.* I., p. 12.
[7] *S. L.*, p. 114.
[8] "Emotional Unity," by T. S. Eliot, *Dial*, Feb. 1928.
[9] Evelyn Underhill, *Mixed Pasture*, London (Methuen), 1933, p. 220.
[10] Von Hügel seems to prejudice the case by giving virtuous-sounding names to what he lists as general characteristics of religious temperaments and rather disparaging names to not specifically religious qualities. Whether some of these religious characteristics are virtues or are rather indications of obtuseness and lethargy of soul, the reader, of course, must decide for himself.

the certain hope that it will vanish " as their minds grow.[1] They are not " very certain that there exist oceans of reality—of things and laws beautiful, true, good and holy "—beyond their assertive momentary insight. " They are so busy pompously affirming to themselves and others that they don't and can't see this or that—that this is not, and that can't be—as to harden down, for good and all, into their narrow, stuffy little world." [2]

A world so different from von Hügel's bovine landscape! " I so love to watch cows," he wrote, " as they browse at the borders, up against the hedges of fields. They move along, with their great tongues drawing in just only what they can assimilate; yes—but without stopping to snort defiantly against what does not thus suit them. It is as though those creatures had the good sense to realize that those plants which do not suit them—that these will be gladly used up by sheep, goats or horses; indeed, that some of these plants may suit them—the cows—themselves later on. So we ought to do: not sniff and snort at what we do not understand here and now: not proclaim, as though it were a fact interesting to anyone but ourselves, that we do not, here and now, understand this or that thing; but we should just merely, quite quietly, let such things stand over, as possibly very true, though to us they look very foolish—as indeed, possibly, things that we ourselves will come to penetrate as true and rich indeed. In a word, we can and should be sure of all that is positive and fruitful for us in our outlook; sure, also, that whatever really contradicts *that* is false. But as to possible further truths and facts, we will leave ourselves peacefully docile and open." [3]

Here some people will discern a fundamental difference between their own and von Hügel's attitude towards life—the difference, roughly speaking, between the active, moral, and practical temperament and the detached, religious, and artistic temperament. They will suspect that

[1] *S. L.*, p. 9. Cf. *E.* I., p. 14: " It is by my not denying as false what I do not yet see to be true, that I give myself the chance of growing in insight." [2] *L. N.*, p. 23. [3] *Ibid.*, pp. 23–4.

it was the invalid in Huvelin who said to the invalid in von Hügel: "Ne vivez pas de comparaisons. Allez votre chemin; laissez les autres aller le leur. Ne prétendez point forcer les autres à voir de votre manière; vous n'y parviendriez jamais. Dieu se sert de tout." [1] On the contrary, is not life, for an energetic man, a series of comparisons, alternatives, conflicts, and contradictions? To be content with dimness is, for him, a sign of feeble-mindedness; comprehensiveness, a misnomer for compromise. He will find von Hügel's later treatment of suffering and evil callous; his "fruitful tension" between mysticism and institutionalism only a timid vacillation between the individual and the group. Why, he will be for ever asking, does not von Hügel come to the point and fearlessly take one position or the other? What would exasperate him most would be to hear the Baron remark, in a typically give-and-take manner, "There is much in what you say, if you keep it in its place."

Yet more than ordinary courage was required of him whom his fellow-workers in Europe and America came to regard with veneration and affection as "l'évêque des modernistes"; [2] and, at least according to the standards of a quarter of a century ago, the Baron's exegetical work was sufficiently fearless and pointed to lead to serious difficulties with the authorities of the Church which he so loved that he could never have been content outside it. Certainly he appreciated and used action, critical analysis, and the partisan necessities of moral and practical achievement; but he believed that if their limitations were not recognized the spirit of arrogance and infallibility thus engendered would more than taint their good effects. His belief presupposes that we are not the lords of creation. If we are, there is no reason, aside from its inherent ugliness, why we should not be overweeningly sure of ourselves, our knowledge, and our ultimate, if not present, ability to manage everything for the best. But if God exists in and beyond creation, then the fact that von Hügel

[1] *S. L.*, p. 60.

[2] Paul Sabatier, *Les Modernistes*, Paris (Fischbacher), 1909, pp. xlix–li.

personally was more devotional, appreciative, and disinterested than critical and aggressively reformative in spirit does not detract from the truth of the general contention of his parable of the cows, namely, that as before God we are but beasts of the field, so even before reality, which in varying degrees is divinely informed, we should temper our natural assurance with a humility befitting our station. Thus, whether the Baron's " tensions " turn out to be " fruitful " or futile, he nevertheless recognized a prerequisite of religious knowledge in what he described in Père Grou as " the *fine fleur* of Christianity and of the Church " [1]—the creaturely spirit, the realization of one's nothingness compared to God's plenitude of being and worth.[2]

Without recognizing this primarily religious spirit of creatureliness, which lurks in his " critical realism " and " tensions," one would misunderstand the Baron. Without the creaturely spirit, von Hügel felt, the finest mind will misunderstand religion. But with that spirit even decidedly unintellectual natures, like Brother Lawrence or the Curé d'Ars, may attain to rich apprehensions of the supernatural; and when that spirit dwells in a profound mind, as in the case of St. Thomas Aquinas, the apprehension increases in wealth and spaciousness in proportion to the harmonious response of the whole personality to its inexhaustible object.[3]

The Baron's incessant appeal to the whole personality as the organ of knowledge is based upon his view of consciousness. According to the positivists, consciousness begins with sensations. The subjectivists would put the sensations entirely " within " the mind, with or with-

[1] *S. L.*, p. 60.

[2] Cf. the prayer on p. 69, J. Grou, *Manuel des Ames Intérieures*, Paris (Gabalda), 1928. See also the discussion of " creature feeling " in *Das Heilige* by R. Otto.

[3] Cf. " ' Our faith cometh of the natural love of our soul, and of the clear light of our reason, and of the steadfast mind which we have of God in our first making.' . . . Faith is the activity of our whole personality: it stands, as Julian [of Norwich] says, on the natural love of our souls, our affections; on the calm light of our reason; and on the steadfast mind, or will, which we have of God. Perfect faith involves the harmonious exercise of all parts of our complex nature."—W. R. Inge, *Studies of English Mystics*, London (John Murray), 1906, p. 72.

out reference to "external" things. Rejecting both of these subjectivist views, von Hügel accepted the current analysis of consciousness as being at first a rich, vague datum, a complex prior to, and including, subject and object and the process of thinking as commonly distinguished from either. From birth to death man lives within this rich whole, gradually and never exhaustively distinguishing and articulating its varied contents.[1] We are thus from first to last in constant touch with reality, our occupation being rather to understand it than to reach it. It may well be that our difficulties in articulating reality become at times painfully acute, but even so they are relatively mild compared with the fundamental anguish of agnostic and subjective systems, which presuppose an original divorce between consciousness and reality and subsequently long in vain for an impossible *rapprochement.* While clearly aware of the inconsistencies of opposing epistemological positions, the Baron never scrutinized his own realism too closely. Had he fully developed it, perhaps he would have been stopped by many an impassable logical crevasse. But he took it in the large, and in the large it was a reflection of his emotional unity and a means of preserving the same in times of stress.

Within the ultimate continuum of human consciousness von Hügel metaphorically demarcated three ranges:[2] first, experience, dim, inchoate, stretching off, so to speak, indefinitely into mystery; second, knowledge in an ordinary, easy-going sense, which is experience organized and articulated to a fairly high degree; third, truth, experience articulated at its best, which is the "point lumineux,"[3] the kindly light amid encircling gloom. Since, for the Baron, true thought involves rich feeling and the func-

[1] *E.* I., pp. 274, 51–3, 68–9, and *R. G.*, p. 145.

[2] "All the departments of human knowledge pass through something that can be illustrated by the setting of a jelly. The jelly at first is simply fluid; it is next capable of collapse, or of utter change of form, at any moment; but it becomes more and more coherent and solid, till at last it stands there, a definite and fairly solid shape."—*S. L.*, p. 356.

[3] "La vérité est, pour vous, un point lumineux qui se perd, peu à peu, dans l'obscurité."—Huvelin, *S. L.*, p. 58.

tioning of the whole personality, articulation must not be taken in a too rationalistic sense, nor the " point lumineux," supposing it actually to gleam now and then in the darkness, as the culmination, for instance, of symbolic logic or of any other tendency to abstraction. Most of the sciences would probably belong to the second region of knowledge; for although they are sometimes highly articulated in their own fashion, nevertheless their inner consistency results largely from simplification, from their isolation from the rest of life. Presumably, then, articulation covers a multitude of meanings, including, as examples, logical systematization, the transport of a lyric, organic unity, artistic composition, personal integration, which lesser articulations justify their limited uses in so far as they harmoniously organize and enhance the value of human experience.

Here a certain type of realist might object that the Baron's theory of knowledge as so far outlined is nothing but an exploitation of the " ego-centric predicament ": the objective is made a feature of our experience; we never escape ourselves; we never know reality as it is in itself apart from our meddling minds. To this von Hügel would agree; we are in a predicament in the sense that we can see only with our own eyes, that we can know only from our own point of view. But he would make a virtue of necessity; he would claim that the objection from the alleged realist actually came from a subjectivist or from a convert to representative perception. It is possible, indeed, but barren to assume that just because *we* know, we do not know; that just as soon as the objective is known by us it becomes subjective.[1] To assume that knowledge is so dis-

[1] Von Hügel never took up the ambitious task of ascertaining in detail the relation of subject to object. Never having supposed that we created all the objects of our knowledge, he seems to have assumed that in that respect objects exist largely independent of our minds—and (presumably) more conceivably so for us, those which as living and conscious beings may be able to exist to some extent *for themselves*,—while giving and receiving their value and significance for us only through our knowledge of them. But " the matter stands differently with the Infinite Intelligence, God; that Intelligence as really extant is, indeed, a previous condition for the existence of any finite subject or object, whether this subject or object be thought of as perceiving and perceived or the reverse." (*R. G.*, pp. 134–5.) As the Baron " has

torting presupposes that knowledge is direct and true in regard to that assumption at least,[1] if not in regard to anything else. The logically less assailable and practically more invigorating hypothesis is not an inordinate realism, which fears the

told us that his own intellectual evolution began in ' a more or less Idealistic philosophy of an Hegelian type, assumed to be baptizable and indeed baptized ' " (Evelyn Underhill, *op. cit.*, p. 216, referring to *R. G.* p. 3), he must have sympathized at one time with arguments like this briefly summarized one of Le Roy's: " On observe d'abord l'impossibilité radicale de penser, à quelque titre ou degré que ce soit, un *dehors*, un *au-delà* de la pensée: une assertion quelconque, serait-elle d'intention et de tendance négatrice, présuppose néanmoins toujours la pensée, est un flot du courant que celle-ci constitute, n'a de sens—même hypothètique ou problématique—et littéralement n'existe qu'en elle, après elle, par elle, intérieurement et relativement à elle." (Édouard Le Roy, *L'Exigence Idéaliste et le Fait de l'Évolution*, Paris (Boivin), 1927, p. x.) But it might be shown, were this the place for it, that von Hügel's faith that reality is ultimately spiritual was primarily religious and was based, in his maturity, probably more on modified Thomism and Realism, history and tradition, than on Absolute Idealism.

The Baron also slurred over the closely allied question of the relation of fact and value. He seems, on the whole, to have followed common sense in the opinion that there are many facts with no particular moral value, that ordinarily fact and value do not coincide for us. If, as the Baron thought, " It is a delusion, second only to seeing no traces of mind in the world about us, not to find there brutal seeming facts which apparently give the lie to any such rationality " (*R. G.*, p. 64), the ascription of definite logical or moral value to those " brute facts " would as much violate the ordinary significance of language as would the attribution of obscurity to something logically or morally self-evident. A religious mind tends, however, to consider the distinction between existence and value not so much as an irrevocable divorce as a temporary separation due to our ignorance and inability to spiritualize experience. It is likely to believe in " a final coincidence of existence and value in an object which is at once the most *real* of beings and the good ' so good that none better can be conceived.' " (A. E. Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, Series I., London (Macmillan), 1930, p. 32.)

All this suggests that " the truth . . . as revealed to us is not only *quantitatively* different from the truth as it is to God, but it is also *qualitatively* adapted to our apprehension, whilst ever retaining the unique life-giving quality drawn from the Author of Life and Truth. As a Roman child was laid, new-born, at its father's feet, and only if he himself lifted it up was it allowed to live; as a mother's milk is uniquely adapted to her child, just because, though of her very essence, it is not identical with either the whole of her person or any other single part of her; so also with man: inconceivable creation must be followed by unutterable condescension, absolute truth must bend down and be proportioned to his needs, if he is to arise and approach God, and is to grow into the image of His likeness." (" The Church and the Bible," *The Dublin Review*, Oct. 1895, p. 299.)

[1] Cf. E. G. Spaulding, *op. cit.*, passim.

subject to such an extent that wherever its action is suspected we are driven to believe ourselves tombed in ourselves to ponder on our own ideas and worry whether these mythological entities correspond to some external reality. The more encouraging postulate is that we know objective reality as truly as we know subjective reality. If we have to change our views of either type of reality continually, it is not because we are alienated from the real but because our purposes change, or because what we prematurely took to be simple we find in other relations is more significant and complex than it appeared to be at first sight. Thus "we do not know the Thing-in-itself, in the sense that we know nothing exhaustively, and that we do not, of course, know the Thing as outside our knowledge of it. But we do know the Thing in our knowledge of it, and we there know it without further mediation." [1]

We know nothing exhaustively—how obvious! At the heyday of scientific domination in the last century, that was admitted too; but only temporarily—with the advance of science all things would become clear. And now popular opinion has veered off to the other extreme: we are so exhausted that we can know nothing. Von Hügel's position differs from both: compared with science, he is "creaturely"; compared with scepticism, dogmatic. We do know to some extent and we can always know more, but we can never know all; for we are men, not gods. Were we sufficiently creaturely, we should be contented with our lot: neither discouraged, since there is no end of hope ahead, nor complacent, since we shall always be more keenly aware of our limitations. Thus knowledge depends largely upon the aspiration of the creature. "Incomprehensibility, indefinite apprehensibleness, and the supremacy of the ethical, we find them in their degree in all creatures and in our knowledge of them. . . . Conceive of anything as exhaustively comprehensible, or again as not indefinitely knowable, or finally, as not involving or leading at its best and highest to moral questions and to moral acts, and you

[1] *E. L.*, p. 153; cf. *R. G.*, p. 45.

have discrowned life and ruined science. . . . Here is the point where Faith and Science are not only supplementary but alike; here it is that the true temper and implications of Faith can alone discipline the mind's untempered desires and save them from swinging from the comprehension of Hegel back to the agnosticism of Herbert Spencer. Faith alone can keep us moving on and on, and up and up, in constant growth and movement, the will ever transcending the understanding, and the fuller objects and the supernatural object of both will and understanding ever seen and felt to transcend both." [1]

This "rich middle position, of an admittedly ever unfinished movement, tension, twilight, and mixture of knowledge and ignorance—of a knowledge truly of reality, yet ever inadequate to such reality—a knowledge ever partial, yet increasable," [2] is von Hügel's critical realism.[3] His "realism properly and critically understood, assuredly does not mean that the apprehensions, however certain they may seem, of any one of us, straight away, and without modification or addition, adequately render reality of any kind.[4]

[1] "The Church and the Bible," *The Dublin Review*, Oct. 1894, pp. 318–19. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 317: "Whilst holding with all philosophers that acts of the understanding are the necessary antecedents and conditions of acts of the will, and with all theologians that one of the essential constituents of the soul's action and joy in heaven, its vision, is intellectual—I would take sides with the Scotists . . . who make the soul's culminating action and happiness to consist specifically in acts of the will, of love consequent upon the sight. . . . The soul's supreme perfection and happiness would reside in the will and would be moral." This rather voluntaristic note echoes all through the Baron's work and appears later, about 1919, in a remark to a niece: "No other knowledge counts but that which feeds and strengthens the mind and soul." (*L. N.*, p. xv.) But his, obviously, is no narrow pietism, blind voluntarism, or easily-satisfied pragmatism.

[2] *R. G.*, p. 195.

[3] Cf. *M. E.* I., p. xvi; *S. L.*, pp. 37, 334; *E.* I., p. 189. See also D. V. Steere, *Critical Realism in the Religious Philosophy of Baron Friedrich von Hügel*, Ph.D. dissertation for Harvard, 1931.

[4] This might seem to be a *prima facie* contradiction of the statement on p. 20, that we know a thing in our knowledge of it "without further mediation." But the need for modification arises not because we do not experience an objective reality straight away, but because, to tie it up with our highly organized conceptions and feelings relative to our usual "system of reality," we must experience it more thoroughly, must unravel its tangled relations.

There are places, nevertheless, where the Baron intimates a mediated

It means only that, in spite of the usual presence of error and illusion, there is some real, dim knowledge of reality, more or less rightly, or at least instructively formulated—the presence of that dim knowledge in the propounder of the system, and again in the student of it, possessing a strange power of inhibiting or promptly destroying the inadequacies of its presentation." [1]

How von Hügel's realism works may be observed in his application of it to the relation of fact and theory. At first glance the history of science seems to be but a manifestation of human ineptitude. Of what use was it for men to have spent their lives in the invention of laws and theories which have later appeared to be vain? Why did so many people accept religious, moral, or political martyrdom for opinions which have now turned out to be groundless? Where is the basis of fact in this tradition of heroic waste and carnage? Where is the basis of fact in any simple experience? Where does theory end and fact begin? [2] Those shelves of books—what would they be to a South

experience, *e.g.*: "Whether or not real objects themselves possess the properties we apprehend as we apprehend them, those objects must assuredly possess real qualities, which, whether or not they are different from these our apprehensions, occasion these differences in us" (*R. G.*, p. 42)—which edges uncomfortably near representative perception, owing to the temporary adoption of an external, scientific point of view leading to a positivistic indifference about ultimate truth and a pragmatic contentment with the rough usefulness of a vague relation. From the point of view of inner individual experience, however, the autumn colours of a maple tree, for example, are just as real and objective as are the psychological sensations, the light waves, or anything else which we may ascertain to be the occasion of, or to be connected with, the same object when we examine it under different conditions, although for certain types of communication it may be convenient to treat one or another of these phases of experience as the more real. (Cf. T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Bk. I., Ch. II., Section 60.) Such at least would seem to fit von Hügel's general position, but he did not go into details like that. He wrote about subject and object without seeking the ultimate ground of the distinction between them. Cf. Warner Fite, *The Living Mind*, New York (Lincoln MacVeagh, Dial Press), 1930, p. 12, also Ch. II., "The Agent and the Observer"; and see his article in *Contemporary American Philosophy*, New York (Macmillan), 1930, Vol. I., pp. 355 ff., called "The Impersonal Point of View and the Personal."

[1] *R. G.*, p. 22.

[2] Cf. J. Maréchal, *Studies in the Psychology of the Mystics*, trans. Algar Thorold, London (Burns, Oates and Washbourne), 1927, pp. 21 ff.

Sea islander who had never seen a book? Probably merely coloured surfaces, but possibly something as far in one direction from coloured surfaces as books are in another direction. Timid chameleons are fact and theory; like other aspects of experience, they change complexion every time we look at them. Yet we *do* keep on. "The very fact that we take to one hypothesis after the other, all of them based upon intimations of our own reason, and applied with ineradicable confidence to subject-matters not ourselves, springs undoubtedly from the fact that hypotheses do *pay*, that they spring from ascertained facts and lead to ascertainable facts, a trifle more or a trifle less, all the way from the ground of fact and, again, from the ground of some other fact or group of facts." [1]

It pays, one might say, in the sense that it pays one awaiting execution to build card houses; it pays by so occupying the mind as to prevent it from reflecting upon the futility of its occupation. But we have not that "ineradicable confidence" in the worthwhileness of building card houses that we have in the use of hypotheses and in the distinction between fact and theory. That confidence may be delusive, but it is essential. The "vitality of the whole system of hypotheses" rests upon a faith that, although in a given situation we cannot be sure of the exact proportions in which fact mixes with theory, objective with subjective, both are to some extent present, and that in the persevering employment of our distinction between them we are able, as we go from stage to stage, to understand better the rôle of each.[2] Thus critical realism in principle and application is a faith which justifies itself in so far as it overcomes its difficulties in practice and holds its rivals in check by the superior contribution it makes to the enrichment of life. Whether it so justifies itself or not should be easier to determine upon further consideration.

[1] *R. G.*, p. 58.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 58–9. Compare von Hügel's treatment of fact and theory with T. H. Green's discussion of Kant's distinction between form and matter, as being not a difference in kind but a difference between a relatively simpler stage in the process of knowledge (matter, fact, etc.) and a fuller, more complicatedly related stage (form, theory, etc.). See *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Bk. I., Ch. I., § 43 ff.

But by this time even a sympathetic reader might balk at going farther. Granted that the Baron is essentially practical and that the practical mind can perhaps nurture contradictions and be patient with obscurity, still, such a capacity gives neither genuine knowledge nor philosophy. Clarity, the careful reader insists, is the eye of philosophy. " ' Immediate unity of outlook and perfect clearness of idea,' let those," he exclaims, " be ' the sole universal tests, indeed constituents of truth '! If there is anything left over, be tenderly tough-minded and feed it to the weak sisters of religion, morality, poetry, and music. Feed them temporarily; when we get around to it, we shall cut them up and clarify them also. The ' only full and typical sciences ' are mathematics and mechanics. They alone meet the requirements of knowledge; human knowledge is ' co-extensive with such sciences alone.' " [1]

As Bergson is reported to have said to a lady who poured out her anti-Semitic feelings before him, " That is a point of view." With clarity as far as it goes and in its proper place von Hügel had no quarrel. He freely admitted that abstract ideas and numerical relations are probably more clear, undeniable, and " transferable from soul to soul " than any other elements of human experience, simply because they are abstract and defined. Hence he would agree with Professor Taylor that " the abstractive process, indispensable if the given is to be understood, is as salutary as it is necessary; the only pure error which calls for mere reversal is the error, which there is no logical necessity to commit, of supposing that the result of the abstractive analysis has preserved the whole content of the concrete experience, of forgetting the presence of the unexplored remainders, of taking the function of analysis, which is to discriminate features within an unexhausted whole, to be the substitution for the whole of something else." [2]

The idea of clarity von Hügel seems to have accepted without analysis just as it was offered him by the advocates of its supremacy. But these men, who are easily nettled by what they call sentimentality and obscurantism in others,

[1] *E.* I., p. 70. [2] *Op. cit.*, Series II., p. 349.

seem to be blissfully ignorant of the flimsiness of their own criterion of reality. No one would object to the practical usefulness and charm of clarity or minimize the difficulty of attaining it. Towards the intellectual expression of truth it is indispensable, but as a measure of reality it is surely too small. Not only is it largely " psychological," in the sense that what is clear to one man may be hopelessly blank to another, but it is attained at the cost of impoverishing simplification.[1] Almost every criterion of truth is to some extent open to the psychological objection of varying in its utilization by different people, but not every one has the contractive tendency of unbridled clarity. The ultimate goal of pure clarity is mathematics, or mathematical (symbolic) logic, which is certainly important and desirable, and even more certainly as little exhaustive of the wealth of reality as the study of the chemical relations of the skeleton is an adequate hint of the manifold exuberance of human life. Paid for by poverty, clarity depends for its existence upon indolence and the willingness to push matters no farther. If that seems unfair at first, any scientist—and clarity is science's breath of life—, or any thinker, or artist, will admit that he must ignore much, must postulate much, if he is to accomplish anything definite. He has not time to examine what is " negligible " in the light of his momentary purpose nor has he opportunity to look over the foundations of his postulates with more than a decorous glance, even supposing that he is aware of what he is ignoring and of what he is taking for granted. Most of our clarity is implicitly or explicitly more a conventional tool to varying extents necessary for practical purposes than an exhaustive criterion of reality. It is like the " ivory tower " existence of many of the Russian nobility before the revolt of the " negligible " masses; or like the reed balsas of the Indians on Lake Titicaca, which will float if they are not used long enough to become water-logged. " In clearest speech there is an echo of an unknown place." [2]

It was doubtless von Hügel's good sense and generosity

[1] Cf. A. E. Taylor, *op. cit.*, Series I., pp. 369 ff.
[2] R. W. Dixon, " Rapture: an Ode."

that prevented him from making any such vain sallies upon clarity. He confined himself merely to attacking its exclusiveness as an ultimate criterion of reality; for if only the intellectually clear is real, values—religion, morality, art—become unreal, since, whatever may be the fundamental nature of these various values, they all agree in being not entirely amenable to rationalism. In common parlance, values are not so much understood as appreciated. Kant emphasized this distinction in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (the Critique of facts) and in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (the Critique of values). The Baron would not have objected to this classification if in actual practice it did not tend unconsciously or deliberately to disparage values as compared with facts, on the ground that the former are managed not at all by science and not completely even by the intellect. But von Hügel apparently believed values to be more real than facts. God, for him, was the concrete reality, the essential unity in multiplicity, the ultimate union of fact and value. Values would stand about midway in his scale, because, as means of God's grace, they may suggest Him, and because they are always mediated by, and involve some reference to, facts. But facts in the ordinary Peter Bell sense—

> " A primrose by a river's brim
> A yellow primrose was to him,
> And it was nothing more "—;

facts considered to be each finished and shut up in itself, so that the moon is the moon in such a way that it cannot be an " orbèd maiden, with white fire laden "; facts, thus understood, stand very near the bottom as being largely abstractions, although not as low as pure abstractions. It would seem chiefly due to our imperfection, ignorance, and lack of spiritual zeal that facts for us so often exist apart from any moral or æsthetic values. But isolated from values, either by spiritual weariness or by the necessities of practical convenience, facts become relatively manageable by science the more they are diluted towards abstractions and the less concentrated reality is within them.[1] " Nothing is more

[1] Cf. : " The world which we ordinarily think of as real is an arbitrary

certain than that the richer is any reality, the higher in the scale of being, and the more precious our knowledge of it, the more in part obscure and inexhaustible, the less immediately transferable, is our knowledge of it." [1] A daisy is a richer reality than a crystal of quartz and much less clear and comprehensible. Crystal, daisy, dog, human being, a complex social event like the Great War—does not the series suggest lessening comprehensibility and increasing apprehensibility [2] as reality moves from its clearer and simpler forms to its richer and more complex ones? [3] The Baron's thought being followed to the end, " If religion is right—if what it proclaims as its source and object, if God be real, then this Reality, as superhuman, *cannot possibly* be clearer to us than the realities . . . which we have been considering. The source and object of religion, if religion be true and its object be real, *cannot*, indeed, *by any possibility, be as clear to me even as I am to my dog.*" [4]

selection from experience, corresponding roughly to the average reaction of life upon the average man. Some values, such as existence, persistence, and rationality, are assumed to be ' real '; others are relegated to the ' ideal.' Under the influence of natural science, special emphasis is laid on those values with which that science is engaged. But our world changes with us. It rises as we rise, and falls as we fall."—W. R. Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, First Series, 1920, p. 278.

[1] *E.* I., p. 11; cf. p. 33.

[2] By comprehension von Hügel meant conceptual understanding. Apprehension may involve some comprehension, but it involves also feeling, intuition, and other functions of personality. Cf. R. Otto: " To *know* and to *understand conceptually* are two different things, are often even mutually exclusive and contrasted. The mysterious obscurity of the numen is by no means tantamount to unknowableness. Assuredly the ' *deus absconditus et incomprehensibilis* ' was for Luther no ' *deus ignotus.*' And so, too, St. Paul ' knows ' the Peace which yet ' passeth understanding.' "—*The Idea of the Holy*, trans. John W. Harvey, 5th impression (Oxford Univ. Press), 1928, p. 139.

[3] *E.* I., p. 11 and *S. L.*, p. 71.

[4] *E.* I., p. 102. Cf. *R. G.*, p. 15. " If I could understand religion as I understand that two and two make four, it would not be worth understanding. . . . To me, if I can see things through and through I get uneasy—I feel it's a fake. I know I have left something out, I've made some mistake." (*L. N.*, p. xvii.) Hence the Baron's appreciation of Leibniz's position: " God being infinite, He can never be entirely known. Hence our happiness will never consist in an exhaustive enjoyment in which there would be nothing left to desire and which would stupefy our mind, but in a perpetual progress to new pleasures and to new perfections." And of Dr. Hettinger: " The blessed are ever desiring, ever receiving, ever striving, ever possessing; they ever are

So, it might be urged, truth's criterion, for this lover of complexity, is obscurity and incomprehensibility! But that is pushing it too far. The Baron is merely trying to maintain Aristotle's thesis that the nature of proof varies with its subject-matter.[1] "The right and proper test for the adequacy of abstractions and of spatial, numerical mechanical relations is, indeed, clearness and ready transferableness; but . . . the appropriate test for the truth concerning existence and realities is vividness (richness) and fruitfulness. The affirmations which concern abstractions and relations may be ever so empty and merely conditional; if they are clear and readily transferable, they are appropriate and adequate. The affirmations which concern existences and realities may be ever so dim and difficult to transmit; if they are rich and fruitful, they are appropriate and true. Thus in neither set of affirmations do we assent without evidence and proof natural to this particular set. And our exactingness can increase, ought indeed to increase, with the increase in the importance of the affirmations put forward within either set. But in the mathematical abstract set, I will require more and more clearness and ready transferableness, the wider and the more universal is the claim of a particular proposition; whereas in the existential concrete set I will require, in proportion to the importance of the existence affirmed, more and more richness and fruitfulness (I mean fruitfulness also in fields and levels other than those of the particular reality affirmed).

blessed and ever become blessed." (Both quoted in "The Church and the Bible," *Dublin Review*, Oct. 1894, pp. 316–17.) Cf. also: "My will—that by which I am moved—is my idea making itself known to me, gradually assuming the definite outline of idea. Since it is the need for definition that urges me on—the need for reaching a point where I can say: There, that is what I wanted!—the condition of advance is that my object should not be completely known. It is because I cannot declare what I want that I continue to want it. On the other hand, it is a fact of familiar observation that once an idea has become definite it loses some of its hold upon us."—C. A. Bennett, *A Philosophical Study of Mysticism*, New Haven (Yale University Press), 1931, p. 54.

[1] "It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs."—*Ethica Nicomachea*, trans. W. D. Ross, 1094, *b*24, Oxford (Clarendon Press), 1925.

" Of course, whether or no the affirmations of religion are thus, not indeed clear, but vivid (rich), and, not indeed readily transferable, but deeply and widely fruitful, is here in no way or degree prejudged. We are only busy, so far, with our method and our standard—not with the answer we shall get, but with the question we have a right to ask. And though even with this method and standard—with these by themselves—we may be unable to acquire religion, we most certainly will never gain religion without them, and still less in opposition to them. Without the acceptance of such a temper of mind, or at least without striving after, or some wish for, such a disposition, it is worse than waste of time to enter upon the questions of fact; worse than simple waste—because we are then certain to come away from such a study more rebellious and empty, or more despairing and bitter, or considerably more sceptical, than we came or could come to it." [1]

What is the principle in accordance with which one recognizes the natural affinity of a certain kind of evidence with a given set of affirmations; what is it that prevents one from capriciously exacting logical accuracy from religion, or poetical charm from physics? Must we agree with Aristotle that the educated man simply recognizes the fitness or the incompatibility of propositions by his own good judgment? Or must we assume Newman's illative sense? In the last analysis neither Aristotle nor Newman shows why or how truth is known; both simply assert that before good judgment and sensitive intellect truth shines in its own light. They refer back to the good and wise man, or to an ultimate and unexplained faculty of appreciating truth. Perhaps that is as far as anybody can go, if he believes at all that the human mind communes with a truth and reality other than its own. Certainly von Hügel made no further discovery in that respect. According to him, our criterion of truth and reality is complete fruitfulness or full satisfaction; things are true and real in so far as they are conducive to the most abundant life possible. Because clarity and consistency are more fruitful in mathematics than any

[1] *E.* I., p. 105.

other tests of truth in that specific range of human interest, clarity and consistency of relations there rightly reign supreme. Because religion at once becomes silly and unintelligible when asked to explain itself in entirely mathematical and logical fashion, it is fruitless to demand that of it. But as the staff and the joy of life, the animator and the sustainer of all other human activities, and the most satisfying of all relations with reality, in so far as it performs these functions religion rightly holds the highest place in an abundant life. Yet in the end each man must find his own salvation, each his own type of fruitfulness, although the wiser and better a man is the more successfully (other circumstances permitting) will he find, recognize, and live an abundant life.

What is this, then, but a bizarre mixture of humanism, pragmatism, romanticism, and individualism? With these vague terms we can here deal only summarily. On the whole, the Baron accepted the truth of their affirmations and rejected the falsity of their negations. If humanism is an interest in civilization apart from religion, which is considered fancy, superstition, or perversion, and apart from science, which is regarded as a degradation of, and a menace to, culture, von Hügel was more than a humanist, because he believed that both religion and science are generally essential to a full human life. If both humanism and pragmatism cramp reality to fit man's measure only, von Hügel disagreed, since for him man was only one of innumerable realities and a very debased creature before the eyes of God. Also, the waverings and doubts of his theory are counterbalanced by the realistic and dogmatic faith of his temperament. His theory and temperament combined produced a moderate gnosticism as opposed to pragmatism's source in a definite agnosticism.[1] He was not satisfied with, or determined by, crudely practical motives alone; his idea of the satisfactory and the fruitful, which included the thirst for truth, objective reality, and God, for their own sakes as well as for our

[1] Cf. *R. G.*, pp. 38–9.

uses, was thus more comprehensive than that of popular pragmatism and more austere than that of common romanticism. And, finally, if he allowed himself and others great freedom of thought (which he guarded in his own case by scrupulous exactitude in practice [1]), he never carried his individualism to the point of imagining that all lives are equally good or all systems equally applicable to reality, or to the point of believing that his ideas were final either for himself or for others. On the contrary, he humbly and sincerely submitted his admittedly imperfect conclusions "to the test and judgment of" his "fellow-Christians and of the Catholic Church." [2]

In his tactics towards sensation, reason and emotion, knowledge and character, clarity and fruitfulness, the Baron has been merely skirmishing along the front between two great points of view which for centuries have fought for the conquest of epistemology, the impersonal point of view and the personal. The personal point of view is based upon a man's intimate knowledge of life as he leads it. It abounds with joys and disappointments, strivings, memories, loves, hopes, prayers, reasonings, moral and æsthetic appreciations. It is the thrilling life of his own awareness of objects and communion with other people. It is not merely the nervous function of a spatio-temporal brain; for that is only one of the myriad possible things to which he may attend. The metaphysics of the personal point of view conclude that consciousness is something underivable, *sui generis*, supernatural, time- and space-transcending, immaterial, moral, religious, intellectual, appreciative, creative, and, in God, the ultimate within which all else has its being.

The impersonal view is that of a man when he observes, in as disinterested a fashion as possible, his own states of mind, his body, other objects, and other people's states of mind, each, as it were, in itself, for its own sake, and dissociated as far as may be from other elements of his consciousness, such as his desires and appetites, his moral

[1] Cf. *S. L.*, p. 48.
[2] *E. L.*, p. xviii; cf. *M. E.* I., p. xxvii and *E.* I., p. xviii.

scruples, religious intimations, and rational preconceptions. It is the point of view of science and as such falls within the wider personal point of view, although failure to recognize this often leads to treating the two as being on a par, or to assuming that the impersonal surpasses the personal. But as a matter of fact the attitude of scientific observation no more avoids *parti pris* than a merely religious attitude, or a merely intellectual, or any other partial, attitude.

Three characteristics mark the impersonal, scientific point of view: the " passion for clearness, which finds its expression in the application of Mathematics and of the Quantitative view and standard to all and every subject-matter, in so far as the latter is conceived as being truly knowable at all; . . . the great concept of law, of an iron Necessity running through and expressing itself in all things, one great Determinism,[1] before which all emotion and volition, all concepts of Spontaneity and Liberty, of Personality and Spirit, either Human or Divine, melt away, as so many petty subjective wilfulnesses of selfish, childish, ' provincial ' man, bent on fantastically humanizing this great, cold thing, the Universe, into something responsible to his own profoundly unimportant and objectively uninteresting sensations and demands; . . ." and " a vigorous Monism, both in the means and in the end of this view. Our sources of information are *but one*—the reasoning, reckoning Intellect, backed up by readily repeatable, directly verifiable Experiment. The resultant information is *but one*—the universe within and without, a strict unbroken Mechanism." Thus, " if we look at the most characteristically modern element of Descartes, and, above all, of Spinoza, we cannot fail to find throughout, as the reaction of this Scientific spirit upon Philosophy, the passion for those three things: for Clearness and ready Transferableness of ideas; for one universal, undeniable Common Element and Measure of all knowledge of every degree and kind; and for Law, omni-

[1] Where indeterminism cannot be wholly banished, science deals with laws of probability and statistical averages, thus seeking as much determinism as it can possibly find.

present and inexorable. That is, we have here a passion for Thing as over against, as above, Person." [1]

The personal point of view, which has just been compared with the impersonal point of view, must not be confused with a petty, individualistic outlook. As against a theory of reality based upon features of our nature which we recognize as contemptible, like hopes of selfish gains and fear of discomfort, the scientific outlook is far more invigorating and worthy of respect. Probably almost as much of the power of the impersonal point of view rests upon its moral and emotional appeal, its disinterestedness, spaciousness, and the katharsis such qualities produce, as upon its scientific effectiveness. If at times von Hügel seems to be unduly critical of science, that is not because he failed to realize its significance, but because from the way he found it well-nigh ubiquitously worshipped as the source of morals, the superseder of religion, the organ of truth, the cure of all ills, and the hope of the world, he could not help concluding that it had become one of mankind's most specious contemporary idols.

Yet "science" itself is only a word covering countless human endeavours from the "domestic sciences" of cooking and housekeeping, the "social sciences" of politics and economics, through "natural sciences" such as geology and biology, to "pure sciences" such as mathematics and physics, when not debased into their "applied" forms. Although all these activities may be roughly classified as scientific, since to some extent they all aim after the clarity, the determinism, and the type of monism just described, nevertheless the zeal with which they pursue those three ideals and the success they attain in that pursuit present such gigantic differences that what a psychologist, biologist, or historian might consider to be "scientific" might strike an astronomer or a mathematician as a vague, popular hypothesis, if not as an undemonstrable, personal prejudice. In short, Kant seems to have found the gist of the matter when he said that a science was scientific in so far as it approached mathematics. Elsewhere different

[1] *M. E.* I., p. 40.

materials and purposes require other concepts and modes of experimentation to supplement pure mathematical science. Hence we may say that if science is characterized by the three notes mentioned by von Hügel, much that ordinarily parades under its name is less strictly scientific than some other occupations the scientific value of which has yet to be acknowledged.

There is nothing self-evident, moreover, in the postulates of scientific method. Clarity, determinism, monism, Occam's razor, certainly are useful in many respects. Far from denying that, von Hügel championed the complete autonomy of science within its self-imposed limitations.[1] But when science, balking at being one of many methods of dealing with reality, and claiming to be the only way adapted to bring out all the fine shades of existence, forgets itself, then the Baron saw the need of protest. One of an impressive company,[2] von Hügel believed that "not everything in the world is resolvable into Logic and Thought," but that "mighty resisting remainders are extant, which perhaps even constitute the most important thing in the world." [3] He felt, for instance, that science as such could not directly furnish us with moral and religious ideals,[4] since that is not its proper concern. What science actually does, he maintained, is to build up "a preliminary world that has to be corrected by Philosophy and Religion, at and for their deeper levels." [5]

We find in the "foreground ourselves, selfish, sensual, childish individuals, mere *units*, but with the mysterious capacity (not more!) for constituting ourselves unselfish, spiritual, manly personalities, real unities and organisms; in the middle distance, the phenomenal curtain and, as it were, buffer state, the resisting, but spiritually not irresistible, medium of the world of physical, mechanical, determinist fact, law and science; in the background, which is really the groundwork also of all, the noumenal reality, the world of

[1] *M. E.* II., pp. 368 ff.

[2] Including, among others, Hamann, Jacobi, Herder, Novalis, Schlegel, Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, the Cambridge Platonists, Coleridge, T. H. Green, Bp. Butler, Newman, *et al.*

[3] *M. E.* II., pp. 370–1. [4] *S. L.*, p. 118. [5] *M. E.* II., p. 369.

spirits and of the absolute Spirit, of persons and of the absolute Person, the world of liberty, morality, eternity and love." [1] This rough threefold scheme, according to von Hügel, is not merely an indication of the interrelatedness of "the different kinds, spheres, and levels of man's apprehension," but is inherent in the "great, largely dormant system of the world." "Thus Man can and should call this congenital interrelatedness into ever more vigorous and more fruitful play; whereas, if it were not already present deep within the very nature of things, no amount of human effort or ingenuity could ever evoke or insert it." [2]

The "devotional" spirit of von Hügel's philosophy stands out clearly in the above quotations. That our goal is to become personalities as much like God as possible, he does not vainly attempt to convince others but accepts as a fact, if not of their own experience, at least of his. What the impersonal is in itself and why, apart from its relations to us, it should exist, if it does, he makes no attempt to explain. He is interested almost exclusively in the rôle played by the impersonal in the development of human personality. Therein the Thing—the body, the senses, the "intensely abstract and general Mental Categories"—is absolutely necessary.[3] Yet, "on the other hand, Man,

[1] *S. L.*, pp. 94–5. [2] *M. E.* II., p. 371.

[3] *M. E.* II., p. 350. Cf. *E. L.*, pp. 163–4: "Only if sense is simply cut off from Spirit, and if, say, close contact with mathematico-physical science can do nothing for the awakening and disciplining of the human soul, can we rule out non-moral things and acts as necessarily incapable of mediating spiritual benefit. Certainly, neither sticks nor stones can, as such and separately, profit my soul; but the element of inexorable Fate, of impersonal Law, and of opaque *Thing*, must be placed somewhere in the totality of my life, even of my spiritual life; and, placed in the middle distance of this my life, and used rightly by me, so largely still a mere natural individual in the foreground, I can touch and pass through that element, ever again, as through an awakening and purifying river, out on to the background and heights, having become thus, more and more, a spiritual person." "Thus Science . . . not merely aids us to represent and to communicate our personality acquired elsewhere, but the shock, friction, contrast, the slow continuous discipline, far more, beyond doubt, than any positive content furnished by such science, can and should constitute an essential part of the soul's spiritual fertilization." (*M. E.* II., p. 374.) Cf. *S. L.*, pp. 73, 148; *M. E.* I., pp. 205–6, 245–6; *M. E.* II., pp. 40, 349.

unless he develops a vigorous alternating counter-movement, ever grows like to the instruments of his labour and self-development, and hence, whilst busy with Things (whether these be Natural Happenings and their Sciences, or Religious Institutions and Doctrines), he inclines to become, quite unawares, limited and assimilated to them—himself thus a Thing among Things, instead of, through such various Things, winning an ever fuller apprehension of and growth in Spiritual Personality." [1]

In the history of philosophy the relations between Thing [2] and Thought [3] have been conceived in three principal ways: Force is ultimate and Thought an inefficient accident; or Thought is ultimate and Force an "effluence"; or Thought and Force are really one and are distinguished only by our human mind. The view of religion, "in its normal, central stream," namely, that Thought is ultimate and prior [4] to Force, von Hügel contended, preserves the truths of the two other narrower views within its wider, personalistic range. The strength of the first and the third views, the latter notably represented by Spinoza, rises from its recognition of the purifying action of the Thing upon human personality.[5] "The unpurified, all but merely natural, animal, lustful and selfish individual man, is far too like to the brutes and plants . . . for it not to be a fantastic thought to such thinkers as Spinoza . . . to believe that he is likely, taken simply in this condition, to outlast, and is capable of dominating, the huge framework of the visible world . . . his little selfish thinkings cannot but seem mere bubbles on a boundless expanse of mere matter; all creation cannot, surely, originate in, depend from, and move up to, a Mind and Spirit in any way like unto this trivial ingenuity." [6] But the logic of Spinoza's system virtually choked his own soaring spirit, "by 'purifying' away not only this Animal Individualism, but Spiritual Personality as well," because he took "Mathematico-

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 374.
[2] Force, matter, the impersonal, law, fate, etc.
[3] Consciousness, the personal, spirit, etc.
[4] Logically, if not temporally, prior. Cf. Le Roy, *op. cit.*, pp. x–xi.
[5] *M. E.* II., p. 375. [6] *Ibid.*, p. 376.

Physical concepts to be as directly applicable and as adequate to Ultimate Reality as are the Ethico-Spiritual categories."[1]

Materialism and Spinozism, in their final annihilation of our highest ideals, resemble doctors that cure their patients by killing them. But we want to live, certainly not for ever as we are now, yet as we believe we might become if we were faithful to our spiritual and moral apprehensions. For this end, to dismiss the impersonal as an illusion or as merely "mental" and of a piece with our unregenerate petty consciousness, explains nothing and leaves us no whit better off. It maintains existence on the same low scale from which materialism mercifully delivered us in death. The only theory that does justice to all the claims of our nature is a preliminary materialism within a greater personalism, the impersonal being superior to the merely rebellious individual and inferior to the personality aware of its proper place in reality. Why all this should be so, we know not; only faith in the demands of our "true self" leads us to some such belief. Our primary task is the practical one of utilizing and transforming matter in the interest of personality, a task never a *fait accompli*,[2]

[1] *M. E.* II., pp. 376–7. Cf. *M. E.* I., pp. 41–2 ff., and *E. L.*, pp. 131–2. "Now these truths [about the purifying value of the impersonal and science] must be preserved, whilst the Mathematico-Physical one-sidedness and the 'one-step' error must be carefully eliminated. And indeed it is plain that only by such elimination can those truths operate within a fully congenial system. For only thus, with a dissimilarity, between the Ultimate, Libertarian, Spiritual Reality, and the Intermediate, Determinist, Physico-Mathematical Range, can we explain and maintain the pain, not only of the selfish but also of the true self, in face the Mere Thing; and only thus is all such pain and trouble worth having, since only thus it leads to the fuller development and the solid constitution of an abiding, interior, mental and volitional Personality." (*M. E.* II., p. 377.) "In the ultimate resort, room can be found for the severest natural-science methods, and for the fullest recognition of their necessity and irreplacable importance, in a wisely cultural conception of the world and of life; whereas room cannot be found in any purely natural-science scheme of the world and of life (if that scheme be taken, not only as final at its own depth and stage of apprehension, but as ultimate altogether) for Culture and History, as possessed of objective worth." (*E.* II., p. 34.)

[2] "Except for our general faith in its already present latent reality, and in its capacity for ultimate full realization and manifestation." —*M. E.* II., p. 381.

but always a new experiment under different conditions. That for von Hügel was the only wise course to follow: "to recognize the incompatability between merely natural existence and truly personal life, just as it is, in its whole acute non-reconciliation; to insert this conflict into our complete outlook on to Life in its full breadth and depth, and to find the harmonization in God the Infinite, in whom alone such parallels can meet, and not deliberately to blind our right eye or our left, in order to force that outlook into one single aspect—a degree of unification which, when achieved in this violent manner, would mean for us, at the same time, a point of absolute inertia, of eternal stagnation." [1]

The Baron took special pains to protect his opinion about the "irreplacable importance" of science from being attacked as academic—as suggesting the successful completion of a scientific curriculum as an entrance requirement for heaven. He used the word science not with its current English restriction to the natural sciences,[2] but so as to include history, textual criticism, grammar, the management of concepts and relations, the running of business, the darning of clothes—in fact as equivalent to any "however simple mental attention to *things* and their mechanism, their necessary laws and requirements." [3] Just as recreation and exercise are valuable if entered into wholeheartedly at the time, but are empty if taken as final ends in themselves, so conscious and sincere occupation

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 377; von Hügel quoting from Prof. H. J. Holtzmann, *Richard Rothe's Speculatives System*, 1899, pp. 205–6.

[2] *S. L.*, p. 118.

[3] *M. E.* I., p. 78; cf. pp. xxiv, 43; also *M. E.* II., p. 379: "Any poor laundry-girl, who carefully studies and carries out the laws of successful washing, who moves, in alternation, away from this concentration on the Thing, to recollection and increasingly affective prayer and rudimentary contemplation, and who seeks the fuller growth of her spirit and of its union with God, in this coming and going, to and from the Visible and Contingent, to and from the Spiritual and Infinite, and in what these several levels have of contrast and of conflict; or any lowly farm-labourer or blacksmith or miner, who would proceed similarly with his external determinist mechanical work, and with his deeply internal requirements and spiritual growth and consolidation: would all be carrying out precisely what is here intended." See p. 117 below.

with a science as "self-sufficing, its own end and its own law," and at the same time as part of the greater whole of character,[1] can be deliberately used by anybody as a means of discipline and purification. The degree of purification will depend in part upon the things and even more largely upon the attitude of the subject. For most people philately, for instance, could not be more than a hobby; yet it is conceivable that some individuals might discover in it as great disciplinary value as others find in a well-established science like astronomy, or even in some still widely unrecognized and often opposed undertaking, such as Biblical exegesis, eugenics, or a programme of social reform.[2] The less tractable the Thing is to man in his average, thoughtless state, the more effective it is as a means of purification, provided he keeps his faith, even though the Thing slay him.

Before leaving this outline of the Baron's epistemology, we should note two or three objections commonly made against such a theory of knowledge. If knowledge depends upon the harmonious functioning of the whole personality, how can there be any knowledge, since no human personality is perfectly harmonious? In advocating the development of spiritual personality as the goal of life, does not von Hügel presuppose the hegemony of religion? But is not religion, like morality, science, art, or any other single, isolated aspect of conscious experience, an abstraction?

Religion, for von Hügel, meant the adoration of God, Whom, he believed, is the source of all truth, value, and reality. Nothing is or can be, therefore, more comprehensive, more intrinsically positive and beneficial for every sphere of life than the adoration and, as it were, the assimilation of God; hence the hegemony of religion. But if religion, in the sense of the Spirit of God, is the life and the light of human existence, both in that general sense and in the more specialized sense of being the response of humanity to that Spirit (a response crystallized in various cults, theologies, and institutions), it is not the whole of human nature, although the Baron believed it to be the

[1] *M. E.* I., p. 45. [2] *Ibid.*, II., pp. 381 ff.

most important element of that nature. Without constant contact with other departments of life, the inspiration of religion has no material to work upon other than its own cults, wherein it soon burns itself out, like a fire fed only by kindling.

As to the objections encountered by any epistemological theory that finds complete knowledge only in the whole—namely, that, if the whole cannot be grasped, there is no knowledge—, this criticism is either a *petitio principii*, or a *non sequitur*, or both, because it is by no means self-evident that we must know everything in order to know anything. As we ordinarily assume the contrary, we should furnish good reasons before venturing to play fast and loose with our underlying postulates.[1] And if von Hügel prefers the fat concrete to the lean abstraction, that does not mean that abstractions—inevitable in all partial knowledge—are insignificant, or that because our knowledge is largely composed of abstractions it is therefore wholly false. When an abstraction is known to be an abstraction, it loses its venom; we know what to do with it. For us men, moreover, there are no more complete abstractions than there are complete concretes; the two are for ever to some extent inseparable in thought and reality. Hence, though we learn more of things as we see them in fuller sets of relations and as we harmonize our unequal abilities, we never pass beyond von Hügel's " twilight and mixture of knowledge and ignorance."

In a world where " vivre c'est lutter, souffrir et aimer," [2] living knowledge is a continual coming and going of doubts and fruitful " tensions," most of which may never confide their secrets to us. Much more than by human perspicacity was the Baron impressed by " the many-levelled richness and complexity of life, the organic character of human personality, and the dangerous silliness of simplification when applied to the mysterious scene which confronts our human consciousness, or the more mysterious

[1] Cf. H. W. B. Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic*, Oxford (Clarendon Press), 1916, pp. 194–5.

[2] Elisabeth Leseur, *Journal et Pensées de Chaque Jour*, Paris (J. de Gigord), 1927, p. 88.

facts of our inner life." [1] "We live," he remarked in a letter to a niece, "in times of such obvious transition, decline, poverty of deep, creative conviction, of such excess of analysis over synthesis that it is in the air all around us to ask questions, to poke about, to wonder, to drift, to use the microscope; where to become and to be, to produce reality, to adore and to will, and to see things in the large and upon the whole, and at their best, is what we all require." [2]

"To see things in the large . . . and at their best," while summarizing von Hügel's attitude towards theories of knowledge, likewise betrays his lack of a detailed, technical epistemology. In an ordinary man this want of a system tends to a muddling of categories—to being religious, for example, towards science and scientific towards religion. The technically trained mind, running to the other extreme, is apt to be obsessed by a single category—to be intellectualistic, or pragmatic, or naturalistic in everything. Contrasted with the exhaustive epistemologies of neo-realists, idealists, and other flourishing schools, critical realism is less a matter of logic than a biographical description. Like "Protestant Episcopal," were that interpreted as implying loyalty to Protestant principles together with fidelity to the sacramental, hierarchical, Catholic Church, the phrase "critical realism," as involving at once scepticism and belief, is superficially a contradiction in terms. That such a contradiction in terms, however, does not always involve an impossibility in life is shown by the accuracy with which "critical realism" describes a character like von Hügel's. In every age there have always been men who believed that, if the development of personality through the harmonious exercise of all its healthy capacities be the highest goal and norm which we possess, we should estimate and utilize everything in relation to that standard. Thus no good capacity or its product in theory or practice should be utterly ignored (as pragmatists often spurn *a priori* aspects and constructions of the human mind), and no good capacity should be trusted exclusively (as extreme mystics have

[1] Evelyn Underhill, *op. cit.*, p. 215. [2] *L. N.*, p. 134.

sometimes trusted their inner lights without regard to external supplementation), but, as far as possible, and differing rightly with individuals, everything should be ordered for the sake of an increasingly more abundant life.

As the desire for abundant life is the motive animating his epistemology, so too it is the ground of the Baron's interest in the supernatural. In establishing the validity of the normal sources and features of human consciousness, "upon the whole and at their best," as he sought to do in his analysis of the contributions and limitations of opposing theories of knowledge, von Hügel presents his readers with a well-rounded view of personality rich in possibilities of knowledge and growth. If we are thereby obliged to recognize more sources of contact with reality and thus to explore more possible means of access to the supernatural, the greater task should be rewarded by a more comprehensive and vivid grasp of the significance of the supernatural than any narrower epistemological position promises. This chapter, then, has been but a necessary preparation for that study of the evidences for the supernatural and of its meaning which form the subject of the following chapters.

INTIMATIONS OF THE SUPERNATURAL

SYNOPSIS

Tentative definition of the supernatural, idealistic and religious —Intimations of the supernatural in external world: the trend towards consciousness; universal purposiveness; anti-teleological methods as evidence for teleology; shortcomings of the argument —History's evidence—Testimony of beauty—Intimations of the supernatural in morality: the moral sense; chief problem that of moral realism; analysis of virtues that for their best flowering require belief in God; the supernatural quality in these virtues; religion's enhancement of morality; self-subsistent moral Ideas are abstractions; they point to God as their ground; natural and supernatural morality—Awareness of the infinite as an indication of God; presence of this awareness in all experience; reasons for accepting the awareness as a valid affirmation of an infinite reality—The witness of eternal life: the experience described; eternal life and immortality; Nirvana; is there an experience of eternity? time, duration, and eternity; experience of eternal life as a revelation of God—Weakness of the whole discussion; inevitability of recourse to religious experience.

CHAPTER II

INTIMATIONS OF THE SUPERNATURAL

> " O gain that lurk'st ungainèd in all gain!
> O love we just fall short of in all love!
> O height that in all heights art still above!
> O beauty that dost leave all beauty pain." [1]

LTHOUGH interest in the supernatural dominates his ritings, and although he specified several characteristics f it in his valuable essay called *Christianity and the Super-atural*, von Hügel nowhere brought together all his scattered emarks on the subject in such a way as to define exactly hat the word meant to him. For the sake, therefore, of aving something on which to work, we must seek some ort of preliminary description of the central topic of this hapter.

Frequently supernatural suggests magic, spiritualism, and milar thaumaturgic enterprises, in which the Baron had ot the slightest curiosity. It also suggests a far-away, heological realm, crudely superimposed on our natural xistence, like the representations of God as an old man ooking through a break in the clouds of a primitive Italian ainting—a conception quite alien to von Hügel. From he point of view of much modern idealism everything not rictly natural, in the sense of being best disposed of by cientific method, such as consciousness and values, may be alled supernatural—and that is virtually the Baron's start-ng-point. He realized that the so-called natural world, he world presented by the natural sciences, is perhaps the reatest edifice of human abstraction. It is only one way of egarding a reality which, he believed, is just as much, or ather more, permeated by moral and religious values as it

[1] Francis Thompson, " Desiderium Indesiderium."

is by space, mass, velocity, time, and other scientific values. The supernatural life, therefore, is neither "queer" nor theologically far-fetched but "is as real a fact as is the natural life." [1]


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BARON FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL, 1903

Elliott & Fry] [*Facing page* 46

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
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experiences of the infinite and the eternal. This procedure is in accordance with von Hügel's intention and practice, since he believed that " unless all the different departments of life and all the different levels of our own activity and experience, variously, in some degree and way, prepare, imply, contain or show spiritual realities and spiritual necessities as somehow the deepest facts and final crown and justification of life's entire movement and travail, Religion in general is untrue." [1]

The external world forms so great a " department of life " that it cannot be excused from exhibiting, if possible, traces of the supernatural. Undertaking nothing new or suggestive, the Baron here made only a mediocre showing. After cursory reference to the subject in his earlier writings, when later he came to discuss it in more detail in his *Reality of God*, illness and age prevented him from treating it as well as he could have wished. In gist his discussion is merely the well-worn argument for the rationality of the external world, which is supposed to indicate the existence of God. Von Hügel accepted as true the " very vivid, indelible impression of the Reality of the External World and its appearances " as " thoroughly distinct from our apprehensions of it." [2] This he held not only accords with common sense but is postulated by science, which, " wherever it is unadulterated and moved by its own thirsts and needs, is a search for the respective realities as they are in themselves, liberated as far as may be from any and all deflections occasioned by our apprehending minds." [3] He also maintained, Aristotelian-wise, that both universals and particulars are real and inseparable.[4] Although aware that science often employs more or less fictitious, pragmatic concepts as instruments towards knowledge, he felt, nevertheless, that not all laws, concepts, universals, and species are merely convenient modes of classification, dependent solely upon our purposes;

the long run is always obliged to cultivate, and our belief in God."—*R. G.*, p. 33. Cf. also *L. N.*, p. xlii.

[1] *E. L.*, p. 258.

[2] *E.* II., p. 142.

[3] *R. G.*, p. 45; cf. p. 187.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 40; cf. p. 47.

but that faith in the distinction between such instrumental concepts and established laws presupposes contact with reality in varying degrees; and that that faith is absolutely essential to scientific knowledge.[1] Thus our practical life and science presuppose that the external world is made up of many grades of interrelated realities forming a knowable cosmos.[2]

By way of substantiating the Baron's faith in a cosmos, let us take his own example of "the upward trend" of the organic world, "the ever-increased complexity of organization, the growing depth and interiority."[3] "Each step in complication, richness, and in delicacy of response to new claims and necessities is in defiance of any law of material survival in the rough and tumble of actual existence. The lichen would remain the lichen for evermore were this the primary cause and law, and so would the anemone and so would the caveman. We see it all around us. The very greatness and pathos of life consists precisely in the opposite. Every step I take forward in knowledge, in insight, in wisdom, and in goodness is also a sure denial to the merely physical, mechanical conception of life."[4] "Natural Selection can but describe the results and explain part of the method of this upward trend, but cannot penetrate to its ultimate cause and end."[5]

The desired conclusion is that the ultimate cause and end of organic evolution must be something more like mind, purpose, value, than like mechanical law or purely physical and chemical reactions. The Baron might have improved his argument had he hunted out more carefully what was involved in admitting mind and purpose anywhere in the external world. Since, although von Hügel did not do this himself, Professor A. E. Taylor has developed the same point, perhaps a quotation from the latter will serve to make less vague the implications of the former.

"'Nature,' we might say, really does show a 'trend' or

[1] *R. G.*, p. 41.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 40; *E.* I., p. 71; *E.* II., p. 143.
[3] *M. E.* II., p. 281.
[4] *R. G.*, p. 54.
[5] *M. E.* II., p. 281.

' bias ' to the production of intelligence surpassing her own. And further, we must remember that if there is such a ' trend,' it will be necessary to include under the head of the process it determines, not only the emergence of the various forms of pre-human life on our earth, but the ' geological ' preparation of the earth itself to be the scene of the ensuing development and the pre-preparation during the still remoter astronomical period of the formation of our solar system. Thus to recognize so-called ' quasi-purposiveness ' even in the course development has followed on ' one tiny planet ' inevitably involves finding the same quasi-purposiveness on a vaster scale throughout the whole indefinite range of natural events. The more we are alive to this simple consideration that ' *de facto* determination by ends,' once admitted anywhere in Nature, cannot be confined to any single region or part of nature but inevitably penetrates everywhere, the more impossible it becomes to be satisfied with such expressions as ' quasi-purposive ' or ' *de facto* ' teleology and the like.

" The vaster the dominating ' plan,' the more vividly must it suggest a planning and guiding intelligence. Nature . . . may . . . be like a sleep-walker who executes trains of purposive acts without knowing that he does so. But the plan itself cannot have originated without a wakeful and alert intelligence. (Even the sleep-walker . . . only performs trains of acts adjusted to ends in his sleep because he has first learnt consciously to adjust means to ends in his waking life.) Let ' Nature ' be as unconscious as you please: the stronger is the suggestion that the marvellous, and often comical, ' adaptations ' of a highly complex character which pervade ' Nature ' are the ' artifices ' of one who neither slumbers nor sleeps. What look like ' accidents ' may very well be deliberate designs of a master artist, or, as Plato says, contrary to the proverbial expression, it may be Nature which ' imitates ' Art. I will not attempt to estimate the amount of probative force which ought to be ascribed to these suggestions. It is enough for my purposes that they are there, and that their drawing has notoriously been felt with special intensity by so many of those who are best acquainted with

the facts, even where their metaphysical bias has led them to withhold assent." [1]

If honestly impressed by the order and beauty of animate and inanimate nature, we allow von Hügel to be right in regard to the presence of some rationality and beauty, can we not better explain those qualities as projections or reflections of our own minds and feelings in an otherwise material universe? The Baron has no retort to this, except that such speculation strikes him as unnecessary and contrary to the naturally credulous, realistic inclinations of the human mind. What has animated archæological researches in Assyrian and ancient Egyptian civilizations if it has not been an " instinctive faith " that we were becoming better acquainted with minds which, although in many respects widely different from our own, were yet enough like ours for us to understand them to some extent? It has been this same usually inarticulate faith that has directed us in all our dealings with nature, and most strikingly so, perhaps, in astronomy. " What was the discovery of Neptune in its successive stages other than a sallying forth of mind certain of being met by mind? And now we have, but within a few years, a practically unparalleled series of discoveries, one after the other, concerning this reign of mind: a Mind distinctly not our own, and yet a Mind sufficiently like our own for us to believe It present everywhere, and for us, in various degrees, to be able to work into and with Its laws." [2]

But how is it, somebody might ask, that if science really rests upon an instinctive faith in the rationality of the universe, it is always increasing the scope of its physical and mathematical explanations, with the result that mind seems to be ever losing ground, so that with the completion of science mind will have vanished into thin air? Here again, since the Baron does not treat that question specifically, we must draw in somebody else to answer in fitting spirit. If the reader will make proper allowance for differ-

[1] *Essays Catholic and Critical*, ed. E. G. Selwyn, New York (Macmillan), 1926, pp. 56–58.
[2] *R. G.*, pp. 55–6.

ences of metaphysical undertone, he will see that on this point von Hügel is very much at one with Professor F. C. S. Schiller.

" Can it really be that they *cannot* see that every triumph of the most rabidly ' anti-teleological ' mechanical method [1] is, from the ' synoptic ' standpoint of philosophy, so much more welcome testimony to the power of the human mind and will to grapple with its experience, and confirms the validity of its teleological assumptions? " [2]

" What are these mechanical explanations which have so successfully preoccupied the fertile fields of science? They are devices of our own, *methods* which we have tried and found workable, ideals conceived by our *intelligence* to which we are coaxing reality to approximate; they are pervaded by human purposiveness through and through, and prove that, so far as we have tried, nature conforms to our thoughts and desires, and is *anthropomorphic enough to be mechanical.* In being mechanical it plays into our hands, as James says, and confesses itself to be intelligible and teleological *to that extent at least.* There is no intelligibility without conformity to human nature, and human nature is teleological. A mechanically law-abiding universe does conform to some of our demands and is so far intelligible. We must assume, therefore, that this conformity will extend further, that, if we try sincerely and pertinaciously and ingeniously enough, we can force nature to reveal itself as *wholly* conformable to our nature and our demands. Nothing less than that will content us, and nothing less than that need be assumed. Nay, any attempt to stop short at something less, *e.g.* at a world which was mechanically intelligible, or even intellectually intelligible, but ignored our moral and emotional demands, would seem to jeopardize all that the pertinacity of our sciences has achieved. A world which can be ' fully explained,' but only in mechanical or barely intellectual terms, is *not* fully intelligible, is *not* fully explained." [3]

[1] And " projection " or " reflection " theory too.
[2] *Personal Idealism*, ed. H. C. Sturt, London (Macmillan), 1920, p. 121.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 120–21.

The triumph of the sciences therefore requires "a spontaneous correspondence between the human reason and the Rationality of Nature." The immensity of their success appeared to von Hügel to be so great that he considered it "an unanswerable proof that this rationality is not imposed, but found there, by man." But rationality, or Thought, without a Thinker, he alleged, is "an absurd proposition." "Thus faith in Science is faith in God." [1] Or, more carefully, since science ignores "our moral and emotional demands," it is faith not in an ethical personality [2] but in "a unitary and unifying supreme Intelligence" distinct from, and immeasurably superior to, our own.[3]

The baldness of this outline reveals only too clearly the gaps in his argument. Far from refuting the pragmatists, for instance, he has merely advanced a theory based on a different estimate of the power of the human mind. It does not follow logically that the immensity of science's success implies that it does not create but finds rationality; nevertheless, in the absence of logical cogency one way or the other, that immensity may naturally produce a realistic impression upon a "creaturely" mind. Such a mind, being more desirous of feeding on reality than of demonstrating its own talents to itself and its fellows, may find greater strength for its scientific endeavours in following a realistic rather than a pragmatic postulate. And although in human affairs we never find thought without a thinker, nevertheless is the type of thought found in the motion of the winds or the metabolism of mammals, so similar to our thought that we can push the analogy equally far in all cases? And does an analogy appropriate to certain features within reality necessarily apply also to reality as a whole? What is the meaning, moreover, of a rationality wide enough to include unanticipated earthquakes, roses, men, insects,—expansive enough to permeate all reality at the cost of losing the significance that it has in and for humanity? Yet would any form of rationality simpler than that be satisfactory? If thought without a thinker is dismissed as an abstraction, why does von Hügel

[1] *E.* I., p. 71. [2] *R. G.*, pp. 71–2. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

retain a "unifying supreme Intelligence," after he has expressly stated that deep reason never exists without deep feeling? Is intelligence without emotion more conceivable after human analogies than thought without a thinker?

Must we conclude, as someone has aptly done, that "Nature conceals rather than reveals God"?[1] Von Hügel's revised form of the "teleological argument" manifests a popular feature of philosophy of religion, namely, that it is neither religion nor philosophy. Yet such discussions have this merit: they can comfort religion by showing how fragile are the rational bases of opposing systems; and, if they cannot conceal the flimsiness of the apologetic scaffolding around religion itself, they can, just to that extent, suggest that the reason why religion still stands lies not in the support of the scaffolding but in the strength of apparently surer foundations of its own. Although these arguments fail by not proving enough, they arouse hope by pointing in a direction favourable to religion. Their weakness lies in their discursiveness and isolation. A "unifying supreme Intelligence" is neither God nor truly personal, but it may perhaps become both if it can be supplemented by other features of experience. The Baron, like Newman, relied upon the cumulative effect of many intimations, each faint in itself.

Although von Hügel was interested in history and keenly aware of its importance in connection with religion and philosophy, he never developed its possible intimations of the supernatural beyond two general contentions. The first was that history's interest in the value of events pierces through their temporal setting towards an eternal (hence supernatural) significance;[2] the second, that the fact that history enriches rather than destroys the growth of science,

[1] Cf. "'Eh quoi! ne dites-vous pas vous-même que le ciel et les oiseaux prouvent Dieu?'—Non.—'Et votre religion ne le dit-elle pas?'—Non. Car encore que cela est vrai en un sens pour quelques âmes à qui Dieu donne cette lumière, néanmoins cela est faux à l'égard de la plupart."—Pascal, *Pensées*, No. 244, ed. V. Giraud, Paris (Crès), 1928.

[2] *E.* II., p. 53; cf. pp. 27 ff., 59 ff., *E.* I., p. 263, and Lester-Garland, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

philosophy, and other human endeavours, suggests a harmony between apparently non-mental events and the human mind.[1] As far as our present purpose is concerned, then, most of his passages about history as a means of disclosing the supernatural can be subsumed under one or the other of those two wide contentions.

He never made the most, either, of the beauty of the world as pointing beyond itself to supernature. " Here I observed," wrote one of his nieces, " that though natural beauty did not make the *first* appeal to him, nor was his spirit *of* it . . . yet he certainly observed and loved it greatly. It may have been that his reserve about all visible beauty was an intentional thing, a limitation that he had trained himself into, in a desire to move away from it along a different road. He seemed to fear any very marked love of beauty, and did not regard its marvellous appeal as a special testimony to God. . . . And this lack (if it is one) went through all his being; sheer beauty always left him cold; he needed the beauty of mind; he rejoiced at and regarded the beauty of souls. ' We will not idolize form, it is the content that matters,' is a very characteristic remark of his. Thus he could love a Browning, but not the divine music in a Shelley or Keats." [2]

Considering his realism, it is to be expected that he recognized beauty as a more than human reality, pleasing other creatures also, and widespread throughout creation.[3] But " the beauty even of beauty " [4] lay for him in the perfection of a thing in its degree and kind.[5] One of the relations between nature and supernature is here bared by beauty which, pertaining essentially to the ideal, the supernatural, is known and exists for us only in union with the natural, which it transfigures and perfects.[6]

His analysis of moral experience, however, brings out in

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 280.
[2] Gwendolen Greene, *Two Witnesses*, London (Dent), 1930, p. 141.
[3] *R. G.*, pp. 75–6.
[4] " Order the beauty even of beauty is." Traherne, " The Vision."
[5] *R. G.*, p. 127. Implications of a personal ultimate reality, present in the experience of natural beauty, are set forth by L. W. Grensted, *Psychology and God*, London (Longmans), 1930, pp. 220–21.
[6] *R. G.*, p. 128.

more detail what he means by the supernatural and how he understands its relation to the natural. Whereas science, history, and æsthetic appreciation proclaim *what is*, morality, he believed, proclaims *what ought to be*. Ordinarily speaking, the mere fact that a thing is what it happens to be does not imply that it is what it ought to be—unless, of course, all that is is right, in which case moral distinctions are meaningless. " Matters of fact never, of themselves, issue in the ethical imperative." [1] We can never derive our feeling of *what ought to be* simply from *what is*; [2] such a derivation cannot account for the emergence of the moral flavour. In asserting that morality cannot be derived from bare factuality, von Hügel does not mean to affirm that the moral sense appeared historically earlier than perception of the external world. " The originality claimed for Ethics can only mean that, given whatever circumstances may be essential for the awakening of the moral sense, this sense will spontaneously wake up, accompanied with more or less awareness within ourselves of its presence and awakeness; it will not be deduced by the reason from the reason's previous experience; it will wake up as spontaneously, under the conditions required for its awakening, as the sense of an external world woke up within our minds as soon as the conditions necessary for that apprehension were present to our senses." [3]

Thus the Baron defended a moral sense suggestive of Butler's conscience, or Shaftesbury's sentiment, or the widespread feeling that some things are right and some wrong, a feeling which, although the things may differ with different individuals and although one may not be able to explain to oneself exactly why one's own convictions are right or wrong, inevitably brings remorse if ignored. As the sense of beauty cannot be explained by " resolving " it into " elements " other than itself, such as pleasurable emotions and sensations, so von Hügel's moral sense is *sui generis*,[4] revealing new qualities of reality, which, though not the same, are as valid as those revealed by perception and the experience of beauty.

[1] *R. G.*, p. 69.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 70, 88.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 83. Cf. p. 10 above.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 84.

Happily for the Baron, his primary problem is not to demonstrate the existence of a moral sense, an undertaking which would meet much opposition from advocates of anthropological, metaphysical, and rationalistic theories of ethics. Believing in the integral functioning of personality, von Hügel could never have supposed that tradition and reason are irrelevant in the formation of moral judgments. Far from being an oracle crying in the wilderness, his moral sense requires the co-operation of the rest of human experience; but the rest of experience, he averred, cannot take on what we recognize as a moral note without the concurrence of "conscience."[1] Although his moral sense always appeared in the background, the Baron's chief problem, however, was to display his reasons for believing in the objective reality of moral values, regardless of whether they were reached by conscience, social requirements, or intellectual endeavours.

The grandeur, power, beauty, and scientific rationality of the universe seem to be *there*, objective, independent of our wills, whereas moral qualities seem to be confined to our species and decomposable, if roughly treated, into non-moral impulses.[2] Nobody doubts that the universe is gigantic, but many wonder whether it is good. Even if traces of pro-

[1] What A. K. Rogers writes of Hutcheson might likewise be applied to von Hügel. "Hutcheson makes it plain that in speaking of a moral *sense* he intends putting no emphasis on the term except as a means of identification; all it is meant to stand for is the fact, open to anyone's observation, that when the normal man turns his attention to certain objects there do tend to make their appearance in his mind new feelings which affect his attitude toward such objects, prior to any conscious reflection on their nature, or on the external circumstances or consequences that attend them." "There are several feelings of this sort. One is the feeling of appreciation which arises from a perception of beautiful objects. . . . [Moral] approval is to be compared . . . to perception. And like sense perception, it is in a way its own justification. . . . It further should be noticed that the doctrine of a moral sense is not intended to supplant reason, but to supplement it. It does not supersede moral reflection. What it does is to supply the value notion necessary to the very conception of morality; without itself constituting a rule, it sets the ends which make rules possible." "The sense of beauty and the moral sense agree in that both are separate from self-interest, and both arise immediately without reflection; but their objects are not identical, and each feeling is a feeling *sui generis*."—*Morals in Review*, New York (Macmillan), 1927, pp. 226, 227, 232.

[2] *R. G.*, p. 111.

vidence exist, are they not feeble and contemptible compared with the domination of physical misery and the ubiquity of moral apathy, hypocrisy, and degradation? Are not the Christs and the Platos the most pathetic misunderstanders of life? [1] And yet—curious fact—among the sons of men they are the most dogmatic, the most sure that they are right. "The reality of the ideal and its infinite transcendence of finite attainment is the very note of moral and religious experience.[2] . . . In no sphere of our experience is the implication of objectivity—the 'truth-claim'—more insistent, one might say, more overwhelming, than just in the moral and religious life." [3] In no sphere, too, can this claim be more easily brushed aside.

Nevertheless, as far as subjectivity and objectivity are concerned, the pronouncements of the moral sense, von Hügel insisted, are equal in validity to the declarations of perception. As the latter claim to put us in contact with an external world of sensory and scientific values, so the former claim to put us in contact with a world of ideal and moral values. If our conception of the moral realm has differed with time, place, race, and social *milieu*, so too has our conception of the external world.[4] If present ethical speculation is chaotic, is it any more so than present scientific speculation? Even if moral thought does lag behind scientific thought, that proves not necessarily that it is illusory but that it is undeveloped. The types of argument that would prove moral experience to be subjective would prove scientific experience to be so likewise. Our faith in the objective validity of the one as giving, in spite of error and obscurity, some true knowledge of reality rests on the same logical basis as our faith in the objective validity of the other.

It is vain to seek in the Baron's works any carefully devised theory of what constitutes morality. He seems to have accepted, as well as a cultivated, European, Roman Catholic

[1] *R. G.*, pp. 108, 109, 113.
[2] *E.* II., p. 146, quotation from Pringle-Pattison's *The Idea of God*, p. 382.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 144–5, quoting Pringle-Pattison, *op. cit.*, pp. 288, 252.
[4] *R. G.*, p. 85.

could, the prevalent ethical standards of Victorian England.[1] His method here, as in the examination of traces of God in the physical world, is to draw out implications from observed facts. Thus in support of the objectivity of the claims of the moral sense, he attempted to show by the analysis of a series of commonly accepted virtues that morality at its best requires faith in God.

Heroism, for instance, exists in every degree of attractiveness. The only serious rival to a theistically coloured ethics is not a dumb, dogged heroism, but the heroism of one fervently devoted to some abstract principle—a formal, Kantian type of heroism, which, in spite of its strength, von Hügel felt was intrinsically strained and lacking in warmth compared to the more happy, homely sort that Christian love for God and men occasionally engenders. The last, wherein head and heart are united, where the moral ideal is not an *a priori*, categorical imperative but is the will of a loved and loving Person, can produce " a disposition and a practice which deliberately sacrifices all things earthly with genial brightness and assurance that all will be well—a death like that of Sir Thomas More." But this genial type of heroism, the Baron submitted, " appears to require, in the long run, a belief in a Personalist Spirit as the Ultimate Reality." [2]

[1] One who knew him well writes that, although intellectually daring, von Hügel was so far from being " large-minded " morally that he disliked to question traditional Christian morality and even social conventions. (M. D. Petre, " Friedrich von Hügel," *Hibbert Journal*, Oct. 1925; 24, 77–87.) " As to ethical problems, of which many are tormenting and insistent at the present day, he was intransigent—he allowed no possible change of outlook. . . . But on all these points we have just the defects—if such they may be termed—which correspond to his great qualities, one of which was his determination never to choose the easier path, even though he sometimes chose the safer one; never to follow the line of inclination and indulgence; never to draw down faith or morals to our own low level." (M. D. Petre, " Von Hügel and the Great Quest," *The Modern Churchman*, Dec. 1931; No. 9, Vol. XXI., pp. 475–83.)

[2] *E.* II., p. 159; cf. *E.* I., p. 285. Jean Mabillon, the historian, and Father Perry, the astronomer, are cited as examples of men whose religious faith strengthened their devotion to scientific truth in spite of discouraging opposition in one case and mortal illness in the other. Faced with such difficulties, they might have weakened had they believed that morality was either a human convention or an impersonal

Another virtue referred to by von Hügel, much stressed by the higher religions,[1] and equally suspected by cynics of all times, is purity, especially full voluntary celibacy, which he believed was indubitably sanctioned by the life and teachings of Christ and St. Paul for those who are capable of aspiring to it and who knowingly choose that sacrifice in order that they may thereby better glorify God.[2] The possibility and the power of this difficult virtue were proved to him by his intimate acquaintance with two remarkably noble men, Father Raymond Hocking and Abbé Huvelin, in whom the instincts and passions of human nature, " mastered and penetrated through and through by the love of Christ and of souls," [3] enhanced rare forces of mind and sympathy. It was those two men, and " no old woman with a tract," who " saved " him when he " was young and tempted to fall into sin." [4] But " both these men would have remained incredibly smaller had they listened to the subtle explainers away of the renunciation, visible as well as invisible, preached and practised by the central figures of the Synoptic Gospels, and if they had settled comfortably into a married life." [5] For the Baron, the greatness of these men, like that of Mabillon, More, and Perry, lay in the supernatural quality of their lives, in their heroic loyalty to goodness, beauty, and truth, as they understood them. " Wheresoever there are acts, experiences, necessities of sheer self-surrender, in the deepest search and work within the visible and temporal, the contingent and relative,

law of nature to be obeyed chiefly out of prudence whenever obstacles eclipse its inherent beauty. (*E.* I., pp. 288–9; cf. *E.* II., p. 160.)

[1] Humility, modesty, " unpretentiousness, littleness in one's own eyes "—also a religious favourite—, is, if not excessive, ordinarily considered a likeable quality not necessarily dependent upon religious belief. " Yet *creatureliness*, the sense, not of my littleness amidst a huge World Machine, or World Soul, or World Process, but of my weakness and poverty as measured by perfect Spirit—of the Spirit not myself, yet sufficiently like me to humble me whilst sustaining me; this beautifully rich virtue still shines out, in its specifically Theistic colour, in Charles Darwin's touching self-oblivion." (*E.* II., p. 159; cf. *E.* I., p. 288.)

[2] *S. L.*, pp. 5, 209, 327 ff., 350. Cf. pp. 232 ff. below.

[3] *S. L.*, p. 5.

[4] *L. N.*, p. xxiv; *S. L.* p. 5; *E.* I., pp. 286–7.

[5] *E.* I., pp. 286–7. Cf. *L. N.*, pp. xviii–xx.

to the Invisible, the Eternal, and the Unconditional: wheresoever such self-surrender is from these temporalities, apprehended as such, to these Eternities, accepted, adored as such; there is the Supernatural." [1]

" Apprehended," " accepted," " adored " suggest a conscious, religious attitude as essential to the manifestation of the supernatural in human activities. Yet the Baron thought that the supernatural should not be " directly identified and measured by the amount of its conscious, explicit references to Christ, or even simply to God, but by certain qualities of which heroism, with a keen sense of givenness and of ' I could not do otherwise,' appeared to be the chief." [2] Although most of his examples of the supernatural were drawn, for the sake of clarity, from heroic lives or moments, he nevertheless realized that heroism itself is not a distinguishing mark of the supernatural. The homely—our eating and drinking and ordinary duties—forms the bulk of our lives and the principal material for the supernatural to work in and upon.[3] The natural too, as St. Paul pointed out, may lead to such heroism as the giving of one's body to be burnt or the distribution of one's wealth to the poor; yet that heroism may remain wholly natural owing to the absence of a supernatural intention and to the presence, " central and determining, of motives of vanity and pride." [4]

As an illustration of the supernatural, without explicit religious reference, the Baron recalled a young lieutenant, who met his death by shielding with his own body from the fire of the enemy the wounded body of an old sergeant.

[1] *E.* I., pp. 197–8. [2] *S. L.*, p. 6; cf. p. 234.

[3] " On n'a pas tous les jours dans la vie l'occasion de faire des actes héroïques, mais on peut faire héroïquement de petites actions."—Abbé Huvelin, *Quelques Directeurs d'Ames*, 4th ed., Paris (Gabalda), 1923, p. 16.

[4] *E.* I., p. 248. Cf. " The difference between the life of the spirit and that of the flesh is itself a spiritual difference: the two are not to be divided materially or on their occasions and themes so much as in the quality of their attention; the one is anxiety, inquiry, desire and fear; the other is intuitive possession. The spirit is not a tale-bearer having a mock world of its own to substitute for the humble circumstance of this life; it is only the faculty—the disenchanting and re-enchanting faculty—of seeing this world in its simple truth."—G. Santayana, *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, New York (Scribner's), 1927, p. 42.

" The sergeant saw that his rescuer was dying. ' Oh, how sad,' he said, ' that you, just starting on a brilliant long life, should die thus for and instead of me—an elderly man of no special outlook or importance!' The lieutenant turned a beaming countenance upon him: ' Sad? What could be better?' he exclaimed and fell back dead. *That*, again, is supernatural." [1]

Had the lieutenant's action been thoughtlessly impulsive, it could not be called moral or suggestive of the supernatural, any more than any heedless act followed by accidental death. But, from his exclamation, he seems to have realized to some extent the danger involved and seems to have chosen with the spontaneity of high spirit to sacrifice his own life for the life of somebody else to whom he was in no way personally obligated, except by compassion for this other man's miserable state. The lieutenant, described as of " largely inarticulate intelligence and conviction," presumably had no theological or religious considerations in his mind. He acted because his nature was such that he just " could not do otherwise." Although he himself may have scoffed at " supernaturalism," his action betrayed a silent preference of supernatural to natural values; he unwittingly fulfilled the saying, " Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." [2] Such " anonymously supernatural acts," however, the Baron believed would have, " *in the long run and upon the whole*," little significance for us and little persistence were they not rendered intelligible and inspired by the great revealers and incarnations of God's prevenient love, above all by Jesus Christ.[3]

[1] *E.* I., p. 224.

[2] St. John xv. 13. In regard to the " anonymously " supernatural cf. T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Book I, Ch. I, § 14.

[3] *S. L.*, p. 234. Sir Alfred Lyall furnished von Hügel with another example of how the supernatural may work in a man without his knowing it but which may, like a disease, be recognized by the more experienced eye of another. (*R. G.*, p. 158.) The Baron had an intense longing for a fat, concrete, nourishing reality (cf. " It's not a matter of intellect or logic, it's loving with one's inside, with one's stomach."—Dostoevski, *The Brothers Karamazov*, Modern Library, p. 283), compared to which narrowly rationalistic or naturalistic systems like those of Hume and Haeckel (*E.* II., p. 161) seemed barbarously thin and dreary.

The transfiguration of morality by religion generally appears more strikingly in definitely religious cases than in "anonymously supernatural acts." Ordinary morality, aided by good-nature and social necessity, can produce fair play and a certain amount of political and social liberty, equality, and fraternity; but an unlimited compassion and love even of enemies, a love overflowing the barriers of race, class, training, conflicting interests and tastes, on the whole, only religion seems able to supply.[1] In spite of morality's stress upon *what ought to be*, it is generally more "realistic" and fact-bound than religion. Only religion's "creative love" seems able to bathe present repulsiveness in a light of possible loveliness creatable on earth or realizable in Heaven. But this love, at least as it appears on the largest scale among the Christian saints, depends upon faith in, and love of, God, Who is the creative love that makes all things new.[2]

The general effect of religion on morality is to give it a happy zest, to round off its harsh edges. People more notable for moral than religious fervour are often marked by an oppressive gravity, the heaviness of which comes largely from the importance they attach to their own scrupulous maintenance of their jealously guarded principles. The truly religious temper, on the other hand, is marked,

Lyall, as a moderate agnostic, was a disciple of Hume; yet his rich nature was often unquenched by Hume's "cleverness" (cf. *L. N.*, p. xiii, and references to Hume in index of *R. G.*) and by the subjectivist explanations of religion offered by anthropologists. Thus, unknown to himself, Lyall really longed almost as much as von Hügel for a reality greater than that of the phenomenal, passing universe. This dissatisfaction with the ephemeral and the merely human, so characteristic of religious minds, von Hügel believed not to be illusory but rather a dim sense of Realised Being, of Pure Action, of God. (*E.* II., p. 161.)

[1] "I could never understand how one can love one's neighbour. It's just one's neighbours, to my mind, that one can't love, though one might love those at a distance . . . but at close quarters it's almost impossible. If it were as on the stage, in the ballet, where, if beggars come in, they wear silken rags and tattered lace and beg for alms dancing gracefully, then one might like looking at them. But even then we should not love them."—Dostoevski, *op. cit.*, pp. 291–2.

[2] *E.* II., pp. 159–60; cf. *E.* I., p. 287, citing Abbé Huvelin and Capt. Horace de Vere as exemplifying creative love.

von Hügel contended, by entire self-abandonment to God.[1] The focus shifts from puffed-up mites like us to God's sustaining strength, wisdom, love, and spaciousness, wherein we rest. Our duties are performed just as carefully, but not merely by our own unhallowed efforts, not alone in a stuffy cellar, but out in the open air, in the presence of love, where burdens are easy and yokes light. This life with God gives a joyousness and peace, which nothing else can give,— "a happiness that is not superficial and a depth that is not morbid," a "suffering serenity."[2] Unless everything is divine in some pantheistic sense, or unless moral and religious values are not worth pursuing after they become painfully exacting, a "suffering of expansion" is inevitable. Inevitable, that is, if one does not renounce those values, a renunciation which leads as inescapably to a "suffering of contraction." A non-religious, secular, humanistic scheme of morals either produces a deadness to both kinds of suffering, by taking morality lightly, and in taking it lightly it contracts the soul; or, in treating morality as the most important phase of life and yet as only a characteristic or fiction of the human race, it condemns the race to serve knowingly an idol of its own.

Reflecting on the zest that religion can lend to morality, von Hügel concluded that for its fullest development the ethical life implies faith in God; preferably, of course, a conscious faith, but one not so much of intellectual assent as a determiner of action and dispositional tone in accordance with ethical and religious requirements. It by no means follows, for example, that an avowedly religious man will always exhibit a better moral life than a disparager of religion, since there are many causes that may arrest or deflect "the true moral flowering of his religious convictions." On the other hand, the morality of many self-styled naturalists and atheists may be unwittingly religious and intimately dependent upon religion's diffused influence. As "what any one of us

[1] Illustrations in *E.* I., pp. 289–90 (where Simon Knapp's heroism, with religious reference, more clearly suggests the supernatural than the bravery of the above-mentioned lieutenant, without religious reference) and *E.* I., pp. 223–4.

[2] *E.* II., pp. 161–2; *E.* I., pp. 290–91.

men really thinks always differs, more or less, from what he thinks he thinks," the usual classifications which men devise for themselves and others are a none too accurate indication of the presence of the Spirit that bloweth where it listeth.[1]

The Baron's discussion of the religious implications of morality was highly subjective and empirical, in the sense that whether his treatment of the subject pleases them or not, it will have weight only for those who, like him, have found that the ethical life is significant and delightful to them chiefly in so far as it is an expression of devotion to God. Deprived of ultimate truth, reality, and love, they are miserable; they consider their wretchedness to be an "unconquerable" sense of that reality, truth, and love, the denial of which is urged upon them by either their own indolence and sin or theories regarding God and moral values as outworn finery.[2]

It is sometimes affirmed by moral realists who dislike the conception of morality as merely human but wish to save it from being contaminated by religion, that moral values are self-subsistent. The Baron maintained that the ethical sense is *sui generis* and not merely a religious mouthpiece; that morality is autonomous on its own level; and that it may exist without being aware of its relationship to religion or the enhancement it can derive from it. But he would apparently balk at self-subsistent moral Forms, Ideas, or values.[3]

Such moral Forms are comparable to supposedly self-subsistent scientific laws or physical elements; they are products of abstraction. But what distinguishes them from rigorously intellectual abstractions is that our attitude towards moral values is tinged with personal emotion, whereas our attitude towards scientific concepts is, theoretically, impersonal. Kant made the difference clear when, in spite of the cold formality of his system, he declared that one should reverence the moral law, and also asserted that reverence can be felt only towards persons. The natural

[1] *E.* II., p. 162.
[2] *E.* I., p. 115.
[3] *E.* I., pp. 54–5.

inference is that his permissible " representation of moral laws as divine commands may be something more than an imaginative personification." [1]

To halt at self-subsistent, moral concepts, without pushing back to personality, which seemed to the Baron to be our best analogue for the source and sustainer of such values, is to stop at the level of abstractions. Were there no religion in the world, we might be obliged to break off thus prematurely, on the ground that such a position did more justice to moral demands than one distorting them into fabrications of our paltry spirits, or into characteristics of a momentarily dominant race of vertebrates. But there is a vast amount of religious experience which unequivocally proclaims the personalistic source of such values as well as of all being. The Baron believed that these claims are just as valid as those of logic, æsthetics, and ethics, and that they bring out and meet the latter's implications.[2] This religious experience is characterized by a certain obtuseness to the distinction between God and ultimate values. The notion that God is subservient to moral laws outside His own being is as repellent to such believers as is the idea of bonding their friends against embezzlement; it seems to indicate a very low opinion of Him. The old problem of whether goodness is good because God so ordains it, or whether God is good because He is true to Goodness, strikes them as being as artificial as the question, " Would you gladly be damned for the glory of God? " This point, which von Hügel insinuates rather than expounds, is rendered more explicit by Dr. C. C. J. Webb in a similar connection.

" When we call God wise and good . . . we mean that he is himself the wisdom and the goodness of which we are speaking, there is no wisdom or goodness beyond him in which he shares. We cannot conceive him apart from wisdom or goodness, nor, if we believe in him at all, can we think of wisdom and goodness apart from him. . . .

" As a great Platonic scholar, Professor Burnet of St.

[1] C. C. J. Webb, *God and Personality*, 1920, New York (Macmillan), p. 119; cf. A. E. Taylor, *Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 67.

[2] *E.* I., pp. 54–5.

Andrews, has lately observed, it was in this distinction of Plato's between God and what was acknowledged to be the Highest, a distinction which the modern theist does not make . . . that we must seek the principal source of those controversies which the Church Councils of the fourth century of our era were summoned to decide. I feel myself convinced that the maintenance of the Platonic distinction can never prove in the long run satisfactory to the religious consciousness. The God whom we worship must be the Highest, must be what Plato called the Idea of the Good, but this Good must not, as in the Platonic tradition . . . be something in its innermost nature above and beyond even the most exalted kind of Soul. The best Soul, the divine Spirit, which moves and works in the world, and is the source of what is good in the human souls, which derive their origin from it, must be essentially one with the Highest; even in its innermost nature the Highest must possess that spiritual life of which our personality is but a faint and imperfect likeness." [1]

So it seems that Dr. Webb would agree with von Hügel that morality is not a gesture "into the blue," [2] but "that the ultimate analysis of the moral sense gives us intuitions of God, the Supreme Good, as real as does that knowledge, at work within the external world, bring us solid intimations of God as the Supreme Intelligence." [3]

Von Hügel dwelt so much upon supernatural morality for the sake of exhibiting clearly the theistic implications of ethics. Yet one of the most insidious and "all-but-irresistible" dangers of religion, which is ever ready to sap its force and lead to "the most destructive counter-excesses," is the tendency to allow the fascinations of Grace to blunt one's appreciation of "the beauties and duties of Nature." [4] Moderate living, bodily cleanliness, honesty in buying and selling, due respect for law, reasonable politeness in social intercourse, these natural virtues of Confucius and Jeremy Bentham, often pooh-poohed on account of their dowdy domesticity, their "Babbit" dullness,

[1] *God and Personality*, London (Allen and Unwin), 1920, pp. 174–5; cf. pp. 236 ff.
[2] *L. N.*, p. 100.
[3] *R. G.*, p. 77.
[4] *L. N.*, p. 61.

and lack of high-flying imagination, nevertheless bring their own very real reward. It would be fanatical of the state or of any secular organization to exact more, since most men are prevented by circumstances from going beyond them, and about some, perhaps, shades of the prison house have so closed in that they can conceive of nothing better.[1] Not only are both nature and supernature from God, " and to be loved and honoured as His: but they have been created, they are administered and moved, by God, as *closely interrelated parts of one great whole.* . . . No Grace without the substrata, the occasion, the material, of Nature; and (in the individuals called to the realization of the type) no Nature without Grace." [2]

But to be absolutely satisfied with that abstracted part of the whole, called nature, and with that alone, is almost impossible for any complete individual. It is as likely to lead to suffocation by smugness as the pursuit of a " pure spirituality " untrammelled by nature is likely to lead to ineffectiveness or madness. Shorn of its intrinsic connection with supernature, civilization seemed to von Hügel cheap, an insult to man,[3] and the church a contemptible super-

[1] *E.* I., pp. 282, 199, 89. [2] *L. N.*, p. 61.
[3] Cf. E. B. Browning, from " Aurora Leigh ":

" Natural things
And spiritual,—who separates those two
In art, in morals, or the social drift
Tears up the bonds of nature and brings death,
Paints futile pictures, writes unreal verse,
Leads vulgar days, deals ignorantly with men,
Is wrong, in short, at all points. We divide
This apple of life, and cut it through the pips,—
The perfect round which fitted Venus' hand
Has perished as utterly as if we ate
Both halves. Without the spiritual, observe,
The natural's impossible,—no form,
No motion: without sensuous, spiritual
Is inappreciable,—no beauty or power;
And in this twofold sphere the twofold man . . .
Holds firmly by the natural, to reach
The spiritual beyond it—fixes still
The type with mortal vision, to pierce through,
With eyes immortal, to the antitype
Some call the ideal,—better call the real,
And certain to be called so presently
When things shall have their names."

fluity,[1] because, although knowing the better, man has accepted the less as sufficient. Who can be content with a "largely dry and distant" reference to a narrow-minded deity, when the Psalms present a God of awful immediacy in whose presence is the fullness of joy?[2] Without denying one jot or tittle of their good, but rather perfecting it, does not the Christian Nova Lex and above all the life of Christ surpass "Natural Law, Aristotle, the Decalogue and natural prosperity," by opening up more fully the channels of the supernatural?[3] It is especially to the Christian Church, in its indestructible ideal and in "its fullest and fairest fruits," the Baron believed, that mankind should be grateful for keeping alive on earth the fire of the supernatural.[4]

Apparently in his own life von Hügel had no need of sharp definitions of natural and supernatural and of the relations between them. At any rate, aside from what has already been said about supernature's "perfecting" nature, there is little more of importance on that score to be found in the Baron's writings. Nor does he offer us "amphibious"[5] creatures any means of reconciling the conflicts that frequently occur in practice between the two worlds—the good so good that it cannot be renounced and the better so much better that everything else must be renounced—; for in our present state we cannot always "harmonize" and "reconcile" things as if we were the Absolute, but sometimes must take this or that irrevocably. The adjustment of the tensions, the adaptation of humane ends to the service of God and the

[1] "It seems to me that some people are quite deficient in the religious sense. . . . They are like people who are without the musical sense. . . . Religion to them is a purely this-world affair. God is a kind of chalk-pit. Religion is *not* of this world, it is supernatural, it leavens the world. They can never understand this, and the need for this leaven. The Church works in two levels. She is never the State. She is not the police, nor a sanitary engineer, nor a bricklayer, nor a builder, nor a plumber. Marriage, having children, education, proper clothes, decent behaviour, the plumber—all these are good things, but they are not religion. The essence of religion is the supernatural life; the other world, the otherness of God, different from, but penetrating this our life. That is God's level. The natural level is the State, etc. The Church must never be the State."—*L. N.*, pp. xxx–xxxi.

[2] *E.* I., p. 199.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 176.

[4] *E.* I., p. 200; *G. S.*, p. 163.

[5] *E.* II., p. 246; *G. S.*, p. 205.

service of God to the benefit of the world,[1] is left to each struggling soul aided by whatever wisdom the ages and his fellows have accumulated.

In the awareness of the infinite the Baron thought he caught another intimation of the supernatural. No man has ever been entirely satisfied with the evanescence and contingency of nature.[2] Even the most idyllic utopias disappoint if not their authors at least everybody else.[3] "A spark disturbs our clod." We long for something not merely good or better, but for the very best; for something beyond the caprices of time and space, of life, and, even more, of death individual and racial; for something inexhaustible in power, truth, and all excellence; for an absolute, perfect Abiding and Infinite.[4] In all our contacts with finite beings, this sense of the Infinite arises with different degrees of intensity. It is the background of our existence, an indefinable quality of our terrestrial atmosphere. It attends all our sense-perceptions, reasonings, and volitions, through every stage of obscurity or relative clarity. "Whatever name we give it,—instinct; innate, original, or unconscious form of thought; or form of conception,—it is the specifically human element in man." [5]

> "Our destiny, our being's heart and home,
> Is with infinitude, and only there." [6]

Literature, philosophy, psychology, religion, furnish so many examples of this dissatisfaction with the world, not merely because it often thwarts selfish interests but primarily because of itself it will not quench man's infinite thirst, that there is no need of laboriously proving the existence of intimations which in some form or other everybody has experienced, no matter how he has accounted for them.[7] It has sometimes been glibly asserted that a thirst or a hunger

[1] *E.* I., p. 168.
[2] *E. L.*, p. 384; *M. E.* II., p. 281. For an important discussion of the infinite, see von Hügel's article "Experience and Transcendence," *Dublin Review*, April 1906, esp. pp. 360–65.
[3] *E. L.*, p. 230.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 154.
[5] *M. E.* II., p. 340; cf. *E. L.*, p. 243.
[6] Wordsworth, "The Prelude."
[7] Cf. pp. xvi f. in Algar Thorold's Introduction to *Readings from Friedrich von Hügel*, London (Dent), 1928.

is no proof of a meal in prospect; people die of starvation no matter how hungry they are. Yet, although our "civilization" guarantees many miscarriages in individual cases, the general fact prevails that hunger would be quite anomalous were nourishment of any sort non-existent. This figurative use of "thirst," moreover, implies something of the nature of search (or is von Hügel unfairly slipping the coin up his sleeve?); and searching implies at least a vague awareness of what one is hunting for—"Thou wouldst not seek Me, if thou hadst not found Me." Were we not somehow aware of the infinite, we should not know that we and all things natural are finite.[1]

The Baron's treatment of the apprehensions of the infinite is of a piece with his usual method of establishing his type of realism. Whether or not they are illusory, we start with the intimations as undeniable elements of religious experience. "The argument reaches port the moment these intimations are allowed really to be what they themselves claim to be."[2] That is one of the difficulties: what do they claim to be? If, among the examples of dissatisfaction with the passing universe, one picks as one sees fit, one can frame, on behalf of these intimations, almost any sort of metaphysical claim. In this situation one is thrown back upon one's own religious judgment to determine whether a given metaphysical interpretation of a religious experience "rings true" or not; just as one must judge art and art critics by their conformity to one's own taste, realizing also, alas, that one's own taste may be so crude as to be of little significance for anybody else. Whoever is concerned with the matter at all, therefore, must judge according to his own experience and information whether these intimations claim, as von Hügel contended that they did, to put us in touch with "a trans-human Reality which penetrates and sustains ourselves and all things." Then, if objections to that claim can be swept away, the claim holds the field in fact, if not in logical right, just as the vivid impression of the external world is tentatively accepted as true for us, if we cannot show it to be false, or propose a better alternative in its place.

[1] *E.* I., p. 296; *M. E.* II., p. 339. [2] *E.* I., p. 44.

As the Baron could not even begin to face all the possible objections and alternatives to his interpretation, he had to choose some outstanding representative of dissent to serve as devil's advocate. Certainly, even if he should triumph over this opponent, von Hügel would not thereby strictly establish his own position as the only possible true one. But in choosing Ludwig Feuerbach he did his best to meet the ablest of his antagonists, trusting that if he could overcome him he could *a fortiori* silence his lesser foes. Reducing Feuerbach's argument, as outlined by the Baron, to its barest skeleton, we find that the German admits apprehensions which claim to be awarenesses of an objective, infinite reality; but, believing the claim to be illusory, he holds that the apprehensions are actually a consciousness of man's own infinite nature. As an extreme Hegelian, he started on the assumption that human personality consists of mind alone; that it can know only itself; and that it is, as man's true nature, a form of the Absolute. Hence the inevitable conclusion that " the consciousness of the infinite is nothing else than the consciousness of the infinity of consciousness." [1]

These assumptions about the nature of consciousness, however, never remained long unmodified by the few people who adopted them, Feuerbach himself later renouncing them. As has already been noted, von Hügel never tried to ascertain exactly what consciousness is. But we have seen why he insisted that our nature is more than simply discursive and abstractive mind; that it is intuitive, emotional, sensory, volitional as well; and that, far from knowing only himself, every human being lives with others in a cosmos of real objects to which he is manifoldly related. If this is true, it would seem clear that whether " man's consciousness of the Infinite is or is not, as a matter of fact, simply man's consciousness of his own truly infinite consciousness, we cannot decide straight away that ' it cannot be anything else.' " [2] The realistic alternative is perhaps possible; and it certainly better agrees with normal religious experience, as von Hügel understood it, which, in so far as it is specifically religious,

[1] *E.* I., p. 31. Cf. Lester-Garland, *op. cit.*, pp. 29, 43.
[2] *E.* I., p. 33.

never admits that the objects of its faith are mere projections or prolongations, realized or potential, of the human mind individually or collectively.[1]

But, Feuerbach continues, if this infinite is objective, why does it vary as we vary? Why do later stages of religion look back upon earlier ones as so many sheer idolatries, unless those earlier stages were expressions not of objective truth but of human imaginings? Religion, moreover, has advanced upon the whole "from seeing God as it were visibly in the visible, outside world to experiencing Him in the operations of the human conscience and in the necessary laws and ideals of the human mind."[2] What is that advance if not an indication of the essential subjectivity of religious experience?

Von Hügel recognized that trend but maintained that it was by no means the only one. Recent science and philosophy, he contended, are making less possible a conception of Nature as mechanical or blindly impulsive, and imperative a conception recognizing, more deeply than ever before, that in various degrees rationality and purposiveness are engrained everywhere; and this is the first step to finding God again in the heavens and on earth as well as in the souls of men.[3]

Nor does Feuerbach's conclusion follow from his premises in the argument about idolatries—unless one is prepared to renounce science, ethics, all human knowledge, as well as religion, on the ground that the mere presence of outworn concepts and absurdities, both in the past and the present, involves also absence of truth and inability on the part of growing human consciousness to discern it in the midst of half truths and errors.[4] When put to this trial for idolatry, or subjectivism, religion comes out as well as, if not better than, most of its colleagues; for although it may and often does abandon this or that element of its faith, yet as an historical fact "it does not *pari passu* lose faith in trans-subjective, transcendent, superhuman Reality as such."[5] It is just "that attribution by the soul of the most objective validity and transcendent worth to" what Feuerbach

[1] *E.* I., p. 34. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 35. [3] *Ibid.*, pp. 35–6.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 36–7. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

regards as a " mere projection of a self utterly shut up within this self's own sheer human musings, which gives religion all its specific power." [1] No wonder that the Baron marvelled that so fundamental a characteristic of human life should be called an "illusion." If that is illusory, what is not?

One other objection of Feuerbach's should not be overlooked: [2] his allegation that since we must think of God anthropomorphically we cannot assume that He exists except as an apotheosis of human abstractions. The attributes by which we describe God and which, Feuerbach argues, alone give Him meaning, he pretends retain their significance only as characteristics applicable to the human beings to whom they belong. But anthropomorphism, as von Hügel pointed out, is nothing new to religion. If the dictum of St. Thomas Aquinas is true, that " everything that is apprehended by any apprehending being, is apprehended according to the manner of this being's apprehension," [3] then all our knowledge is anthropomorphic, although we may be most keenly aware of it only in an important matter like religion. Even if man can never get out of his own skin, that does not decide how far that skin may stretch. It seems to stretch far enough to include a painful sense of the inadequacy of human life and knowledge and a dim awareness of something infinitely greater and other than itself. And this sense is so deep-rooted in humanity and so demonstrably impels men on to and beyond their noblest achievements in every field of life that to accept it as basely anthropomorphic, in the sense of being illusory, or merely anthropomorphic, in the sense of being, like the little toe, only a curious feature of the human constitution, is ultimately suicidal.[4] " There then remains no way out of scepticism, where scepticism is least tolerable and where it is most ruinous, than to carry right up into religion what we believe and practise in our practical life and in our science. Just as we simply admit the existence of countless realities, more

[1] *E.* I., p. 37.

[2] The need of brevity here prevents any exposition of either Feuerbach's arguments or von Hügel's rejoinders in all their varieties and shades, but the footnotes facilitate any desired reference to the text.

[3] *E.* I., p. 40.

[4] Cf. *E. L.*, p. 242.

or less different from, though only lower than or equal to ourselves; and as we frankly grant the real influence of these realities upon ourselves and our knowledge of them, since such influence and knowledge are prior to, and are the material of, our discursive reasoning about them; so also let us simply admit the existence of a perfect Reality, sufficiently like us to be able to penetrate and to move us through and through, the which, by so doing, is the original and persistent cause of this our noblest dissatisfaction with anything and all things merely human.[1] Certainly no other explanation has ever been given which does not sooner or later mis-state or explain away the very data, and the immense dynamic force of the data, to be explained. But this, the only adequate, explanation moves us on at once, from the quicksands of religion as illusion, to the rock of Religion as the witness and vehicle of Reality." [2]

Virtually inseparable from his treatment of the infinite is von Hügel's discussion of what the experience of eternal life contributes to the idea of the supernatural.[3] Religion alone, and only in its profoundest representatives, has furnished men with a concrete sense and conviction of a reality of superlative, permanent worth as being to some extent presupposed and experienced throughout all human activity. Philosophy, ethics, speculation have been able merely to analyse this religious belief and to find within their own

[1] Cf. *M. E.* II., pp. 282–3: "With the explicit assent of practically all the great Mystics of all ages and countries, and the implicit instinct, and at least partial, practical admission, of all sane and developed human souls; we will then have to postulate here, not merely an intellectual reasoning from finite data, which would somehow result in so operative a sense of the Infinite; nor even simply a mental category of Infinitude which, evoked in man by and together with the apprehension of things finite, would, somehow, have so massive, so explosive an effect against our finding satisfaction in the other categories, categories which, after all, would not be more subjective, than itself: but the ontological presence of, and the operative penetration by the Infinite Spirit, within the human spirit. This Spirit's presence would produce, on occasion of man's apprehension or volition of things contingent and finite, the keen sense of disappointment, of contrast with the Simultaneous, Abiding, and Infinite."

[2] *E.* I., pp. 40–41.

[3] On this entire subject see Evelyn Underhill's *Man and the Supernatural*, London (Methuen), 1927; and, dealing specifically with the Baron, H. D. Oakeley, *History and Progress and other Essays and Addresses*, London (Allen and Unwin), 1923, Chap. V., "Time and Eternal Life." Cf. pp. 242 ff. below.

levels " intimations and requirements converging towards such a conviction." [1] But they have never produced as vivid an experience or as insistent an affirmation of the Reality behind those intimations and requirements as religion has done.

St. Augustine provides one of the classic illustrations of the experience. At the window in Ostia, he and his mother, Monica, both deeply concentrated in religious thought, seemed to " touch," as it were, " by an impulse of all their heart," God Himself, God Who *is*, the refreshing Contrast [2] to the rushing, fretful world of nature. He was overwhelmed by a feeling of God's transcendence of time, of His simultaneity, by the feeling that He alone sustains and contains this fragile, fleeting universe. It was the experience, so he was personally convinced, of God, of something totally Other and yet the Home of all being; the experience of the Ultimate Reality, the Eternal Goodness. He felt that if that faint but unforgettable " touch " were to be continued, he would know the meaning of eternal life and of the words, " enter thou into the joy of thy Lord." [3]

The joy of the Lord, the knowledge and the love of God, life with God, that, said the Baron, is what religion means by eternal life.[4] The truly religious soul has no interest in unending existence for its own sake; apart from God such

[1] *E. L.*, p. 382.

[2] The charm of otherness. Cf. *R. G.*, p. 119: " We have, in the case of succession and simultaneity, a likeness in unlikeness and an unlikeness in likeness between man and God, and the point especially to insist upon here is, I feel sure, that the unlikeness in God is part, a large part, of our joy in Him, of the support and supplementation, the restfulness which the Psalmist found and we all still can find in Him."

[3] *E. L.*, p. 90; cf. *E. L.*, pp. 88–89; *M. E.* II., p. 248; *E.* II., p. 141; *E.* I., p. 86. Compare Suso's rapturous vision, mentioned by W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, New York (Scribner's), 1899, p. 174: " One such, which came to him on St. Agnes' Day, he thus describes : ' It was without form or mode, but contained within itself the most entrancing delight. His heart was athirst yet satisfied. It was a breaking forth of the sweetness of eternal life, felt as present in the stillness of contemplation. Whether he was in the body or out of the body, he knew not.' It lasted about an hour and a half; but gleams of its light continued to visit him at intervals for some time after."

[4] Eternal life for von Hügel " is essentially life as it is actually lived, though its timelessness may be concealed under human conditions." W. L. Bevan, " Baron von Hügel's ' Eternal Life,' " *Constructive Quarterly*, June 1913, p. 355.

existence would be hell itself. " Not where I breathe, but where I love, I live." [1] " The specifically religious desire of Immortality begins, not with Immortality, but with God; it rests upon God; and it ends in God. The religious soul does not seek, find, or assume its own immortality; and thereupon seek, find, or assume God. But it seeks, finds, experiences, and loves God—because of these experiences which lie right within the noblest joys, fears, hopes, necessities, certainties which emerge within any and every field of its life here below—it finds, rather than seeks, Immortality of a certain kind. The . . . growth of the belief in Immortality amongst the Jews, a belief fully endorsed and greatly developed by our Lord, was entirely thus—not from Immortality of no matter what kind to God, but from God to a special kind of Immortality.[2] Especially does Christ always keep God and the Kingdom of God central, as the beginning and end of all, and the Immortality peripheral, as but the extension and full establishment of the soul's supernatural union with, and of its supernatural activity towards, God and man." [3]

Lest St. Augustine be dismissed as a prejudiced witness, on the ground that he was both a Christian and a philosopher, let us consider another example of the sense of the eternal, one presumably less prejudiced, since it makes no direct, positive affirmation of eternal life. In primitive Buddhism, the Wheel of Generation, " the countless, endless-seeming

[1] Robert Southwell, " I dye alive."

[2] Cf. Some of the " magnificent utterances in the Psalms . . . such as, ' With Thee is the fountain of Life, and in Thy light shall we see light ' (xxxvi. 9); and ' Whom have I in heaven but Thee? and, having Thee, I delight not in aught that is on earth. My flesh and my heart faileth, but God is the rock of my heart and my portion for ever ' (lxxiii. 25, 26). Thus here, without any speculation concerning time and eternity, we have the fundamental elements of Eternal Life, the human spirit finding its peace and support in the Divine Spirit, its origin and home." *E. L.*, p. 48. Cf. *E. L.*, p. 22; *E.* I., pp. 76, 80; *L. N.*, p. xxxii.; *M. E.* II., p. 198; *E.* II., pp. 275–6.

[3] *E.* I., p. 197. Cf. *E. L.*, p. 396: " Neither an Eternal Life that is already fully achieved here below, nor an Eternal Life to be begun and known solely in the beyond, satisfies " the requirements of religion, in its fullest development. " But only an Eternal Life already begun and truly known in part here, though fully to be achieved and completely to be understood hereafter, corresponds to the deepest longings of man's spirit touched by the prevenient Spirit, God."

reincarnations," is " always in strictest correlation with *Nirvana*; Nirvana was longed for as an end to, an escape from, the sickening horror of that dizzying Wheel." [1] Whether or not Nirvana involves total annihilation of conscious personality is here irrelevant. The pertinent fact is that the primitive Buddhist, seeing life entirely as a hopeless succession of unconnected events and impressions, and his own future as deprived of any stable memory of " self-identical personality," protested spontaneously from the very bottom of his being and sought in Nirvana something other than this ghastly change.[2] In regard to the judgment of the facts, the primitive Buddhist was hasty and one-sided. Our consciousness reveals as much duration as successiveness. Even successiveness itself could not exist for us were there not something in us that does not change, " or, at least, that is in touch with, that is penetrated with, something that abides and *is*, to explain how it comes that we have a consciousness of change and flux at all, and, above all, how it is that we so keenly suffer under, are so driven to desperation by, the impression or opinion that everything is entirely changeful, is completely flowing." [3] But in regard to the judgment of values, supposing that the universe is merely a flux, the Buddhist expressed the irresistible conviction of the human race: without something eternally worthwhile, life is not worth having; it increases in value as we rise from meaningless distraction towards something quite other, Nirvana,—or the simultaneity of God, as von Hügel would say was the full implication.

Since like any other human trait the awareness of the eternal varies greatly in intensity, there are always many

[1] *R. G.*, p. 214. Cf. *R. G.*, p. 246; *E. L.*, p. 10.

[2] Cf. *E.* I., p. 213.

[3] *R. G.*, pp. 215–17. Cf. *E.* II., p. 50; also T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Oxford (Clarendon Press), 1924, p. 59: " The relation of events to each other as in time implies their equal presence to a subject which is not in time. As little could there be a relation of objects outside each other, or in space, if they were not equally related to a subject which they are not outside; a subject of which outsideness to anything is not a possible attribute; which by its synthetic action constitutes that relation, but is not itself determined by it."

people to maintain either that they can give no meaning to the phrase or that an absolute eternal is not logically necessary. As music cannot be profitably discussed with the tone-deaf, so here there is no discussion with the first group. As far as logical necessity is concerned—that domineering stepmother of philosophy—, there is probably no real permanence in the physical world; whether a thing is there held to be permanent or not depends largely upon our purposes and needs. That does not mean, however, that there is not permanence, unity, continuity, in some form of consciousness, perhaps absolute permanence in absolute Thought.[1] Others, uneasy in the proximity of absolutes, argue for a relative eternity, claiming that consciousness itself is aware not of permanent values but of durable ones,[2] which, apparently on account of their supposedly longer duration, we may roughly term eternal as far as we ephemeral earthlings are concerned. But in the end this is only a comparison of the more with the less transient, and the fact that they are both recognized as transient, as being strictly temporal and non-eternal, yet remains unexplained. What von Hügel is busy with is the widespread apprehension of "*all* mere Succession and Fleetingness," which awakens, and is felt in contrast with, "a sense of Simultaneity and Abidingness, as somehow superior to and normative of, as somehow alone giving dignity and worth to, all that flux and relativity." [3]

The Baron's conception of eternity may be further elucidated by a comparison of it with time and duration. Following James Ward and Bergson, von Hügel summarized time as a succession of fixed, mutually exclusive moments of identical quantity and quality, each in juxtaposition and exterior to the other,—in short, a mathematical time,

[1] As proposed, *e.g.*, by Édouard Le Roy, *L'Exigence Idéaliste et le Fait de l'Évolution*, Paris (Boivin), 1927.

[2] *E.g.* Alfred Loisy, *Mémoires*, Paris (Nourry), 1931, Vol. II., p. 561: "Il [H. J. Holtzmann] s'accordait avec von Hügel pour admettre que . . . 'le sens de l'éternité en contraste du temps, du simultané en sa différence du successif, est un élément d'une importance capitale dans la vie religieuse.'—Ceci est moins clair pour moi, qui n'ai pas le sens de l'immuable. Si l'on veut parler du sentiment qui nous fait apprécier les choses passagères d'après des valeurs durables, éternelles par rapport à nous, j'en demeure d'accord."

[3] *E. L.*, p. 154.

representable by equidistant points, such as clocks register on their dials, " a conception really derived from space-perception and exterior, measurable *things*." [1] This time is the clock-time of science, schedules, and social engagements, not the duration of inner experience. That duration is essentially qualitative and incommunicable, composed of a variously rapid succession of heterogeneous spiritual forces and experiences, emotions and volitions, " each affecting and colouring, each affected and coloured by, all the others, and all producing together a living harmony and organic unity, all which constitutes the essentially unpicturable experience of the living *person*." [2] Thus, as Bergson emphasized, human duration differs in part from the time of things, and, as Aquinas noted,[3] is partially affined to eternity. In inner experience, past, present, and future are not merely successive but are overlapping, mutually modifying, interpenetrative, and in that respect we in varying degrees transcend " the

[1] *M. E.* I., p. 106; *E.* II., pp. 52–3; *E.* I., pp. 69–70. On von Hügel's treatment of time, duration, and eternity, see Steere, *op. cit.*, pp. 75–85 ff.

[2] *M.E.* I., p. 106; *E.* II., pp. 52–3.

[3] " Aquinas insists . . . upon a mode of existence lying between Time and Eternity, which he calls *Ævum*. ' Even supposing Time to last for ever, we can still distinguish within it a beginning and an end, by noting various parts of it. Eternity, on the other hand, is all together (*tota simul*).' But ' *Ævum* is intermediate between Time and Eternity, participating in each; since, whilst Time has a before and an after,' and ' Eternity neither has, nor can suffer, a before nor an after,' ' the *Ævum* has not,' of necessity, ' either a before or an after, although they can be conjoined to it.' Now ' spiritual creatures, as regards their affections and intellections, in which there exists succession, are measured by Time; as regards their natural being, they are measured by the *Ævum*; and as regards their vision of glory, they participate in Eternity.' . . .

" We have here an interesting groping after what M. Bergson now describes under the designation of *Durée*, the succession which is never all change, since its constituents, in varying degrees, overlap and interpenetrate each other; a succession which can be anything from just above the chain of mutually exclusive, ever equal moments—artificial, clock-time—to just below the entire interpenetration and *Totum Simul* of Eternity. Taken thus, the conception . . . indicates that man, even in the beyond, will—*pace* St. Thomas—still remain more or less subject to *duration*, though there he will be indefinitely more penetrated by, or aware of, that Eternity, that Eternal God, Who already here and now supports and penetrates him through and through. And this same conception suggests that even here and now, in his deepest experiences, man apprehends and loves that Eternity by means of and within, and as akin to, yet contrasting with, his own *duration*, his quasi-eternity."—*E. L.*, pp. 105–6.

temporal aspect of the time-sequence "[1] and approach a simultaneity similar to eternity. Clock-time, then, stands beneath us, as a quite automatic convention and necessary simplification of duration,—a compromise, "the joint product of Duration, which alone is truly experienced, and of Space, which alone is clearly picturable."[2] And eternity stands above us, the unattainable goal and limit of our partial simultaneity. Because we find that our own experience is richer and more satisfying the more it is concentrated and knit together, we least worthily conceive perfect life and reality, God, as absolutely simultaneous. "The very fullness of His life leaves no room or reason for succession and our poor need of it."[3] But if clock-time is a convention devised for limited terrestrial purposes, and if the advance of personality lies in its approach to simultaneity, we seem justified in supposing—if we have any right to suppose at all—that in "the other life" "the clock-time convention will completely cease, and that, though the sense of Duration is not likely to disappear[4] (since, in this life at least, this sense is certainly not merely phenomenal for man,[5] and its entire absence would apparently make man into God), the category of Simultaneity will, as a sort of

[1] *E.* II., p. 141. St. Augustine studied the experience "of a melody or of a poem, in which the series of sounds is not a simple succession, however much conceived together, 'but is,' as demands Dr. [Pringle] Pattison, 'significant, and in a proper sense a whole.'"

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 53; cf. *M. E.* II., p. 247.

[3] *E.* I., p. 93; cf. *E.* II., pp. 65–6; *E.* I., pp. 69–70; *E. L.*, p. 384. Nevertheless, that need not mean that God is not aware of succession, that in that respect His experience is more limited than ours. Might He not "transcend," without being ignorant of, succession, in some such way as that of one who fully appreciates the appeal of a mediocre picture yet prefers and lives in what is believed to be a higher sphere of artistic appreciation?

[4] *E. L.*, p. 366: "We are indeed actually touched, penetrated, and supported by the purely Eternal; and yet . . . we ourselves shall never, either here or hereafter, be more than quasi-eternal, durational. . . . Only this double sense will save us from the perilous alternatives of an uncreaturely sheer fixity and an animal flux and change. We thus gain a perennial source of continuity and calm." Cf. A. E. Taylor, *Faith of a Moralist*, Series I., p. 230: "The task of putting off temporality can no more be finished at a given date than the evaluation of a 'surd' can ever be completed by writing down the last significant digit of the unending 'decimal.'"

[5] Cf. *E.* I., pp. 87, 93; *M. E.* II., p. 248.

strong background-consciousness, englobe and profoundly unify the sense of Duration. And the more God-like the soul, the more would this sense of Simultaneity predominate over the sense of Duration." [1]

But the Baron, of course, does not conceive of Eternal Life merely as a regulative principle, an ideal limit towards which our quasi-eternity may approach, but rather as revealing a fully extant Eternal Object, God.[2] His argument for the reality of an eternal being follows the same design as his argument for the infinite. Obscurely yet effectively pervading our whole experience of the passing, finite universe is the sense of a contrasting, eternal Other.[3] The awareness of this Eternal Object, the Baron claims, alone can account for the oppression we feel at the thought of being confined to the utterly transient and subjective or to the merely human. This awareness is so essential for the leavening of civilization, constitutes " so decidedly the very flower and test of our fullest manhood," [4] that to call it illusory is to repudiate humanity at its best. And the Eternal cannot be simply Spirit in the making, solely Becoming as opposed to Being, since we have no other instance of a mere potentiality's causing such joy and pain, exerting such incalculable influence, " and all by means of just this vivid and persistent impression that this Becoming is an already realized Perfection." [5] Hence any assumption of a finite or an "emergent" God is not only contrary to ordinary, empirical inference but flies directly in the face of the facts of higher religious experience, especially the central facts of adoration and grace, which presuppose the existence of God, the entirely self-conscious source of all abiding goods and " energizings," in Whom men live and Whom alone they can adore.[6]

What is this discourse on Eternal Life but a religious rhapsody? And how the words are bandied about! One moment von Hügel talks of the human experience of eternal life, and the next he is explaining what the object experienced

[1] *M. E.* II., pp. 248–9; cf. *E. L.*, pp. 302, 386–7, and pp. 252 ff. below.
[2] *E. L.*, p. 302. [3] Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 231–2, 365–6.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 384–5. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 385. [6] *Ibid.*, pp. 383, 385.

is.[1] This is natural, however, since for a realist and above all for a religious person the chief value of that experience pertains to what is supposed to be its object, God. But why did he not say so in the beginning? Were it not all the time merely one of God's masks, eternity might perhaps be dead and dull;[2] its awareness might contribute no more than the awareness of duration to "the very flower and test of our fullest manhood." We imagined, some might say, that the Baron would show that scientific method or the mathematical concept of the infinite leads to God. We thought he would prove God to be present in something from which by definition He was excluded, thus pulling the more into the less, "making the finite comprehend infinity."[3] But instead of offering such an original contribution, the old wizard does nothing but beg the question. When he talks about the eternal, he means, after all, God, the religious eternal. As he starts with God, he is naturally always able to find Him at the end. To be sure, we have been warned not to expect any "proofs" of God's existence; we have been informed that the awareness of the Eternal is a specifically religious experience; but we thought that was only prudence or modesty on the Baron's part. Our opinion was strengthened by his use of philosophic terms; we assumed that he was showing how favourable philosophy was to religion. But all the time it was merely religion (in philosophic guise) affirming itself. It was only a rough survey of science, ethics, and some features of religious experience, in the light of religious experience itself, which last was either to be accepted on its own merits or to be rejected. And in the end, as von Hügel asserted, since philosophy neither creates nor irrefragably endorses these religious awarenesses, it becomes a matter of religion's own autonomy.

[1] Cf. *E.L.*, p. 378: "Eternal life consists in the most real of relations between the most living realities—the human spirit, and the Eternal Spirit, God; and in the keen sense of His Perfection, Simultaneity and Prevenience, as against our imperfection, successiveness and dependence." And *E. L.*, p. 382: "Eternal Life . . . is . . . the effect, the action, of a living Reality, or the effect, the interaction of several such realities. Hence Eternal Life is no substitute for either God or man, but it is the activity, the effect, of God, or of man, or of both."

[2] *E. L.*, p. 50.

[3] R. Browning, "Easter Day."

Religion and its intimations, in the last analysis, stand, if at all, on their own feet. One is or is not religious, seemingly without further argument, excuse, or justification. Leaving these preliminary philosophical skirmishes, then, let us now turn to the Baron's conception of what religion is and of how that independent power works.

RELIGION

SYNOPSIS

Religion involves personal relations with one or more superhuman, divine realities—Is belief in God illusory?—The reply depends largely upon the strength of religious experience—Special intellectual difficulties of supernatural religion: miracle, creation, revelation—God's supernatural reality a ground for tolerance—Von Hügel's belief in the superiority of Catholic Christianity—The importance of the institutional element of religion—Sacramentalism; the necessity of a spiritual utilization of matter—Substitutes for the church—What is "the church"?—Sectarianism—The advantages of the church over its substitutes—The supernatural soul of the church—The institution as the purgatory of the individual—The rational element of religion—Religion and philosophy—The mystical element—The interrelation of the elements of religion—Are there not other elements?

CHAPTER III

RELIGION

" O how amiable are thy dwellings, thou Lord of hosts!
My soul hath a desire and longing to enter into the courts of the Lord: my heart and my flesh rejoice in the living God.
Yea, the sparrow hath found her an house, and the swallow a nest where she may lay her young, even thy altars, O Lord of hosts, my King and my God."[1]

THE intimations of the supernatural reviewed in the last chapter, all that " dim and dumb Religiosity," as von Hügel called it, furnish the material out of which the historic institutions of religion are made and stammer the questions which those more developed institutions formulate and answer.[2] The intimations may arouse a " Cosmic Emotion or some other Pantheistic feeling or outlook "; [3] they may even create a sense of dependence; but unless they lead to " an attitude involving a belief, however inarticulate, in some Superhuman Beings or in one Superhuman Being," they have not yet reached religion. Religion, as the Baron understood it, is " evidential, trans-subjective," involving personal relations with its ontologically real Object.[4] Anything short of that, although it may contain many lesser features of religion, is strictly speaking no more religion than a girl is a woman. Contemporary Buddhism, for example, may appear as a corruption of Primitive Buddhism; but the former, " penetrated by belief in supernatural beings," is a religion, while the latter, in spite of the sublimity to which it sometimes attains, " appears rather as a grand prelude, an impressive clearing of the stage for religion than as a religion proper." So too Confucianism

[1] Psalm lxxxiv.

[2] *E.* I., p. 66; *E.* II., pp. 143–4. The correctness of their formulations and answers is not here prejudged.

[3] *E.* II., p. 158.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 157.

is more a moral code than a religion in its sharpest sense. The dissatisfaction with mutability, as found in Primitive Buddhism, and the moral fidelity of Confucianism " are not only great things in their kind, they are also things variously necessary, as stimulations, checks, materials, to Religion. Only they are not Religion proper, not direct parts of Religion itself." [1]

A definition is a man, in the sense that it reveals the sympathies, the knowledge, and the ignorance of its maker. Also, as Dr. Webb has remarked, " Religion neither can be nor need be defined," [2] because almost all definitions of it " presuppose for the understanding of them the very knowledge which they are supposed to impart." [3] The Baron was acquainted with immanental and subjective definitions of religion, with explanations of it in terms of functional psychology, sociology, biology, and the rest, none of which he could find thoroughly acceptable or illuminating. Although his knowledge of religions other than Christianity was admittedly second-hand (but no more so than that of the vast majority of Occidental religious writers), he had an advantage which some of them proudly disclaim,[4] namely, a deep, thoroughly developed, active

[1] *E.* II., p. 158.

[2] C. C. J. Webb, *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, London (Nisbet), 1924, p. 3.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[4] " It is argued that any abiding or systematic commitment in religion necessarily ties or atrophies the mind; that it is therefore useless or dangerous to listen to any man committed to a particular religion—indeed to any man originally trained and hence moulded by any one of the countless religions that have existed or that still exist upon this our earth. What is the good, it may be said, of listening to this man—a Papist? Do we accept Popery—or, even if we think it not altogether false, do we accept it as altogether true? Will not his mind be continually deflected by his incorporation in that gigantic system? . . . The man may mean well, but he cannot look facts in the face. . . . Many a man nowadays implies or perhaps even says, that the only adequate way of knowing religion is never to have known it. . . . To know religion in general, we require in the first instance to know religion in particular, to have lived it, to have been trained by it, to retain the most vivid, the most detailed, the most sympathetic understanding of its workings, of its temper, of its fruits. . . . We can all only use what we have got, clinging to the best we can find, praying for more light to see what is better and best, and guarding ourselves against all vehemence, all lack of generosity, all putting a limit to our ever vigilant docility."—*R. G.*, pp. 24–7.

religious sense, which permitted him to enter into the spirit of religions other than his own and to recognize sources of power and failings in them as well as in Christianity. All his training and experience convinced him that the ideal of Roman Catholic Christianity (interpreted, incidentally, as generously as possible) is the norm of what religion is and should be,[1]—although he did not expect others whose experience of the world and whose constitution were different to agree with him. The heart of Catholicism, according to his interpretation of history, his own devotion, and that of his co-religionists, is an all-animating belief in God, a supernatural life, nurtured and patterned, in this case, in accordance with the great orthodox tradition of Western Christendom. Hence wherever he found traces of a workaday, vital (as opposed to a distant or theoretical) consciousness of the supernatural,[2] " a sense of the Otherness, the Distinct Reality, the Personalism of God," in any way akin to his own awareness of the divine, there to some degree he recognized definite religion.[3] But wherever that sense of God's reality and paramount importance is lost—as it often is, owing to its being absorbed and transformed by subtly different or quite distinct conceptions, valuations, and practices, of passing fashions in economics, politics, ethics, science, or philosophy—, there von Hügel felt that the rare spirit of religion had evaporated too.[4]

Aside from the fact that a few people seem to possess no religious sense (which, however, proves as little against religion as colour-blindness does against the hues of the rainbow), there are many obstacles to the treatment of all religious data in the Baron's uncompromisingly theistic manner. The variety of objects worshipped and the

[1] Cf. *M. E.* II., pp. 266–8; *R. G.*, p. 14; *E.* I., pp. 134–5; *L. N.*, pp. 9, 56.

[2] *E.* I., pp. 25, 43, 48. Cf. " Religion itself is . . . consciousness of the strictly supernatural," which is the " kernel of Otto's . . . numinous." " It is this immediate recognition of the numinous, the wholly other and transcendent, in persons, things, events, which is the root of worship, and so of religion."—A. E. Taylor, *Faith of a Moralist*, Series II., pp. 156, 157, 186.

[3] *E.* I., p. 158; cf. *E.* I., p. 23.

[4] *E.* I., p. 67.

intellectual and the moral contradictions involved therein possibly suggest a nightmare rather than a divine revelation. The Bible alone, for instance, presents God and His saints under almost every aspect of moral turpitude;[1] what is wanting in the Bible is unstintingly provided by pagan religions. How can there be anything more in all this than a superstitious devotion to transfigured human aberrations?

This particular objection, von Hügel noted, is somewhat headlong, since it overlooks the undeniable goodness and beauty which religion has brought into the world. But he relied chiefly upon his *tu quoque* argument: if one regarded the scientific development of the human race in the same indiscriminate and jaundiced fashion, one would conclude that it too, or any other major activity, such as art and ethics in their vicissitudes, was only sound and fury, signifying nothing.[2]

This *tu quoque* argument has at least two weaknesses: one should show clearly why a method of arguing supposedly relevant to science is therefore relevant to religion also (otherwise one is merely asked to believe a minor miracle because one has succumbed to a major one); and one should show whether the general trust to be put in religion, if the argument is relevant, necessarily vouches for the truth of the particular matter in point. In regard to the first consideration, we have seen that the Baron pleads for a carrying over into religion of the realism of science and ordinary life, on the ground that only thereby can we escape a ruinous scepticism. But this scepticism is ruinous only from the religious point of view; from a purely secular or naturalistic point of view such scepticism might be a wholesome emancipation from error. Hence for one entirely unaware of the desirability of religion there is no more obligation to forsake scepticism than there is for a non-musical person to become musical. The supposed obligation is merely the regret of a certain type of religious person that one without that type of religion should be thus incomplete. The Baron's argument is almost equally irrelevant

[1] *E.* I., p. 26.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 44–5.

for a religious person, since, as von Hügel has reiterated, a person of that type is at bottom incurably realistic and believing, and may have far more faith in the reality of his religious object or objects of worship than in the scientific realism which he is asked to take as his model.

But—turning now to the second consideration—even granting that the argument is universally compelling, what is it other than an expression of faith that behind the multiple forms of worship there is a reality better reached through some of these forms (especially those of the higher religions and notably those of Christianity) than others? Just as von Hügel's critical realism in science vouched for no one particular fact but expressed the trust that one could best apprehend physical reality by realistic assumptions, so strictly speaking his method here does not of itself vouch for the supremacy of any particular religion or religious conception of God. If we or the Baron thought he was justifying contemporary science and a contemporary presentation of Christianity, we were inadvertently loading his argument with more cargo than its logical structure permits it to carry. In the end he says merely, "It is best to postulate that science reveals a mysterious, predominantly physical something, and that religion likewise reveals a similarly mysterious, predominantly spiritual something." This arid postulate we transform almost unconsciously by our education, personal intuitions, and prejudices, as follows: "Science reveals the world which we learned about through our studies in chemistry, geology, astronomy, philosophy, through our travels, walks, camping, gardening, and games. Surely, you know what the world is! And religion reveals God Whom we prayed to so hastily and pleasantly as children, Whom we took so seriously as adolescents, Whom in maturity we still think most highly of, like to have around, occasionally fear, at times reverently adore, and then as naturally ignore. Surely you know what God is!" And the point is that we do (or must believe we do), in some doubtless largely fabulous and certainly vague but vivid way, apprehend both physical realities and God. Without

this preliminary experience we should never have any clue for the instructive disentangling of the otherwise overwhelming welter of conflicting religious and scientific facts and theories.[1]

Guided by his religious sense, then, the Baron thought he was able to distinguish, in the intricate data collected by the comparative study of religions, partly true from almost wholly false conceptions and practices connected with the supernatural; just as a devout believer, although untrained in exegesis, history, or theology, is able to distinguish the noble from the base in the Psalms or in religious literature other than his own, once the meaning has made its way through exotic phrase or mode of thought. The moral degradations, for example, associated through the ages with religion and especially with belief in the supernatural he felt were more accidental and apparent than intrinsic and real. Religion, because it is only one and a very aggressive element in man's personality, needs to be checked and purged by his moral sense, philosophy, science, and other "energisings and intimations" for its own truest development and that of his complicated nature.[2] Also most of what seems morally repulsive to us in earlier stages of religion turns out to be a real if slight advance in morality, if a given stage is compared not with the latest stage which we by the help of intervening centuries have reached, but, more fairly, with the stage from which it has just emerged.[3] Even if religion inevitably makes certain abuses possible, those would not outweigh, according to the Baron, its self-correcting advantage in preserving for humanity an increasing consciousness of the supernatural holiness and goodness of God.[4]

[1] This seems to be the conclusion to which Professor Norman Kemp Smith, much imbued with von Hügel's thought, arrives when he writes: "Divine Existence is more than merely credible: it is immediately experienced; and is experienced in increasing degree in proportion as the individual, under the discipline and through the way of life prescribed by religion in this or that of its great traditional forms, is enabled to supplement his initial experiences by others of a more definite character."—*Is Divine Existence Credible?* Annual Philosophical Lecture, Henrietta Hertz Trust, British Academy, 1931, Proceedings, Vol. xvii, London (H. Milford), p. 28.

[2] *E.* I., p. 46. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 47. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

Among the intellectual difficulties connected with belief in the supernatural, particularly as it manifests itself in Christianity, are those of miracle, creation, and revelation.[1] Von Hügel believed that the supernatural should not be identified with the miraculous.[2] The supernatural might exist without miracles, but miracles, as a lesser manifestation of the greater supernatural category, cannot exist without the supernatural. In a miracle, the Baron taught, something unique and believed to come from God occurs. These unique events, effected either in mind or matter, are only striking examples of His actual, but generally faintly appreciated, immanence in the universe. "Grave difficulties" arise only when these experiences "are interpreted as meaning that the spiritual or psychical or physical effects of Miracle constitute direct breaches within (as it were) the phenomenal rind and level of natural reality—breaches that can be strictly demonstrated to be such by Natural Science itself."[3]

Huvelin admitted, "Le miracle m'est très antipathique,"[4] but of von Hügel's belief, aside from the generalities noted above, one can only surmise. As a good Roman Catholic he must have accepted as *de fide* many miracles and attendant doctrines, such as the resurrection of Christ which, he contended, cannot be accepted unless it has some (prudently undefined) basis in historical fact and is thus susceptible of scientific treatment.[5] The "uniqueness" of miracles cannot be such as to put them entirely out of the natural order; otherwise we should not be aware of them at all, as the supernatural

[1] Some of the difficulties involved in a personalistic conception of God will be noted below, esp. pp. 174–190.

[2] *E.* I., p. 197; *L. N.*, p. xxiv.

[3] *E.* I., pp. 57–8. Miracles, in fact, cause trouble only when they are miracles! Nor need they ever fear a "demonstration" against them by science, for science demonstrates only what is scientific; what it cannot as yet manage, it must assume, on pain of treason to itself, that it can later manage. It cannot afford to demonstrate that anything is exempt from the natural order of science; such a demonstration itself would be proof of its dominion, proof that what eludes science is subject to scientific demonstration.

[4] *S. L.*, p. 62.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 18 ff., 30; *E.* I., pp. 268–92, 40, 187.

communes with us through the natural. No matter how strange or rare it may be, a miracle's theoretic amenability to scientific as well as to religious "explanation" must thus never be denied, even though up to any given moment science has devised no means of coping with it. But a miracle's chief value is not its singularity but the meaning that it may convey to religious people. If the resurrection of Christ is in some form an historic fact open like any other to scientific investigation, that naturalistic interest is secondary for religion, compared to its importance as a revelation of the character of the supernatural. Von Hügel, then, would seem to assert that signs and wonders have always existed and met a demand, that they can be interpreted in purely scientific fashion as well as with any degree of religious falsity or insight (which displays them as miracles for those who can appreciate them), but that blessed are they who have not seen miracles and yet believe in the supernatural.[1]

The widespread doctrines of creative evolutionists and the teachings of Whitehead about the constant production of novelty and the uniqueness of all events, "as one-time occurrences,"[2] have made us more aware of the constant, universal presence of creation than were our predecessors a hundred years ago, without, however, in any way banishing its mystery. Although everything in nature shows traces of a beginning, nevertheless so inexplicable are the origins which we are able to observe within the universe

[1] To supplement von Hügel's sketchiness on this matter, see Taylor, *Faith of a Moralist*, Series II, Chap. IV. Note Lester-Garland's summary: "It appears then that von Hügel conceived a miracle as an occurrence, inward or outward, which is, and is consciously apprehended as, unique in the most complete sense of the word; but that as far from constituting a breach or violation of any lower kind of order, it is in essence a sort of intensive realization of the supreme principle of order beneath which all other lower kinds must be subsumed and which gives to them such degree of permanence and reality as they possess. In contrast with this he seems to have thought of the Supernatural as a steady, all-pervasive influence, always at work, always in multitudinous ways penetrating, or seeking to penetrate, the Natural and to raise it to a higher level. Its manifestations vary in vividness and intensity, but there is nothing essentially catastrophic about them."—*Op. cit.*, pp. 68–9.

[2] Cf. N. Kemp Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 9 f.

that a creation of all nature is, even if true, neither picturable nor clearly comprehensible.[1] With such speculations science has no concern; for its demands are filled by the existence of an already extant matter, regardless of whether it was created or is eternal. The behaviour of this matter it can describe without recourse to the ultimate *why* of its existence, because it is content to discover the intermediate *how* in its evolution; [2] and, if the emergent evolutionists are here correct, it must soon forsake attempting to explain *how* one thing develops from another, and merely note *that* one thing succeeds another in such or such a fashion. Concerning creation religion is thus left more or less to its own devices, its only duty being to remain true to its deepest convictions. After discreetly remarking that the Jewish-Christian revelation has taught us that, "as a matter of fact, the universe is not only a creature but a non-eternal one," [3] von Hügel ventured to recall St. Thomas's metaphysical freedom from primitive cosmogony, when the learned saint insisted that the religious core lies not in the age or the timelessness of matter, neither of which would be incompatible with creation, but in its ultimate dependence, regardless of its temporal or non-temporal characteristics, upon God.[4] The religious person, convinced that God is the fountain of life, knows that, as long as he refers all being and intelligibility to Him as their source, he maintains the distinction between the creature which he feels himself and all natural things to be, and the sovereign otherness that he meets in God, thus remaining true to the most delicate demands of his religious nature, no matter how grotesque may be his imagery or his explications.

In a similarly general fashion the Baron discussed revelation. All perplexities concerning what has been revealed, where, how, and to whom, and how such revelations can be preserved, interpreted, and renewed, all "the apparent imperfections in the *content*" of revelation, he brushed diplomatically aside in order to turn to what he considered

[1] *E.* I., p. 48. Cf. Lester-Garland, *op. cit.*, pp. 59–60.
[2] *E.* I., p. 49. [3] *Ibid.* [4] *Ibid.*

to be the underlying question, revelation as "the *form*, the vehicle of all Religion." [1] That this is closely bound to his critical realism appears from his choice of "sheer projection," or "purely subjective elaboration" on the part of mankind, as the antithesis of revelation.

Science questions its object and receives replies; it is dependent for its existence upon the givenness, prevenience, and grace, of its object. It has thus a revelational form similar to, but less explicit than, that of religion. "It is only the specifically religious experience which gives us Revelation at its fullest, not only as to Revelation's content but also as to Revelation's form. For Religion alone brings the vivid revelation of Spirit other than the human—a Spirit so perfect and so richly real as Itself to be the ultimate, overflowingly self-conscious cause of man's very capacity for apprehending It. Nevertheless, such a Self-manifestation of Perfect Spirit, once found and accepted, gives a base, a setting and a crown to all these other self-manifestations of the lesser realities—a base, a setting and a crown which their graduated series, taken as a whole, so greatly requires and which indeed it dimly and semi-consciously prepares yet cannot itself effectuate. And this same Self-manifestation of Spirit and the human spirit's response to It, render superfluous all attempts, always more or less hopeless, to construct God *a priori*, or even to demonstrate Him, from the facts of nature and of human life, by any single, deductive argument of a strictly constraining force. Because Spirit, God, works in our midst and in our depths, we can and we do know Him; because God has been the first to condescend to us and to love us, can we arise and love Him in return." [2]

The way in which the chief religions of the world articulate and evaluate the different aspects of God revealed in religious experience accounts largely for their special strengths and failings. As the supremacy of their dogmas seems necessary to the maintenance of their institutions, they tend to treat their own theology as divine and that of others as false, thus leading to the excesses of bigotry,

[1] *E.* I., p. 55. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

hatred, and malice, which have poisoned history.[1] This tendency, however, is counteracted in the interests of truth and tolerance by the deeper realization that the object of worship, though to some extent like, is even more mysteriously other than, its theological conception. Hence there is always room for other views of reality, which, although they may not be the most satisfactory ones reached, yet possess enough truth by which to save their believers.[2] There is no respectable religious organization so jealous of the salvation to be obtained within its gates that it denies the possibility of gleams of salvation for those who though invincibly ignorant of the best as others see it nevertheless follow the best as seen in their own lights.[3] Thus every soul, whether or not it seeks or uses it, has, if it wants it, grace to escape perdition and to know God better.[4] His belief that God and His truth are to some degree present everywhere [5] explains von Hügel's lack of proselytizing zeal. Realizing that most men do not even

[1] *E.* I., pp. 59–61.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 64–5, 235, 252; *S. L.*, p. 62.

[3] *E.* I., pp. 61–3. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 134: "The Christian doctrine of the Divinity of Jesus . . . is undoubtedly true and deeply enriching. Yet it can be wisely maintained by us only if we simultaneously remember that, however truly God revealed Himself with supreme fullness and in a unique manner in Jesus Christ; yet this same God had not left Himself, still does not leave Himself, without *some* witness to Himself throughout the ages before Christ, and throughout the countries, groups, and even individual souls, whom the message, the fact, of the historic Jesus has never yet reached, or who, in sheer good faith, cannot understand, cannot see Him as He really is. The Unincarnate God has thus a wider range, though a less deep message, than the Incarnate God; and these two Gods are but one and the same God, Who, mysteriously, mostly slowly and almost imperceptibly, prepares or supplements, expresses and otherwise aids Himself, in each way by the other way."

[4] *R. G.*, p. 149; *M. E.* II., p. 92.

[5] *E.* II., p. 39. Cf. "Alle echte Religion ist fur Hügel nicht rein transzendent, sondern irgendwie *incarnational.* Das 'Herabsteigen' des Göttlichen in die kreatürliche Beschränkung ist universell, aber in grösster Reinheit und Fülle vollzieht es sich in Menschen Jesus, in den die göttliche Natur so weit einging, als es bei einer wahrhaft menschlichen Natur überhaupt möglich war. Aber es beschränkt sich nicht auf die geschichtliche Erscheinung Jesu. Die Inkarnation Gottes ist vielmehr eine universelle Tatsache, insofern die göttliche Offenbarung universal ist und alle Religionen der Erde umfasst. Hügel setzt sich in seinem Hauptwerk ausführlich mit Wilhelm Herrmann auseinander, den er ob seiner Beschränkung der Gottesoffenbarung auf den geschicht-

begin to exhaust the treasures of their particular religious "appurtenance," he preferred to see them appreciate their own pastures first before attempting to take up a diet that might prove too rich for them.[1]

The Baron's appreciation of God's universal presence in no way weakened his sense of the differences between religions. He had nothing but pity for the notion that all religions are on the same footing and that, because each one may happen temporarily to be sufficient for its own devotees, there is not, therefore, one which is intrinsically superior to all the rest for the fully awakened soul. Having himself gone through vicissitudes of doubt and stress unto a stable, mellow faith, how could he say that all sorts of religion are the same? Are not "indifferentists" and levellers-down able to see, for instance, that "beautiful as are the finest passages of the Indian hymns [in the Vedas], there is, in the Jewish lyrics and prayers [in the Psalms], a poignant sense of personality, of deepest communion between the loving, penitent, receiving soul and the loving, all-holy, self-giving God, which cannot really be found in those grandiose, but vague, abstract, and pantheistic hymns"?[2] Regarding that poignant sense of personality, communion, love, holiness, and otherness of God as deceitful or unworthy, they may deem time spent in prayer and in songs of thanksgiving and praise pathetically amusing and wasted; but those for von Hügel were authentic notes of true religion. He seems, ultimately, to have attempted no proof of that authenticity but to have assumed it as self-evident for religious people. On characteristics like those he classified in ascending fashion Buddhism, Hinduism, Mohammedanism, Judaism, and, crowning all,

lichen Jesus eines 'Panchristismus' beschuldigt. Aber auch die *volle* Inkarnation Christi beschränkt sich nicht auf die geschichtliche Erscheinung Jesu, sondern bezieht sich auf die gesamte Kirche, die als der 'Leib Christi' eine fortgesetzte Menschwerdung des Gottessohnes bedeutet. In den Sakramenten nimmt Gottes ewige Liebe immer wieder sinnenfällige Gestalt an. Erst diese sinnlichen Zeichen und Mittel vermögen das Leben der Seele mit Gott zur vollen Kraft zu bringen."—Friedrich Heiler, *Im Ringen um die Kirche*, München (Reinhardt), 1931, p. 170.

[1] *L. N.*, pp. xxxix, 102–3, 165.

[2] *R. G.*, p. 220.

Christianity.[1] His criteria, differing somewhat in detail, generally stress, as has been noted, the degree of consciousness of God's reality, otherness, and ethical personalism, but he seems to judge more from impression than from the application of a definite, carefully defended system for measuring and weighing religions.[2] In Christianity he preferred Catholicism to Protestantism, because the former more deliberately acknowledges the supernatural life as essential to religion, at least in regard to asceticism, religious autonomy, and the expansive joy exhibited by saintly lives. He pointed out that Protestants as a whole simply cannot understand the reason for the extreme renunciation and self-sacrifice practised by Christ, St. Francis of Assisi, and many a monk and nun since then who have detached themselves from earthly considerations and ties for a purely religious life;[3] and that they are always wondering more whether a religion is conducive to the welfare of the state or the social order than whether it is remaining true to itself, forgetting that during its first three centuries Christianity was outlawed. Also it disappointed him that Protestantism, although strongly developing the natural virtues of honesty, cleanliness, and a useful application of the mind, does not ordinarily rise above a moralistic piety, or attain much of that expansive joy required by the Roman Catholic Church for the canonization of its saints, even of those who, like St. Catherine of Genoa, are melancholy by nature.[4] How true his remarks are, and what they prove if true, any interested person must, of course, decide for himself.

Now, patient and long-suffering reader, if you love the supernatural without knowing or caring to know exactly

[1] *E.* I., p. 269. Cf. *M. E.* II., pp. 266–8; *R. G.*, p. 14; *L. N.*, pp. 9, 56.

[2] An article on this point, in accordance with von Hügel's thought and yet independent, is Evelyn Underhill's "Christianity and the Claims of Other Religions," in *Essays Catholic and Missionary*, ed. E. R. Morgan, London (S.P.C.K.), 1928. Various criteria for classifying religions as higher or lower appear, to cite only a few recent examples, in Otto's *Idea of the Holy*, pp. 58, 146, 177; Webb's *God and Personality*, pp. 245, 247–51; Oman's *The Natural and the Supernatural*, pp. 358 ff.

[3] See esp. *L. N.*, pp. xxiii–xxv. [4] *S. L.*, pp. 301, 350.

what it is and exactly what you are doing; if you have confidence in the cloudy depositions of your religious sense, whilst realizing that they do not tally exactly with those of others, even with those of the official interpreters of your creed; if in the midst of a thousand actual difficulties in regard to facts and teachings relevant to miracles, creation, and revelation you can hold your mind in peace, absorbed in general principles far above the dust of controversy: then you are in a mood of fitting simplicity, devotion, and generous creativity to listen fruitfully to von Hügel's estimation of the institutional element of religion. That is the absolutely essential body of religion, the outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace. As our body and senses are prerequisite to knowledge, religion must not underrate them.[1] Even the most etherial awareness of the infinite is occasioned by the consciousness of contrasting finites.[2] If God is to be known, He must be apprehended ordinarily through the concrete, the incarnational, the manifestation of Himself in some form capable of being assimilated by our sense-conditioned, although sense-surpassing, human knowledge.[3]

Leaving aside the task of ascertaining how religion first made its appearance on this planet, we find that anybody who develops any religion at all is dependent upon some sort of religious institution or tradition.[4] Even George Fox, who claimed direct inspiration from God, received his inspiration by way of the New Testament, from definitely church documents, permeated with sacramentalism and emphasis upon the material, the traditional, and the institutional, as the medium of the spiritual.[5] Von Hügel's appreciation of the institutional was particularly keen because he knew it intimately, for better and for worse, from his youth up. " I can remember," he writes, " quite plainly that already . . . at five or six years of age, I

[1] *E.* I., p. 70; *E.* II., p. 100. Cf. A. E. Taylor, *Faith of a Moralist*, Series II., pp. 299, 301, 302, 307, 308.
[2] *E.* II., pp. 62–3; *M. E.* II., p. 344; *R. G.*, pp. 139–40.
[3] *E.* I., p. 230; *E.* II., pp. 232–3.
[4] *R. G.*, pp. 18, 138; *E.* II., pp. 14–15; *M. E.* I., p. 51.
[5] *E.* II., pp. 70–7; *L. N.*, pp. 29–31.

possessed a sense, not only of God in the external, especially the organic world, but of a mysterious divine Presence in the churches of Florence." [1] His religious sense was aroused and preserved by Catholic tradition, ritual, architecture, all leading up to and maintaining an invigorating awareness of the Real Presence of God.[2] He believed that the Thing element in religion should be used not merely as an expression of a truth or emotion but also to evoke that truth or emotion, as one kisses one's child not only because one loves it but also in order to love it.[3]

Almost any impartial student of religion, almost any unbiased psychologist in this field, almost any member of one of the world's several great orthodoxies would probably concur with von Hügel's estimation of the place of the sensuous, the material, the traditional, and the institutional as forming the normally necessary occasion, " apperceptive mass," instrument, and protective shell of the religious life. And just as surely would most of the sectarians of the world, be they rationalists or " pure " mystics, and most of their savants protest against the Baron as being an insidious " materialist." As the reactions of us all are inevitably determined to a high degree more by moral valuations and emotional associations than by strictly logical necessities, the sectarians would demur largely because they instinctively feel that von Hügel is defending a concrete system from which, on account of its corruptions and abuses, they have disassociated themselves. Without the slightest doubt Roman Catholicism lurks in the background of the Baron's

[1] *R. G.*, p. 80.

[2] Cf. Otto's Chapter IX, " Means of Expression of the Numinous," in *The Idea of the Holy*, for examples of how material things and acts are capable of mediating spiritual values (cf. *E. L.*, p. 163). " Where lies the essence of the sacramental? It is in fact—in the expression of the English High Churchmen—the ' real presence,' the real presence of the transcendent and holy in its very nature in adoration and fellowship, so as to be laid hold of and enjoyed in present possession. No form of devotion which does not offer or achieve this mystery for the worshipper can be perfect or can give lasting contentment to a religious mind."—*The Idea of the Holy*, p. 219. Cf. *E.* II., pp. 248–9; *E.* I., pp. 130–31; and Gwendolen Greene, *Two Witnesses*, London (Dent), 1930, pp. 125, 139.

[3] *E.* I., p. 251. Cf. the James–Lange theory of emotion.

thought about institutionalism. He made no secret of his loyalty to that church or of the fact that his interpretation of religion was based more than anything else upon his knowledge of that communion. Yet it is equally indubitable that von Hügel sought truth rather than the rewards of an apologist. A perusal of his works will draw from him unexpected masses of conviction but not an ounce of deliberate special pleading. Doubtless he pleads unconsciously at times—who does not?—but with oddly gratifying results. Gratifying for any sectarians who may start at scratch, because his argument is so general that although it may show the necessity of some sort of sacramentalism, it does not specify exactly what sort nor how much; they can be content, therefore, with the little that they have and feel that anything more is "over belief" and a superfluity of naughtiness. Gratifying for the institutionalists who start off by already sharing his views and following them in practice, because the truth of his general principle encourages them in their special applications of it.

But there are some people who do not accept this ambidextrous, take-what-you-want fashion of settling the matter and who contend that any opinion that makes the Thing an indispensable element of religion is contrary to the doctrines of the New Testament. There would be no need of heeding this objection were it not a fact that von Hügel believed Christianity to be the norm of what religion is; hence he should be able to show, if not a developed form of institutionalism, sacramentalism, and use of the material in the New Testament, at least a seed capable of growing normally into such a form. It would lead us too much out of our present path to go into this in detail, but in his works are outlined ample grounds for the necessity and the value of the Thing for religion as illustrated by the teachings and the actions of Christ and the early Christians, evidence so incontestable that only a preoccupation with other aspects of religion could lead to its being minimized.[1]

[1] See *E.* II., pp. 101–2, 78–81, 246; *M. E.* I., pp. 29–39; *L. N.*, pp. 178–9; *S. L.*, pp. 319–21, 326; *E.* I., pp. 129, 261.

Regardless of where it began and by whom it was advocated, the utilization of the Thing, the treatment of the sensuous not as a blind alley but as a bridge to and from the spiritual,[1] might be defended as consonant with the general pattern of human existence and as shown historically to have been normally necessary and fruitful in the development of the highest types of religious personality. One can hardly name any outstanding religious figure whose contributions were not greatly enriched by the influence of some religious tradition to which he was exposed, and whose faults and eccentricities are not in proportionate measure due to his failure to utilize as well as possible the resources of that or some available better institution and tradition. Why should religion be the one exception to the rule that in all human affairs the sensuous and the spiritual go hand in hand? Is not perception sensory as well as mental? Is not any complete love both of body and of soul? Is not active life as much a conquest of things and material circumstances as an understanding of men and movements? Does not the artist require contact with lines, colours, sounds, or stuffs? [2] Does not the appreciation of values start with a minimum of sense stimulation, so that ethical advance lies to a high degree in the spiritualization of the senses? [3] Why, then, should religion be an exception? And why, above all, should Christianity, which is not an ideology but an incarnational fact,[4]—why, above all, should Christianity be imagined as being such an exception?

Yet there are masses of men whose relations to the church recall trees by the seashore, "fixed in every kind of unnatural, fleeing or defiant, attitude and angle." [5] Why do they shun that ocean which von Hügel found exhilarating and life-giving? Obviously there are

[1] *S. L.*, p. 319.

[2] "Oui, l'œuvre sort plus belle
D'une forme au travail
Rebelle,
Vers, marbre, onyx, émail."
"L'Art," Gautier.

[3] *E.* II., pp. 106–7.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 107–8.

[5] *S. L.*, p. 3.

innumerable answers. There are churches and churches with every variety of weakness and strength, the very best being the least immune to corruption. Misunderstanding of the nature of the institutional aggravates a tendency to define it by its sometimes widespread deficiencies, instead of by its possible and often actual virtues. And finally, as people differ in race, birth, training, and appreciation of the past, the social, and the sensuous, every soul has its own *attrait* and place.[1] That all men are equal in the sense that they all spring from God and that merely earthly differences do not count for Him as ultimate differences, the Baron felt was a Christian teaching. But a doctrine of the interchangeableness of men, a repudiation of individual aptitudes and inabilities, and a denial of a "thorough differentiation [of humanity] into various kinds and degrees of interdependence and mutual service," he considered patently false and unsupported by the Christ Who spoke with simple affection of "the Father and his children, the Master and his servants, the Shepherd and his sheep, the King and his subjects."[2]

If such diversity of souls is inevitable, substitutes for the church, for the dominant and traditional religious institution of a given nation or region, must inevitably appear. We are all acquainted with the individualist, the man who feeling rightly that religion is the deepest and the most personal human experience hastily concludes that an institution can be nothing more than an impertinent meddling in private affairs. Among the Quakers and the Waldensians the family "in great part supplants the Church." A still larger substitute is the sect. As exponents of this position von Hügel cited Montanus and Tertullian. "And then the substitution widens out, yet also thins down," into the state, as proposed by Richard Rothe. "And finally there is the subtlest of all the substitutions," that of philosophy. One has only to recall the Stoics and the Neoplatonists, Hume, "in so far as he retained any religion at all," the Hegelians "of more or less the left," Bradley and

[1] *E. L.*, p. 395.
[2] *E.* I., p. 128. Cf. *R. G.*, p. 23; *E.* II., pp. 231–2.

Bosanquet, " and, with little or no religious sense remaining . . . Benedetto Croce," in order to acknowledge the lure of this temptation for " not a few fine minds." All these men have something kind to say of religion and even of institutional religion; but for them the church is essentially a kindergarten for the masses, a clumsy means of propagating the truth which philosophy alone attains with any sort of " virile adequacy." [1] It was doubtless the realization of these differences among men and of the various alternatives, each with its quantum of truth, opened to them, that caused von Hügel to repeat F. W. Faber's concluding words of a panegyric on the founder of the Jesuits, preached in a Jesuit church: " This, then, my dear brethren, is St. Ignatius's way to heaven; and, thank God, it is not the only way! " [2]

The existence of many ways, however, does not prove that some are not better than others; and the fact that for the bulk of mankind religion involves the institution should make one wary to satisfy oneself that one is sufficiently superior to one's fellows to warrant the risk of choosing a substitute. All along this discussion von Hügel refers to " the Church," as if everybody knew what " the Church " was. If he had said the Roman Catholic Church, to which most of his references are applicable, he would have been clearer. But he would thereby have aroused protests from members of the Holy Orthodox Catholic Apostolic Eastern Church, the less insular zealots of the Anglican Church, and representatives of Hindu, Buddhist, Mohammedan, and other large religious bodies claiming each in its own way to be " the Church." And he would likewise have cut out of his purview many dissentient and heterodox bodies, some of which are institutionalized almost to as great an extent as, or more than, Rome. Several of his remarks about " the Church " are appropriate exclusively to the Roman Church; many others pertain only to the Catholic [3] conception of the Christian church; but these last remarks, if stripped of their Catholic Christian family traits and connotations,

[1] *E.* I., pp. 255–6.
[2] *E.* II., p. 232.
[3] In the large sense revived by Anglo-Catholics.

might be harmonized with the greater remainder of his pronouncements, which are applicable to any form of religious institutionalism, no matter how exotic, primitive, or sectarian, provided that it is of sufficient quality and size to fulfil in some fashion for its devotees the function performed for its members by any of the great orthodox churches.

Shunning the possibly unavoidable but delaying question as to when a sect may, by growth in stature, age, and organization, become a church and when a church may, by backwardness of mind, exclusiveness, and false developments, lapse into a sect, we find, as might be expected from his love of fullness, that von Hügel preferred in general the church to the sect and in particular the Roman Catholic Church to any other religious institution. The tradition of a church, so necessary as a training school and a background for the normal development of religious personality,[1] is usually larger and richer than that of any of the sects which have broken away from it. Although these thus diluted groups, the Baron granted, are frequently right as critics of the ills that led to their separation, in their characteristic stress upon otherworldliness they generally represent only one side, the world-fleeing, of religion's twofold movement towards heaven and earth. The church, moreover, is not usually irrevocably committed to the errors which resulted in separation. Could it reform itself in those respects, the ideally complete whole, von Hügel thought, would be not a conglomeration of fragmentary sects but the intelligent assimilation of them by the church within itself.[2] As it is, most of the sects live, the Baron claimed, not only by the dowry they carried off with them from their mother church when they eloped, but also by the influence and prestige which the church diffuses throughout the world in the defence of religion against the forces of disintegration, secularism, and indifference, to which the otherwise unaided sects might succumb more rapidly than they frequently do.[3] The fact that sects often purify and stimulate a church

[1] *E.* I., pp. 91–2, 259–63; *R. G.*, p. 144; *E.* II., p. 144; *L. N.*, p. 15.
[2] *E.* I., pp. 269–70.
[3] Cf. *E.* I., pp. 265–6; *S. L.*, pp. 234–5; *L. N.*, pp. 29–31, 69–70.

is not denied, or even their occasional moral and intellectual pre-eminence; but that in itself is not religion, nor is there any intrinsic reason why a church should always be behind sects in such affairs. Von Hügel was interested in the institution as a means of preserving for humanity the sense of the supernatural. Any church or sect which, though like a toad ugly and venomous, wore yet that precious supernatural jewel in its head, he preferred, *qua* religious institution, to any sect or church lacking that jewel, no matter how atractive, *qua* moral, artistic, or intellectual force, the latter might be for him as well as for others.

The church, von Hügel felt, can generally emphasize facts about God and preserve them in a way that no individual, family, sect, state, or philosophy can do, thus strengthening and supplementing the smaller or the less whole-heartedly religious groups within it.[1] Compared with the waverings and subjectivity of the individual, the vicissitudes of families, the political turmoils to which a state is ever prey, and the hallowed doubts and inconclusiveness of philosophy, a great church stands like a rock, like something objective and "given." As a substitute for the church, the family seldom rises above a "sentimental moralism, a mutual admiration society," and the state rarely above "a natural, a Golden Rule type, as in the cases of Confucius and of Bentham"; [2] neither family nor state offers enough to assuage an insatiable religious thirst. When he is anxious about his mystical proclivities or dubious about the rationality of his faith, the individual (if he is fortunate or easily satisfied) can find in an understanding church something older and presumably wiser than himself to guard him from his personal vagaries; in the midst of his hesitations to impress him with the factuality of religion; and, when he is either dejected or over-exalted, to steady him by its expression of normal religious consciousness.[3]

[1] *E.* II., pp. 266, 10–14. Note J. B. Pratt's remarks about the power of social confirmation, the psychological effects of the past, etc., in his *The Religious Consciousness*, New York (Macmillan), 1930.

[2] *E.* I., p. 264.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 180; *M. E.* II., pp. 115, 356; *R. G.*, pp. 142–3; *S. L.*,

If the church thus protects and encourages its members, it also abases them for their souls' good. The humiliation of the individual before God alone is apt to be an imperfect humiliation, considering how men love to spare themselves and to do things in the easiest way. If the independence of the individual or the philosopher, with his patronage "of the toiling, moiling Church folk," and with his special insight so superior to that of other men, does not invariably "induce pride and complacency, this can only spring from certain rare qualities in the character concerned." [1] But complete humility, so essential to knowledge and growth, as a rule "imperatively demands," the Baron wrote from experience, "my continuous recognition of my own multiform need of my fellow-creatures, especially of those wiser and better than myself, and of my lifelong need of training, discipline, incorporation; full humility requires filial obedience towards men and institutions, as well as fraternal give and take, and paternal authority and superintendence." [2]

Where is the secret? One should realize as clearly as possible how one stands in relation to other people, but why this stress on humility, this reverence, this devotion, for the church? Is it not, as a voluntary organization for special purposes, on a par with other similar groups, like clubs, reform societies, fire brigades, and governments? One loves one's native land and is willing to serve it as one thinks best. Honour where honour is due; but as for humility towards congressmen or prime ministers, for instance, as for filial obedience towards one's agents in matters of taxation, foreign affairs, and similar governmental business, that is going too far. Why, if the church is on the same level as those other institutions, should there be an exceptional reverence for it? In the first place, is it exceptional? Similar devotion to their families, their "causes," or their countries, has led men to glorify these above all, has made them feel united in something like a "communion of

p. 344. Cf. Webb, *God and Personality*, pp. 242–3; and M. D. Petre, "Von Hügel and the Great Quest," *The Modern Churchman*, Dec. 1931, esp. p. 479.

[1] *E.* I., pp. 264–5.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 264.

saints," and has incited them to sacrifice themselves entirely for the sake of one another. Devotion for the church differs in intensity as the conception of the church differs from that of other organizations. On this point von Hügel speaks primarily as a Catholic, and not merely as an Anglican, Orthodox, or Roman one, but even as some Presbyterians and Lutherans feel, and in a way with which even Oriental institutionalists can sometimes sympathize, when they regard their churches as mystical bodies.

The church, the Baron contended, is never merely a social or Roycian end in itself; it is a means to God and from God, a gate of heaven.[1] As given and maintained by God, with the indifferent co-operation of men, the church is, for a Catholic believer, an incarnation of divine goodness, beauty, and truth, which appearing in Christ as perfectly as His humanity permitted are everywhere present in varying degrees of recognizability. Thus as the most self-conscious and definite instrument of God on earth, the church is distinguished from all other organizations by its pre-eminent goal and scope. It should be the defender and the inspirer of all worthy human activities in so far as they lead to a true appreciation of nature, supernature, and the God of both. As a divinely human expression of God's universal presence, it should not only knit men to the inorganic and the organic worlds, but especially should be the most positive bond of love animating all society. This it sometimes does and is for people like St. Francis of Assisi, Father Damien, and countless others "unknown and unrewarded," who, not blinded by the sordid facts of nature's winter wind and man's ingratitude, stay not their eyes on them, or on the shams and the shames of the church and of the even worse world in which it dwells, but pierce through them to a realm where the heavens declare the glory of God, where birds, beasts, trees, and stones are brothers and sisters of all human beings, who, including even those who have done their best to avoid it, are so bound together in varying love and adoration of God that the slighest act, prayer, suffering, or joy of one finally affects all the others, as the wavelets roused by the

[1] *E.* I., pp. 276–7.

dropping of a pebble in a pool will eventually disturb to some extent the reeds by the water-side. Such people live in a transfigured world. They, if anybody, find "the fountain where they wail'd 'Mirage'!" [1]

But, somebody might protest, von Hügel never exhibited such extravagance. He never stooped to words like those, certainly; but the whole tone of his writings, his religious practices, and the teachings of his church, tend to substantiate their significance. A man who can say, "I love the angels, they stand for something we cannot otherwise express," [2] is not likely to exempt his church from similar treatment. Because he loved the ideal, supernatural church, he cleaved to the actual, natural church, just as one seeks the universal through the particular assumed to participate in it. Because officially and in its best representatives the Roman Catholic Church has stood and still stands as one of the mediators between God and men, and the best mediator as far as the Baron knew, he was willing to accept all sorts of personal limitations for the welfare of that organization and through it for the welfare of his fellow-men.[3] As his dominant interests lay in philosophy, history, and Biblical exegesis, and as his was a nature to seek truth regardless of its possibly unpleasant consequences to himself, provided that it was sufficiently valuable for others, he did not hesitate to publish the results of his disinterested scholarship, although he knew that some of them might be unwelcome enough to lead to possible excommunication by the Roman Church, which, he recognized, is essentially a credal, theological, conservative body, not a debating or research society.[4] Experiment, speculation, risk, are proper for an individual having no official responsibilities, as they may lead to his own and to others' improvement; but as conservation, security, and order should belong to any institution responsible for the spiritual or material inheritance of many people, such institutions are right in guarding their members against all innovations that are not proved to be undeniably true and beneficial.[5]

[1] Tennyson, "The Ancient Sage."
[2] *L. N.*, p. xlii.
[3] *E.* I., pp. 15, 266–7.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 258–9, 267–8.
[5] *E.* II., pp. 16–17. It should be noted, however, that an institution *qua* institution is not necessarily conservative. In earlier centuries the

This caution, however, can be carried too far. The chief fault of modern Roman Catholicism, von Hügel confessed, is that it over-emphasizes the institutional for its own sake and to the hurt of intellectual and mystical elements of religion.[1] In these straits, as in all his others, he did not seek to escape the difficulties by choosing one side or the other, but remaining in the fray he tried to understand and to do full justice to the claims of both sides, to moderate his own vehemence and to temper the excesses of others, in order that a voluntary acceptance of these "tensions" might enlarge and purify his soul as well as theirs. "One long, deep continuous *Purgatory*," [2] "his hair shirt—his Church his deepest pain," thus "he often spoke of Institutional Christianity." [3] "But how far this is from his *final* word on the subject! Were not 'costingness' and 'tension' the two great elements of growth? Was not pain his greatest teacher? Did not just such an intense and claimful nature as his require more than anything the discipline and training, and the food, of the Roman Catholic Church? He gives himself a clear answer when discussing this question. . . . 'The price is assuredly so great that only a strong faith can pay it, but the gain is profound. And I know not whether of anything worth having for men here below more than this can be said.'" [4]

The institutional element of religion has here been treated at some length in order to emphasize the vital importance which von Hügel attached to it. Of the other two strands interweaving with the institutional and forming for the Baron the rope of religion,[5] not as much needs to be said in this particular place. He went into the mystical

Christian Church was deemed to be as "radical" as "communists" are often supposed to be to-day. "A Christian will be as conservative or as radical as he pleases, according as his temper of mind dictates. Religion has fostered both moods; and if it commonly has stood for conservatism rather than for progress, this is not because it is religion, but because the Church is composed of human beings, among whom the lovers of stability have always outnumbered the lovers of change."—A. K. Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

[1] *S. L.*, p. 30. Cf. *E.* I., pp. 257–8; *E.* II., pp. 16–23.

[2] *S. L.*, p. 201; cf. p. 249.

[3] *L. N.*, p. xxxvii. [4] *Ibid.* [5] *S. L.* p., 30.

element in such detail that the next chapter will be devoted to some of its problems. As the rational element includes any attempt to understand and criticize religion, as almost all of von Hügel's writings and most of the comments aroused by them illustrate it, and as any reader of these pages must be already familiar with it and persuaded of its necessity, there is no need of discussing it at length here. "The External, Authoritative, Historical, Traditional, Institutional side and function of Religion" is generally the first to arouse the child through his senses, imagination, and memory, and presents to him and preserves for him and the adult the sense of religion as above all "a Fact and Thing." Question, argument, and the desire for proof and theoretical consistency first generally appear in the youth and secure for him then and afterwards religion as "Thought, System, . . . Philosophy." [1] Examples of the intellectual element can be readily found in various stages of development in all great religious literature, notably in the Upanishads; but, as being closer to his readers' interests, von Hügel confined himself chiefly to pointing out the influence of that element in the New Testament, especially in the writings of St. Paul.[2]

As almost all experience involves intellectual modifications and interpretations, it would be extraordinary if religion should be without some connection with philosophy. Belief in God is, in part, "the profoundest Metaphysical Affirmation," which, once made, leads inevitably to philosophic elaborations regarding the supersensible world, the nature of man, and his relations with the divine.[3] But the fact that religion involves metaphysical assumptions and interpretations does not prove that religion is only philosophy or that philosophy makes religion, any more than similar requirements in regard to science and common sense mean that the data and the experiences forming the material of the sciences

[1] *M. E.* I., pp. 51–2.

[2] See *M. E.* I., pp. 28–39, esp. p. 32.

[3] *M. E.* II., pp. 269–71. "Religion . . . ever transcends mere earthly experience, and is an intercourse with the inmost nature and foundation of all reality; it is a life in and with God, a metaphysical life." (*M. E.* II., p. 262, quoting Windleband, "Das Heilige," in *Präludien*, 1903, pp. 356, 357.)

and of average observation and action are solely intellectual and furnished exclusively by philosophy.[1]

Although the Baron believed that in general theism does more justice to religion than any other system of thought, he felt that at the present time materialism, with its healthy, realistic atmosphere, and agnosticism, with its equally vigorous realization of the infirmities of the human mind, are far less dangerous to religion than an exaggerated pluralism or a pantheistic absolutism. Pluralism, in spite of its appreciation of human limitations and the contingencies and discords of existence, seemed to him to be rendered incapable of dealing with the infinite by its tendency to reduce everything to finites. In this and in its frequent failure to attain anything more than a conventional unity and intelligibility, it sets up a shaky, shadowy throne for the God of religion. But religion's truly false friend, as the Baron saw it, is an Hegelian, or absolutistic, pantheism, wherein, for the sake of unity and intelligibility, differences are dissolved into appearances of an Absolute One transcending spatial, temporal, ethical, spiritual, in fact all determinations[2]—a modest instance of explaining *ignotum per ignotius*.

Absolutists may smile at this as a caricature of their views. What we want, they may say, is to preserve the good points of pluralism and other systems within a more spacious synthesis. We want diversity and unity, finite and infinite, temporal and eternal, contingency and necessity, darkness and light, to dwell peacefully together. That is what von Hügel wanted too and he believed that somehow such diversities do hold together. But not knowing exactly how they are related, he thought it better to resign himself to tensions and obscurity, with their rich possibilities, rather than to accept as more than a one-sided hint any plausible answer alleged to be final or thoroughly satisfactory. Such supposedly final answers, which he imagined some Hegelians, absolutists, and pantheists proferred, he objected to chiefly on account of what they overlooked or

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 270, and *E.* II., p. 130.
[2] *E.* II., pp. 136–7.

excluded. No philosophy ignoring or minimizing temptation, doubt, sin, prayer, adoration, forgiveness, and redemption, no matter how excellent it may be in other respects, can be accepted as an adequate theory of religion, or, *a fortiori*, of reality.[1] Nor can any philosophic absolute in the sense of either a principle of organization or the mere totality of things, nor can any metaphysical moralism within the bounds of a Kantian reason alone, substitute for religion.[2] Religion, "in its most articulate and spontaneous utterances, is not directly a search for, or presentation of, the Whole; still less a finding of man's own mind, or of mind in general, within or as that Whole; nor a striving after self-realization; nor a sense that nothing really matters, except as merely out of place, or only for a time. But religion is, in such utterances, a sense, a love, an adoration, by spirits, conscious of their own distinctness and reality, of an Infinite Self-conscious Spirit, a Reality distinct from and prior to themselves, though their original, penetrative, source; a seeking of conformity by these real minds and wills with that Real Spirit; and a consciousness of, a contrition for, Sin—a sense of the intrinsic difference between, and of the variously abiding results producible by, right and wrong volition and character-building."[3] But though not the whole of religion, the intellectual element manifest in philosophy and theology is nevertheless an indispensable critic and colleague of institutional and mystical factors of religion.

Being a creature of feeling and action as well as of sensation and reflection, man responds to religion also in an emotional, volitional, ethical, experimental, and mystical way. "Here religion is rather felt than seen or reasoned about, is loved and lived rather than analyzed, is action and power rather than either external fact or intellectual verification."[4]

Anybody interested in the interrelation of the three

[1] *G. S.*, pp. 208–9; *E. L.*, pp. 222–3.
[2] *E.* II., p. 265; *M. E.* II., pp. 261–3.
[3] *E. L.*, p. 221; cf. *S. L.*, p. 189.
[4] *M. E.* I., pp. 52–3. The Baron traces the mystical element in the New Testament (*M. E.* I., pp. 25–39) and in St. Catherine of Genoa (*M. E.* I. and II.) and refers to it, *passim*, in almost all his works.

elements will find much of value in von Hügel's pages dealing with their distribution among ages, sexes, professions, races, and the major religions of the world.[1] The crises involved in the transitions from one stage to another—from the external, institutional phase of childhood to the age of reasoning endangered by scepticism, and from an institutional and rational religion to one of warm, vigorous, mystical conviction—are treated with brevity and insight.[2] The Baron shows how a desire for simplification and a failure to understand elements with which one is personally unsympathetic may lead to the domination of one element over the rest to the general detriment of religion.[3] But because nearly everybody possesses to some extent all three elements as a multiplicity distinguishable within, but not independent of, the unity of his personality, the ideal is not to allow one to grow with ruinous exclusiveness but to bring about a healthy development and harmonization of them all. We should remember, however, that the ideal and the normal are seldom the actual and not always the most desirable in ourselves, in others, or at a given time, and should tolerate, therefore, and even encourage diversity, specialization, and alternation, not only as enriching to religion as a whole, but frequently as the best for a given age or individual, considering the particular conditions involved. If we are thus able to hold faithfully to a single standard amidst a multitude of applications of it in regard to the elements within religion, we should be capable of treating religion itself in a similar fashion among the other activities of life, realizing clearly that life is a failure if God and religion are not first and fundamental, but that the methods for achieving this and the extent to which it should be achieved must vary as widely as individuals vary.[4]

The Baron has been criticized for his division of religion into three elements and for his connection of each of those elements with special psychological, physiological, and logical parallels. Thus he linked the institutional with

[1] *M. E.* I., pp. 58–65, 8–10. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 53–5.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 65–76. [4] *Ibid.*, II., pp. 116, 360–61, 366, 387–95.

sense impressions and the actual; the rational with the "central process of mental abstraction and reflection" and with the actual and the necessary; and the mystical with volitional action and the trust in the reality of trans-subjective objects, which alone gives worth and significance to sensation and thought.[1] It has been pointed out that here his psychology is not fully abreast with the times and that his schematization is "somewhat arbitrary" and *a priori*.[2] If it had once been called to his attention, doubtless von Hügel would have admitted this himself, no matter how content he might have been with his remarks when he first composed them. But those were merely comparisons and illustrations, to be retained if truly suggestive, to be abandoned if misleading. His discussion of the three elements, not being based upon those analogies, remains on its own merits, as a solidly built house does not collapse every time a tree is blown over on the lawn.

It has also been claimed, with some banter turned upon von Hügel's alleged susceptibility to the number three, that religion contains more than three elements. As when it suited his purpose, however, he did not hesitate to subdivide the three general elements into six more specific ones,[3] presumably he would have granted religion four, five, or more major elements, had he thought his three could not subsume everything appropriate to it. Professor Albert A. Cock believes that the adorational and the æsthetic factors of religion could only with "great difficulty" be brought within the Baron's "threefold analysis of the elements."[4] To von Hügel's trio Dom Cuthbert Butler adds a fourth, "the element of service of others."[5] Professor James B. Pratt suggests as a fourth element "the practical or moral which lays the emphasis upon the thing that must be done rather than upon the thing that must be believed or felt."[6] As von Hügel never aspired to finality or exhaustive-

[1] *M. E.* I., pp. 55–8.

[2] *Speculum Religionis*, Oxford (Clarendon Press), 1929. Chap. IX., "Friedrich von Hügel and His Work," by Professor Albert A. Cock, p. 209.

[3] *M. E.* I., pp. 85–6.

[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 209–10.

[5] *Western Mysticism*, New York (Dutton), 1924, p. 292.

[6] *The Religious Consciousness*, New York (Macmillan), 1930, p. 14; cf. pp. 13, 19, 20–21.

ness but regarded his work as necessarily groping and stuttering, like all human endeavours in such lines, and as he recommended the books of Butler and Pratt from which the passages just quoted were taken,[1] it is natural to conclude that he appreciated their contributions towards the elaboration of his outline, whether or not he felt that they involved adding new elements or splitting up old ones. Although criticisms about classification seem never to have absorbed his attention, we know that he would never wittingly have preferred simplification to increasing abundance.

The objections, however, against which he took special care to defend himself were primarily moral and religious and all sprang chiefly from the importance he ascribed to the intellectual element in religion. Does not his intellectual requirement, by ruling out the uneducated majority of mankind, most women, and all children, confine religion to a (mercifully) small, priggish class of round-shouldered, weak-eyed bookworms? Is not such spiritual and intellectual snobbery, the brand of the Pharisees, something so foreign to Christ that "even to suggest its presence seems at once to disfigure and to lower Him"? But the intellectual element, von Hügel recalled, is not limited to any one class; it is as common to all men as the other two elements, like which it varies greatly in degree of fullness or want. Nor is the intellectual element merely a matter of education, philosophy, mathematics, and science; those, rather, as has been said,[2] are only features of that wider function of human personality, "represented by every however simple mental attention to *things* and their mechanism, their necessary laws and requirements."[3] What we commonly call intellectual gifts, in the narrow sense of scientific acumen or literary power, these, like all other parts of our nature, in themselves neither good nor bad, found in saint and sinner,

[1] Cf. preface to the second edition of *M. E.*

[2] See above, p. 38.

[3] "Hence, the Venerable Anna Maria Taigi, the Roman workingman's wife, attending to the requirements and rules of good washing and of darning clothes; St. Jean Baptiste de la Salle, the Breton gentleman, studying the psychology of school-children's minds, and adapting his

have religious significance only in so far as they are used as means of approaching or shunning God. Though it is true that the institutional side of religion also stresses the thing, the external, the historical, and the objective, which shows that the institutional cannot be actually separated from the rational, nevertheless certain intellectual virtues of considerable value to religion, such as " candour," " scrupulous accuracy," " disinterested collaboration," and " manly renunciation of popularity and easy honours," " as surely find but a scanty field of development outside of the intellectual life, as they are not the only virtues or class of virtues, and as the other two elements each produce a quite unique group of virtues of their own and require other means and materials for their exercise." [1]

The Baron also foresaw that he might be accused of maintaining that one could make a religion to order, that religion depends for its origination, advance, and culmination entirely upon one's own efforts and ingenuity in balancing and fitting its different elements together. This, however, contradicts his belief that " simply all and every one of our acts . . . is dependent, at every moment and in every direction, upon the prevenient, accompanying and subsequent power and help of God." [2] As some of the problems of grace will occupy us later on, it is sufficient to note here that the Baron, rejecting the quietistic notion that as human action ceases God's increases, accepted the one expressed by the maxim, " God helps those who help themselves," a sentiment in accord with the doctrine of St. Bernard, that grace and a good will rise and fall, in their degree of action, inseparably. " As St. Thomas admirably says: 'We attribute one and the same effect both to a natural cause and to a divine force, not in the sense of that effect proceeding in part from God, and in part from the human agent. But the effect proceeds entire from both, according to a

school system to it; St. Jerome labouring at his minute textual criticism of manuscripts of all kinds; St. Anselm and St. Thomas toiling at the construction of their dialectic systems—all these, amongst endless other cases, are but illustrations of the omnipresence and endless variety of this element, which is busy with the rules and processes that govern things." —*M. E.* I., p. 78. [1] *Ibid.*, p. 79. [2] *Ibid.*

different mode: just as, in music, the whole effect is attributed to the instrument, and the same entire effect is referred to man as the principal agent.' " [1]

Von Hügel feared too lest somebody should regard his conception of religion as Epicurean. Whereas Christ talks of renouncing the world, plucking out eyes, bearing the cross, does not the Baron slur over these euphemistically termed "frictions" and "tensions," bidding one to "become rich and full and complex, an æsthete rather than a man of God"? This might be so were the intellectual element taken as alone sufficient for life and religion; in which case one might excuse oneself from bothering with church, working with others, developing one's spiritual powers through practice of prayer and moral discipline, and might sit in one's garden and solve the riddles of the universe with the aid of a pipe. But von Hügel's view of religion upholds the demands of the institutional and the mystical as rigidly as those of the intellectual, and that not in mere theoretical harmonization but in actual, painful practice, involving taxes on the intellect, moral sufferings, and countless unforeseeable daily sacrifices and efforts. If in this life the intellectual must take its place among other equally important elements of human personality, so too, in the life to come, the Baron considered it "sober" to think, the intellectual will never absorb all else in a gnostic vision wherein our knowledge will become co-extensive with reality itself. On the contrary, it will always see itself outstripped by a love and action directed towards God and surpassing knowledge, yet even so known to be pitifully feeble. Thus if the intellectual is delightful as revealing God to some extent to us, it is also cleansing and strengthening through humiliation; for, by indicating our limitations, it plants "fully and finally," in "the very depths" of personality, "the Cross, the sole means to the soul's true Incoronation." [2]

On account of the claim of religion to be man's best means of apprehending the supernatural, we have tried to ascertain, as well as we could from von Hügel's writings, what religion is. But one of its elements, which if not its

[1] *M. E.* I., p. 81. [2] *M. E.* I., pp. 81–2.

"heart" is surely as vital to it as the other elements and asserts for itself more intimate union with the divine than either of them has ever ventured to do, yet remains comparatively unnoticed. In the next chapter, therefore, we must wrestle with the Baron's reflections on mysticism and try to discover whether or not he believed that mysticism reveals God in a manner more satisfactory than any which we have already reviewed.

MYSTICISM

SYNOPSIS

The Baron's definition of mysticism—His ability, deficiencies, and assumptions in this field—St. Catherine of Genoa his test case—His method of studying mysticism—Outline of those aspects of St. Catherine's life which are significant for an examination of the psycho-physical side of mysticism—Influence of sex—Hysteriform phenomena—Ecstasy—What is mystical knowledge?—The presence of God—The psycho-physical states of mysticism must be tested by their fruits—The value of mysticism is essentially a personal question for mystics to answer—Inclusive and exclusive mysticism—Union and pantheism—Negative theology—The fruits of mysticism—Von Hügel's conception of mysticism.

Appendix.

CHAPTER IV

MYSTICISM

" Rapt into still communion that transcends
The imperfect offices of prayer and praise,
His mind was a thanksgiving to the power
That made him; it was blessedness and love! " [1]

THERE are so many types and degrees of mysticism that nobody can investigate them all with thoroughness and sympathy. Even the most widely read student must concentrate upon some particular variety, in order that knowing some mystics well he may better understand others with whom he is less intimately acquainted. If this procedure entails the limitations and the misunderstandings inherent in specialization, perhaps even so it is a lesser evil than a dangerously little knowledge of much. Leaving aside the various pathological states resembling mysticism, the normal analogues of mysticism in ordinary spiritual and mental life, and the more definitely but yet moderately religious " habit of mind which discovers the spiritual in common things," [2] von Hügel chose the " experience (more or less clear and vivid) of God as distinct, self-conscious, personal Spirit " [3] as being probably the most important and valuable aspect of mysticism for Christians and hence most worthy of his study. Although almost all men could be said to possess mystical elements to some degree,[4] were such elements defined in conveniently vague fashion, comparatively few have been granted, in a steady, intense, life-governing manner, that " experimental perception of the

[1] Wordsworth, " The Excursion," I.
[2] W. R. Inge, *Studies of English Mystics*, p. 237.
[3] *M. E.* I., p. xii.
[4] *S. L.*, p. 84.

presence of God in the soul"[1] which seems to be the dominant characteristic of central Christian (and much Eastern) mysticism and which especially interested the Baron.


Whereas it is not generally held against a man that he is not a mystic,[2] mystics, as above defined, are relatively rare and frequently suspected. This is not so often true of men like St. Augustine, St. Bernard, and St. Gregory the Great, whose lives, as Dom Cuthbert Butler has well shown, seem free from traces of visions, locutions, violent raptures, and trances, and in matters of mysticism suggest nothing more "than a deep absorption of mind in prayer, such that consciousness is lost of external things and of the operations of the mind itself."[3] But suspicion very naturally fastens upon the greater number of other mystics, Oriental and Occidental, who exhibit unusual psycho-physical characteristics.

Aside from many personal reasons, it must have been to some extent his desire for a test case that led von Hügel to select St. Catherine of Genoa as his special object of study, a woman of great spiritual breadth and power but the value of whose life and the validity of whose teachings seem to many to be seriously impaired, if not automatically nullified, by the unusual state of her constitution, physical and mental. Although von Hügel concentrated chiefly upon St. Catherine, it is absurd to say that he founded his whole theory of mysticism entirely upon her. When neces-

[1] Dom Cuthbert Butler, *Western Mysticism*, New York (Dutton), 1924, p. 17. Cf.: "I shall use the word mysticism to express the *type of religion which puts the emphasis on immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and intimate consciousness of the Divine Presence. It is religion in its most acute, intense, and living stage.*"—Rufus M. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion*, London (Macmillan), 1909, p. xv; cf. p. xviii.

[2] "Some people have the gift of devotion, the mystical sense, and others have it not. It is not a measure of our acceptance with God, nor of our proficiency in grace. There are many excellent people who 'live ever in their great Taskmaster's eye,' doing their duty because it is their duty, but never carried out of themselves by any of the transports of devotion which saints and mystics describe. These people perhaps do not display much of the beauty of holiness, but they have what is still better, solid and steady goodness."—W. R. Inge, *More Lay Thoughts of a Dean*, London (Putnam), 1931, p. 64.

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 184–6.



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
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sary he did not hesitate to supplement her by reference to other mystics, religious history, philosophy, and the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church.[1] Whether it is a fault or not, it must be admitted that upon the entire expanse of his unusually broad knowledge of these several different fields, and not upon any one mystic or school of mysticism, the Baron based his theory of what mysticism ought to be; for although part of his *Mystical Element* aims at being purely historical (and probably with considerable permanent success), the rest of it, as accorded with his predominantly practical interests, is virtually an attempt to discover what good can be extracted from mysticism. The result is not a descriptive survey of every type of mysticism and an attempt to reach a lowest common denominator, nor the uncritical adoption of any one variety of mysticism exactly as it stands (such as Christian mysticism, which he believed to be more nourishing and balanced than its more pantheistic and "exclusive" colleagues), but a body of judgments as well founded on facts as he could make it, suitable either to aid a believer in the prudent development of his religious life or to furnish a student of mysticism with a point of view which, as more comprehensive and circumspect than most now available, might thus be welcome in the mazes of his work.

Lest one should adopt his outlook without due consideration, the Baron carefully set forth his underlying assumptions. In his study of mysticism von Hügel parted with rationalists, in assenting to facts even though he could not explain them (providing the evidence for them satisfied him), and turned away from the older supernaturalists, in not assuming God to be the direct cause of whatever he could not explain. He also assumed that body influences mind, and mind, body, and that unusual mind-body states are to be expected in unusual people. Finally, as the chapter on epistemology should have made clear, he was

[1] In regard to von Hügel's *Mystical Element*, cf.: "Die Verbindung von strengster wissenschaftlicher Kritik mit lebendigster Frömmigkeit, von Geschichte, Psychologie und Philosophie verleiht diesem Riesenwerk zugleich Anschaulichkeit, Fülle and Tiefe."—F. Heiler, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

persuaded that consciousness involves irrepressible metaphysical affirmations of trans-subjective realities. He made these assumptions not, of course, *ad hoc*, but because he believed that those were the ones best warranted by the present state of our knowledge in such affairs.

As if he had not already done enough to make some of his readers uneasy, he added two other candid remarks. The evidence regarding St. Catherine's psycho-physical states, which interest us by way of illustration, is generally second-hand, not autobiographical, and "it is at all copious and precise only for the period [the last thirteen years of her life, 1497–1510] when she was admittedly ill and physically incapacitated." [1] The sifting of the embroiled, unequal evidence fell, moreover, to one without even an old wife's smattering of medicine and whose knowledge of psychology, though good in general, was admittedly a secondary interest [2] and "clearly insufficient" [3] from a detailed, experimental, and professional point of view. For the sake of fairness, nevertheless, it should be added that just as a doctor may know very much about the nerves, glands, and tissues, and very little about the character, of his patient, so, conversely, von Hügel's observations born of his understanding and admiration of mystics, to whom he was in many respects closely allied in beliefs and motives, are not all necessarily invalidated by his amateurish acquaintance with physiology.

Another preliminary matter is the question of his method of dealing with mystical ecstasies, trances, and the like. The genetic method—the decision to try to explain things by their lowest origins rather than by their fullest developments, on the ground that the earlier stages, which are apparently simpler than the later, reveal more clearly the nature of a thing or process—von Hügel deemed of value in so far as any historical study tends to throw light upon the nature of a thing and to indicate what it is "driving at." [4] But the genetic method taken as alone sufficient

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 7. [2] *Ibid.*

[3] J. H. Leuba, *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, New York (Harcourt, Brace), 1926, p. 66.

[4] "The true answer is that the method of origins is of relative validity

and all explanatory, without reference to final causes and validity, he regarded as one of the products of simplification run amuck, a doctrinaire inhibition, the epitome of staticness, a sacrifice of the known and luxuriant to the unknown and barren, a logical hysteron-proteron.[1] A purely psychological method he regarded as similar to the genetic method, in that both are highly desirable, suggestive, and useful as descriptions, while both are vicious if they pretend to usurp the rights of philosophy to a fuller explanation.[2] If a mystical ecstasy, for instance, is "reduced" without appeal to nothing more than a medley of self-affirmation, sex-repression, starvation, and general psycho-physical instability, the conclusion is predetermined by the method to rule out all questions of validity, all queries as to whether in spite of, or on account of, these concomitants the mystic might not have gained some real knowledge of God or of himself. As these queries, even

and that in the end we *never* find out 'what a thing really is' by asking 'what it was in the beginning.' Nor does the true value of the method reside in the (illusory) starting-point to which it goes back, but in the knowledge it acquires on the way. The true nature of a thing must be found in its validity—which, however, must be *connected* rather than *contrasted* with its origin. 'What a thing really is' appears from what it *does*, and so we must study its whole career. We study its past to forecast its future, and to find out what it is really 'driving at.' Any complete explanation, therefore, is by final causes, and implies a knowledge of ends and aims which we can often only imperfectly detect."—F. C. S. Schiller, in an essay called "Axioms as Postulates," p. 125 of *Personal Idealism*, ed. by H. C. Sturt, London (Macmillan), 1902.

[1] Cf. *M. E.* II., p. 8; *E.* I., pp. 141–2; *R. G.*, pp. 27–9, 89–90, 252–5. Cf. also J. Oman, *The Natural and the Supernatural*, 1931, p. 55 ff. And: "All explanation of the higher by the lower is philosophically a hysteron-proteron. The antecedents assigned are not the causes of the consequents, for by antecedents the naturalistic theories mean the antecedents in abstraction from their consequents—the antecedents taken as they appear in themselves, or as we might suppose them to be if no such consequents had ever issued from them. So conceived, however, the antecedents (matter and energies, for example) have no real existence—they are mere *entia rationis*, abstract aspects of the concrete fact which we call the universe."—Pringle-Pattison, *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, pp. 11–12, as quoted by J. A. Thomson, *The System of Animate Nature*, p. 18, New York (Henry Holt), 1924.

[2] Cf. J. B. Pratt, *Religious Consciousness*, p. 42, and R. H. Thouless, *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, Cambridge (University Press), 1924, pp. 261 ff.

though they may be nine-tenths speculation and guesswork, are the most important ones for religion and ordinary life, it would be unjust to brush them aside for the sake of an unnecessary and false use of a descriptive method attested as valuable (when rightly used) countless times in practice and as often shown to be baneful when held up as the exclusive measure, type, and explanation of any form of conscious human life.[1] Hence von Hügel turned to psychology for the material and suggestion it furnishes and for its value as a negative test in the classification of mind–body conditions; but he reserved the right to make his final decision about mysticism not in the light of psychology alone but in that of his widest experience.

Caterina Fiesca Adorna, the heroine of von Hügel's *Mystical Element of Religion*, was born into the great Guelph family of the Fieschi, in Genoa, in 1447. The Baron's description of her, often quoted, deserves to be quoted again. "The beautiful, tall figure; the noble, oval face with its lofty brow, finely-formed nose, and powerful, indeed obstinate chin; the winning countenance with its delicate complexion and curling, sensitive, spiritual mouth-line; deep grey-blue spiritual eyes; the long, tapering fingers; the massive dark brown or black hair; still more the quickly and intensely impressionable, nervous and extremely tense and active physical and psychical organization; and then the very affectionate, ardent, aspiring, impatient and absolute qualities and habits of her mind and heart and will," [2]—such was the exceptional woman whom generations have reverenced or analysed.

Little or nothing is known of her before her thirteenth year. Her desire to enter a convent, aroused by the happiness a sister of hers found in such a life, was thwarted, in 1463, by her marriage, arranged on political grounds, with Giuliano Adorno, a rich young man "of an undisciplined, wayward, impatient, and explosive temper, selfish and self-indulgent," [3] in no way deserving of his rare but incompatible wife. The first five dreary years of married

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 8. [2] *Ibid.*, I., pp. 97–8.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

life she spent in mournful loneliness and the next five in equally unsatisfying worldly amusement. Her temperamental melancholy and her disgust with herself and the world reached a climax on March 22, 1473, when, deep in prayer, " her heart was pierced by so sudden and immense a love of God, accompanied by so penetrating a sight of her miseries and sins and of His goodness, that she was near falling to the ground. And in a transport of pure and all-purifying love, she was drawn away from the miseries of the world; and, as it were beside herself, she kept crying out within herself: 'No more world; no more sins!' And at that moment she felt that, had she had in her possession a thousand worlds, she would have cast them all away." [1] As it was, henceforth renouncing herself and petty self-seeking, she heroically devoted herself to God and to loving and serving Him in others, realizing clearly that nothing less than that could fully content her.

Very shortly after her conversion, while her feelings were still highly excited, " Our Lord, desiring to enkindle still more profoundly His love in this soul, appeared to her in spirit with His Cross upon His shoulder dripping with blood, so that the whole house seemed to be all full of rivulets of that Blood, which she saw to have been all shed because of love alone. And filled with disgust at herself, she exclaimed: 'O Love, if it be necessary, I am ready to confess my sins in public.' " [2]

Von Hügel did not attempt any explanation of the means by which this vision was brought about, doubtless considering that such factors were less important than the effect the vision had in increasing Catherine's love and penitence. But he did remark that, in contrast to many mystics, this was her only vision, " in the sense of a picture produced indeed 'in the spirit,' but yet evidently apprehended with a sense of apparently complete passivity in the perceiving mind and of objectivity as to the perceived thing, and remembered as such throughout her life. For the frequent subsequent 'sights' or picturings (*viste*) are avowedly only of the nature of profoundly vivid, purely mental, more or

[1] *M. E.* I., p. 105. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

less consciously voluntary and subjective contemplations and intuitions; whilst her only other 'visions,' those seen during the last stage of her illness, seemed indeed to have been of an even more sensible kind than this *visione*, but they were entirely fitful and left no permanent impression behind them." [1] Her last "visions"—meaningless, opaque products of delirium, which any very ill person under similar circumstances might experience—differed strikingly in nature and results from her spiritual *viste*, which she found illuminating in themselves and inspiring in their effects.[2] "And again, this is the one only picture of any, even of a voluntary, meditational kind, concerning the Passion, to be found throughout her life; all her other contemplations and impressions of whatever kind are of other subjects." [3] They are not generally imaginative reconstructions of historical events, common to many mystics, but are rather such profound concentrations upon God Himself, as she thought, that she seems to be aware of Him with unusual keenness, and while communing with Him as a personal God she nevertheless speaks of Him as a fire of love, or in some other thing-like fashion, ordinarily according to the suggestions given her by the states of her intimately interwrought psycho-physical constitution.

The four years after her conversion were marked by excessive ascetic practices, wearing a hair shirt, lying nightly on a bed of thorns, subordinating her will entirely to the will of others, and doing everything possible to conquer her lower impulses and interests in order that she might become more wholly given to God. From May, 1474, until the day before her death she became a devoted, daily communicant. About this time, her husband being sobered apparently by financial reverses, they took up their abode near a Genoese hospital containing one hundred and thirty beds and serving also as home and school for a hundred foundling girls; and, both being now vowed to perpetual continence, they worked in the hospital. In

[1] *M. E.* I., pp. 108–9. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 215.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

1476, in response to one of the interior locutions which later became more frequent and which "appear to have been most vivid and clear thoughts presented to her mind" by God, as she believed, she commenced her great fasts, eating amazingly little during the Lents and the Advents of over twenty years. This she observed, together with her daily communions and austerities, as unobtrusively as possible, taking no pride in, but rather feeling ashamed at, any admiration incurred thereby in others, and utilizing all these things as means of bringing her closer to God. During her fasts "she was more active in good works, and felt more bright and strong in health, than usual." [1] Nevertheless she had to pay the price: "The fire which she felt in her heart seemed to dry up and burn her interiorly. And so great a physical hunger would possess her, that she appeared insatiable; and so quickly did she digest her food, that it looked as if she could have consumed iron. Yet she had no inclination to other than ordinary food, and did not fail to keep all the ordinary fasts and abstinences." [2]

About 1477, the beginning of the great central period of twenty-two years of close life in and with God and of efficient ministration in the hospital, her rigorous penitence and austerities gradually disappeared, blossoming into "expansive love and joy." [3] The frequent ecstasies and trances which marked this period she neither gloried in nor deliberately sought, but accepted such consolations as given by God to serve as incentives to a more godly life. Her ecstasies seem to have been inevitably conditioned and induced (though doubtless not entirely caused nor explained) by intense attention to absorbing thoughts of God to the exclusion of almost everything else, her highly susceptible and disciplined body externally reflecting, and also to some extent affecting, the absorption of her mind.

"If on one of the many occasions when she had hidden herself away in some secret spot, she was ever discovered by anyone, they would find her walking up and down, and

[1] *M. E.* I., p. 136. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 133.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 138.

seeming as though she would wish to do so without end; or they would come upon her with her face in her hands, prostrate on the ground, entranced, and with feelings beyond description or conception. 'These ecstasies would almost always last three or four hours; and if, on coming to herself, she spoke of the wonders she had seen, there was no one to understand her, and so she kept silence.' 'And if called during one of these trances, she would not hear, even though they did so loudly.'

"This inattention would, however, occur only in case the call was simply one of curiosity. For on other occasions 'she would remain as though dead for six hours; but on being called to the doing of any duty, however trifling it might seem, she would instantly arise and respond and go about the doing of this her obligation. And she would thus leave all, without any kind of trouble, according to her wont of flying from self-will as though it were the devil. And coming thus forth from her hiding-place she would have her face flushed, so as to look like a cherub, and to seem to have upon her lips the "who then shall separate me from the love of Christ?" of the glorious Apostle.' And 'on thus arising from those trances, she seemed to feel stronger both in body and in soul,' as in the case of the fasting.

"Even in the midst of her work absorptions would occur like unto these in all but their length of duration: 'At times her hands would sink, unable to go on, and weeping she would say, "O my Love, I can no more"; and would thus sit for a while with her senses alienated, as though she had been dead. And this would occur oftener at one time than at another, according to the varying fullness of experience present in that purified mind.'" [1]

In 1479 Catherine moved into the hospital for the rest of her life, living there in two small rooms with Giuliano, her husband, at their own expense, and both caring for the sick, the dying, and the orphans. From 1490 to 1495 she was matron, in charge of the entire institution. Then, "after she had thus shown a rare devotedness and talent

[1] *M. E.* I., pp. 139–40.

in an ordinary nurse's work, and had next, as matron, manifested, for some years, a remarkable administrative ability," in 1493, in the midst of the Plague, " she rose, in both capacities, to the very height of heroism and efficiency."[1] She remained in the midst of the diseased and panic-stricken city, for months superintending the care of the populace, daily among them, " ordering, stimulating, steadying, consoling " the vast crowds of the sick and the " severely strained workers." [2]

An incident of the time reveals her character. " ' On one occasion, she found . . . a very devout woman . . . dying of ' this ' pestilential fever. The woman lay there in her agony, speechless for eight days. And Catherine constantly visited her, and would say to her, " Call Jesus." Unable to articulate, the woman would move her lips, and it was conjectured that she was calling Him as well as she could. And Catherine, when she saw the woman's mouth thus filled, as it were, with Jesus, could not restrain herself from kissing it with great and tender affection. And in this way she herself took the pestilential fever, and very nearly died of it. But as soon as ever she had recovered, she was back again at her work, with the same great attention and diligence.' " [3]

On account of broken health she resigned her matronship in 1495, and for the same reason, in 1496, discontinued her fasts, except fitfully and intermittently. Her husband died in 1497, leaving to Catherine the care of his illegitimate daughter Thobia, the payment of several legacies, including one to Thobia's mother, and the settlement of much involved business. Von Hügel presented this as " an impressive proof of Giuliano's full trust in the wisdom, balance of mind and magnanimity of his wife, now herself already so broken in health," [4]—a trust which Catherine's behaviour in the conscientious execution of his will and in the tender care of his daughter fully justified.

From 1499 on she found a " gentle, patient, devoted," reverent, matter-of-fact helper in financial affairs and the

[1] *M. E.* I., p. 143.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 144.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 152.

care of her own health, in so far as she permitted it, in Don Marabotto. But he was in no sense the priestly director of the independent woman. Rather in her failing years he gave her " the human support of human understanding and sympathy, and, no doubt," reminded " her, in times of darkness, of the lights and truths received and communicated by her in times of consolation." [1]

Having more leisure during her illness than during her active earlier years, she discoursed more on religious topics, especially on the love of God and on purgatory. Her sayings indicate, even in the midst of suffering, " an overflowing interior plenitude and radiant, all-conquering peace." In the calm expanse and beauty of nature she found a purification of her surface troubles, a refreshment for her soul.[2] Though many strange disorders attended her last years, she seems to have been able to distinguish between pathological and healthy states, to have utilized them effectively as illustrations of spiritual truths and means of advance, and rarely to have considered them as being of themselves alone directly supernatural signs, as her friends assumed with pious credulity.[3]

Nervous troubles commenced to abound about 1507; yet up to even four days before her death, doctors could find no physical ailments; and her judgment, except for momentary imperfections in matters " of relatively secondary importance," [4] remained essentially unshaken. She felt intense heat within and without and had sensations of wounds, arrows, rays, and sparks. These vivid, increasingly painful and exhausting,[5] quasi-sensible experiences to which she had long been susceptible, but which heretofore had been more agreeable and strengthening, and which, disdaining them in themselves, she had nevertheless used to suggest and illustrate teachings about " the joys and health-giving influence of the presence of God," [6] she now utilized in developing her doctrine of purgatory. A desire for death oppressed her, not apparently of any religious origin but a mere isolated symptom of her naturally melancholy disposition.

[1] *M. E.* I., p. 158. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 163 f. [3] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 277–8.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 176. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 187. [6] *Ibid.*, p. 179.

In 1508 she noticed a soul-restoring perfume on one of Don Marabotto's hands, apparently the right one with which he daily communicated her. She linked this with the Holy Eucharist, and said, "Since God grants me this odour, I am determined to derive strength from it, as long as He shall please that I shall do so." [1] When Don Marabotto, "thinking that he must surely be able to perceive what was being transmitted by himself, went smelling his own hand, but to no effect," Catherine rebuked him for seeking favours which God granted only to those in necessity and "as an occasion of great spiritual profit." [2] The Baron finds in this episode evidence for abnormality "in the peripheral, psycho-physical regions" of her soul and proof also of a fundamental sanity in her ability to transcend such conditions and turn them to good account, a strength of mind "perhaps unattainable by, certainly untested in, the always and simply, even peripherally, healthy soul." [3]

Professor Leuba, following carefully von Hügel's data, has summarized as well as could be done the principal psychic and physical manifestations of St. Catherine's last weeks of illness:

"Comforting and monitory voices were frequent. She suffered for a time from great cold, not altogether due to low temperature. At other times, great internal heat, skin hyperæsthesia and hyperalgesia plagued her. She could not be kept in bed; 'she was like a creature placed in a great flame of fire, and it was impossible to touch her skin because of the acute pain which she felt from any such touch.' 'At times she would be sensitive to such a degree that it was impossible to touch her sheets or a hair of her head.'

"Much of her sufferings took the form of 'attacks' . . ." often involving a trembling of her entire body or of special parts of it. "She felt great internal heat located chiefly about the heart, stifling sensations, and spasms in the throat. Frequently the seizure would end in a death-like trance. At other times she would not lose consciousness altogether,

[1] *M. E.* I., p. 184. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 184–5. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

but only speech or sight. One day, after they had been bathing her mouth, she exclaimed, '"I am suffocating." She said this because a little drop of water had trickled into her throat and she could not gulp it down.' She would frequently vomit certain food or all food; yet she never vomited the Eucharist. These attacks would come and go with great suddenness, and her mood would alter with equal rapidity." [1]

She died "at, or shortly before, dawn on the 15th September," 1510.[2]

As our immediate purpose is the study of psycho-physical states of mystics in relation to their claims to be in touch with God, and not primarily the elaboration of the life of any one mystic beyond the exigencies of illustration, our picture of St. Catherine must remain unfinished as long as we postpone any discussion of her ideas, which formed perhaps the most valuable part of her life, to their place later on in the survey of religious teachings about God and man. If von Hügel has done much that is novel and worthy of enduring appreciation in establishing the facts about St. Catherine's life and in setting forth and interpreting her doctrines and their sources, in his estimation of the place of unusual psycho-physical states in mysticism, aside from their particular connection with St. Catherine, he has not made any original contributions unknown to his predecessors in such matters. But he has so sifted and organized their judgments that, if he offers nothing which has not later been promulgated by standard writers on the subject, it is as a rule because they have relied directly (often without suitable acknowledgment) or indirectly upon estimations and suggestions that have caused his *Mystical Element* to be recognized by an authority in this field as "the best work on Mysticism in the English language." [3]

There are at least three ways of dealing with St. Catherine, or anybody else: one can try to make the most of her; one can try to make the least of her; or one can try, as the

[1] J. H. Leuba, *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, New York (Harcourt, Brace), 1926, p. 72.

[2] *M. E.* I., p. 215.

[3] Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*, London (Methuen), 1930, p. 498.

Baron did, to treat her fairly, which is the best way of making the most of her. She herself was displeased with uncritical admirers, who assumed that everything about her was altogether holy and supernatural. Such exaggerated estimates of her have naturally provoked unsympathetic responses in others. Some of these, while not entirely overlooking the fact that she had sufficient health and intelligence to carry on generous philanthropic activities for many years in high spirit and effectiveness, have been much more struck by her "repressed" and "abnormal" sex life, by the similarity of her ecstasies to those of drug addicts and epileptics, and by the likeness of many of her symptoms to those of hysteria. Von Hügel recognized as well as anybody else the presence in St. Catherine of these unpleasant features, which are common also to the majority of ecstatic mystics. It is true that she was unhappily wedded. Very likely, because of her serious and "excessive mentality" and her puritanical lack of "that quite innocent and normal sensuousness, which appears to form a necessary element of the complete human personality," she was born "a person hardly intended for marriage." "Pompilia's dying words, in Browning's 'Ring and the Book,' would, probably at any time after her premature involuntary marriage, have found appropriate place upon Catherine's lips, had she ever thought it loyal or kind to utter them: '"In heaven there is neither marriage nor giving in marriage." How like Jesus Christ to say that!'"[1]

Her sex impulses, diverted (or perverted, if you insist) partially by nature, partially by the churchly influences in her education, and partially by her matrimonial misfortunes, were unconsciously absorbed in religious rather than wifely and maternal ways, except in so far as her nursing ministered to the last. This redirection, or sublimation, if intelligently performed, is not in itself reprehensible, provided that the reason for which such a difficult sacrifice is made is, for the given individual and for the needs of society, superior, or at least equal in value, to normal sexual intercourse. For the sake of war, science, art, or business,

[1] *M. E.* I., pp. 223–4.

people have interrupted or abandoned regular sex life in order to devote their energies and attention to some other goal, the worth of which justifies or condemns the procedure.

Nevertheless, like any departure from the average, this redirection, even if it attains its end, involves its price. The "divine love" of many of the mystics, St. Catherine included, and the ecstasies, pleasures, pains, and unusual experiences connected with it, doubtless depend in part for their strength and in part for some of their manifestations and interpretations upon sex; and here, as elsewhere, when sexual impulses are thwarted or mismanaged, aberrations trivial to ruinous inevitably ensue. But the mere fact that sex organs and energies are, or may be, involved in moments of heightened religious emotion is no more to be wondered at than the fact that they are, or may be, involved in almost any sort of emotion or in any intense activity of mind or body, just as are many other glands, nerves, and organs.[1]

The pleasures and the pains of sense and the multiform influences of sex affect everybody for better or worse; in this matter each individual must be judged by himself according to his attitude and motives. It would be unnecessary to pause over such a commonplace did not some writers on this subject assume that mysticism itself entails grave sexual abnormality. If many mystics have been weak and sensual, that is not due to their mysticism, which aims at destroying such blemishes, but rather to a character which they share with many others, be they mystical, rational, scientific, prosaic, poetic, or what you will. St. Catherine of Genoa—like St. Teresa, St. John of the Cross, and most of the greatest mystics, who, after their conversion and disciplinary days at least, generally showed no tendencies to "moral vulgarity" and who certainly strived for as much freshness and decency as they were capable of in thought and action—treated her pleasures and pains ascetically although sanely; not as something to be sought or to be absorbed in for their own sakes; but, if they were inevitable and could not be ignored, to be utilized,

[1] Cf. J. B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, New York (Macmillan), 1930, pp. 417–20.

as well as possible, as helps or warnings in connection with the principal interests of her life.

Had she been acquainted with some of the more recent discoveries and theories of psychology and medicine, doubtless she might have been spared much torment of body and soul. That acquaintance alone, however, would not have answered the question whether there are not some ideals or tasks, religious or otherwise, for which one is justified in sacrificing or in transforming one's natural impulses at one's own risk, provided that one realizes the expense of such a course and provided that one's goal cannot be reached as satisfactorily by an easier route, all circumstances of time and *milieu* receiving full consideration. The mere presence of abnormalities and disease, although they are repulsive in themselves, and rightly arouse mistrust in others, indicates nothing concerning the validity of their sufferer's beliefs or the value of his life, if, instead of succumbing entirely to them and becoming merely an invalid below the general run of humanity, he, like St. Catherine of Genoa and most of the best mystics, is able to draw wisdom and light from his adversity, is able to transcend and to utilize it to some notable extent, thus showing a certain spiritual buoyancy and independence amid peril and doubt

> " Low kinds exist without,
> Finished and finite clods, untroubled by a spark." [1]

If von Hügel never went into this subject even as vaguely as this, to say nothing of discussing it as minutely as several recent psychologists have done, it was probably because he found the nobility and the strength of St. Catherine's character far more interesting than any possible sexual disturbances resulting from no fault of hers. In a similar fashion he regarded the possibility of her having suffered from hysteria. Without denying the presence of many hysteriform phenomena in St. Catherine's life, he makes it clear that she, like many another great mystic, was no ordinary hysterical patient. Her personality, far from being disintegrated, was as well organized and governed by steady,

[1] R. Browning, " Rabbi Ben Ezra."

commendable purposes as that of almost any outstanding character or genius in a different field.[1] In this respect she is to be attacked, if at all, not on the ground that she resembled victims of hysteria, but on the ground that her fine mind was only too effectively obsessed by allegedly false ideas of religion. Compared with her ideas and beliefs, her frequent unusual psycho-physical states are relatively secondary; more upon the truth and value of the former than upon the normality or abnormality of the latter rests the significance of her life.

Her ecstasies bring up hosts of reflections. We know what it is to concentrate, to think things over until irrelevant details become dim and we find ourselves at last grappling with fundamental ideas and feelings of which we were not at first aware. We have read of novelists who became so entangled in their own stories that for perhaps several days they could not fully escape from them. But the bulk of mankind does not concentrate beyond a certain elementary point. St. Catherine, although she went far, did not go all the way—a fact which limits von Hügel's discussion of mystical knowledge. She focused her consciousness on God, until she was filled with love, joy, and a sense of His goodness and presence; [2] but she seems rarely if ever to have banished all awareness of other things, to have passed into a trance of complete union with Him, as is more common among Eastern mystics. Though she sometimes lost control of her senses, so that she could not move, she seems to have retained some conceptual ideas and some awareness of the state of her body, which coloured her ideas about God—as when she spoke of Him as a spark of love, an idea suggested probably by a burning sensation about her heart.

Von Hügel "would have the reader clearly to understand, that nowhere are such psycho-physical conditions and experiences to be considered the *causes* of her doctrine, as though the lower produced the higher, and as though the

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spiritual were the automatic resultant and necessary precipitate of certain accidental, involuntary conditions in time and space. For everywhere such conditions can only, at best, be accepted as the occasions or materials for the development or illustration of some spiritual doctrine, or contrariwise, as the psychic effects and embodiments of some vividly realized invisible truth or law; whilst this spiritual teaching itself is derived from far other and deeper causes—the interaction of her own experience and free spiritual powers and of God's grace, and the conflict of these with her own passions, the whole helped or hindered by the world without." [1]

The same attitude appears in von Hügel's interpretation of the process preparatory to ecstasy, when the mystic is feeding on, and thinking of, exclusively religious realities and ideas,—" a process which, looked at merely phenomenally and separately, appears as a simple case of monoideism and auto-suggestion, but which can and should be conceived, when studied in its ultimate cause and end, as due to the pressure and influence of God's spirit working in and through the spirit of man,—the Creator causing his own little human creature freely to create for itself some copy of and approach to its own eternally subsisting, substantial Cause and Crown." [2] As long as the mystic regards his ideas and feelings as being only hints of God, they arouse no exceptional difficulties, no matter how mysterious they are. But as the emotional content of his experience becomes more intense and the conceptual content apparently simpler and hence less likely to kindle doubt than to strengthen conviction,[3] the mystic sometimes regards his ideas as actually psycho-physical impressions. " Is not, *e.g.*, Catherine's joy at this stage centred precisely in the downright feeling, smelling, seeing, of ocean waters, penetrating odours, all-enveloping light; and in the identification of those waters, odours, lights, with God Himself, so that God becomes at

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last an object of direct, passive, sensible perception? Have we not then here at last reached pure delusion? "[1]

The answer depends upon the spirituality of the mystic in question. The weaker ones, and the greater ones in their weaker moments, will assume that such feelings, visions, and often hallucinations, are God Himself. The Baron rejected this assumption as false; because it fails to harmonize with the " principles common to all true religion "; because it leads to absurd consequences; and because the admittedly superior mystics denounce such an interpretation of their experience. They recognize the " mentality of these experiences." St. Catherine " constantly speaks of seeing ' as though with the eyes of the body.' And St. Teresa tells us . . . of how, in reality, ' she never,' in her true visions and locutions, ' saw anything with her bodily eyes, nor heard anything with her bodily ears '; and of how indeed she later, on one occasion, ' saw nothing with the eyes of the body, nothing with the eyes of the soul,'—she ' simply felt Christ close by her,'—evidently again with the soul. Thus, too, Catherine tells us, that ' as the intellect exceeds language, so does love exceed intellection '; and how vividly she feels that ' all that can be said of God,' compared to the great Reality, ' is but tiny crumbs from the great Master's table.' "[2]

The outstanding mystics themselves, therefore, recognize that their seemingly physical impressions ought to be accepted as really mental, quickened by the vividness of their developed imaginations, and possessing at best a relation, or an analogical likeness, to spiritual realities with which they are not identical.[3] They know that God is so all-excelling that their own mental processes, sights, and sounds cannot be more than " crumbs." The value of the " crumbs," as an indication of the nature of the loaf and of the Master, they test by their effects for better or worse in their lives.

Some mystics, going beyond St. Catherine's characteristic stage, which involved more or less voluntary, definite, conceptual ideas and also suggestions from her body, reach at times, whether they desire it or not, an almost indescrib-

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 49. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 50. [3] *Ibid.*

able and formless state of union with God.[1] Such a mystic " distinguishes quite clearly between this culminating point and other visions—sensory, imaginative, symbolic visions which can be more easily handled by psychology; in union properly so called, the symbol vanishes, imagery fades, space disappears, multiplicity is reduced, reasoning is silent, the feeling of extension gathers itself together and then breaks down: intellectual activity is entirely concentrated in its intensity; it seizes without intermediary, with the sovereign certitude of intuition, Being, God." [2] At that point " the intuition of God as present " [3] becomes so overwhelming that " the soul seems to be God rather than itself, and indeed is God by participation, though in reality preserving its own natural substance as distinct from God as it did before, although transformed in Him, as the window preserves its own substance distinct from that of the rays of the sun shining through it and making it light." [4] To most mystics this sense of union with God has been granted only in trances or visions, which momentarily incapacitated them for anything else, but which later (among the great mystics) inspired and animated their lives. Some, like St. Teresa, after years of training and by the grace of God,[5] seem to have been able

[1] " The mystic, says Dionysius, ' must leave behind all things both in the sensible and in the intelligible worlds, till he enters into the darkness of nescience that is truly mystical.' This ' Divine Darkness,' he says elsewhere, ' is the light unapproachable ' mentioned by St. Paul, ' a deep but dazzling darkness,' as Henry Vaughan calls it. It is dark through excess of light."—W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, New York (Scribner's), 1899, p. 109.

[2] J. Maréchal, *Studies in the Psychology of the Mystics*, trans. Algar Thorold, London (Burns, Oates and Washbourne), 1927, p. 32.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

[4] St. John of the Cross, *Ascent of Carmel*, ii. 5, as quoted by A. Poulain, *The Graces of Interior Prayer*, trans. L. L. Yorke-Smith, London, 1912, p. 294, and cited by Maréchal, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

[5] " We think it useless to insist on the *interpretation which the mystics themselves give of the nature of their state*. They are unanimous in considering the mystical union properly so called as a grace of God, not only in the sense that God has allowed them by a special providence to benefit by an exceptional concourse of otherwise natural circumstances, but in the sense that a *direct divine intervention has produced in them a state absolutely unattainable* by merely natural means."—Maréchal, *op. cit.*, p. 123

Some Western mystics and even more Eastern ones induce trances by their own devices, without moral or religious preparation, in a purely naturalistic fashion. " The Christian mystics, however, formally

commendable purposes as that of almost any outstanding character or genius in a different field.[1] In this respect she is to be attacked, if at all, not on the ground that she resembled victims of hysteria, but on the ground that her fine mind was only too effectively obsessed by allegedly false ideas of religion. Compared with her ideas and beliefs, her frequent unusual psycho-physical states are relatively secondary; more upon the truth and value of the former than upon the normality or abnormality of the latter rests the significance of her life.

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The answer depends upon the spirituality of the mystic in question. The weaker ones, and the greater ones in their weaker moments, will assume that such feelings, visions, and often hallucinations, are God Himself. The Baron rejected this assumption as false; because it fails to harmonize with the "principles common to all true religion"; because it leads to absurd consequences; and because the admittedly superior mystics denounce such an interpretation of their experience. They recognize the "mentality of these experiences." St. Catherine "constantly speaks of seeing 'as though with the eyes of the body.' And St. Teresa tells us . . . of how, in reality, 'she never,' in her true visions and locutions, 'saw anything with her bodily eyes, nor heard anything with her bodily ears'; and of how indeed she later, on one occasion, 'saw nothing with the eyes of the body, nothing with the eyes of the soul,'—she 'simply felt Christ close by her,'—evidently again with the soul. Thus, too, Catherine tells us, that 'as the intellect exceeds language, so does love exceed intellection'; and how vividly she feels that 'all that can be said of God,' compared to the great Reality, 'is but tiny crumbs from the great Master's table.' "[2]

The outstanding mystics themselves, therefore, recognize that their seemingly physical impressions ought to be accepted as really mental, quickened by the vividness of their developed imaginations, and possessing at best a relation, or an analogical likeness, to spiritual realities with which they are not identical.[3] They know that God is so all-excelling that their own mental processes, sights, and sounds cannot be more than "crumbs." The value of the "crumbs," as an indication of the nature of the loaf and of the Master, they test by their effects for better or worse in their lives.

Some mystics, going beyond St. Catherine's characteristic stage, which involved more or less voluntary, definite, conceptual ideas and also suggestions from her body, reach at times, whether they desire it or not, an almost indescrib-

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 49. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 50. [3] *Ibid.*

able and formless state of union with God.[1] Such a mystic " distinguishes quite clearly between this culminating point and other visions—sensory, imaginative, symbolic visions which can be more easily handled by psychology; in union properly so called, the symbol vanishes, imagery fades, space disappears, multiplicity is reduced, reasoning is silent, the feeling of extension gathers itself together and then breaks down: intellectual activity is entirely concentrated in its intensity; it seizes without intermediary, with the sovereign certitude of intuition, Being, God." [2] At that point " the intuition of God as present " [3] becomes so overwhelming that " the soul seems to be God rather than itself, and indeed is God by participation, though in reality preserving its own natural substance as distinct from God as it did before, although transformed in Him, as the window preserves its own substance distinct from that of the rays of the sun shining through it and making it light." [4] To most mystics this sense of union with God has been granted only in trances or visions, which momentarily incapacitated them for anything else, but which later (among the great mystics) inspired and animated their lives. Some, like St. Teresa, after years of training and by the grace of God,[5] seem to have been able

[1] " The mystic, says Dionysius, ' must leave behind all things both in the sensible and in the intelligible worlds, till he enters into the darkness of nescience that is truly mystical.' This ' Divine Darkness,' he says elsewhere, ' is the light unapproachable ' mentioned by St. Paul, ' a deep but dazzling darkness,' as Henry Vaughan calls it. It is dark through excess of light."—W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, New York (Scribner's), 1899, p. 109.

[2] J. Maréchal, *Studies in the Psychology of the Mystics*, trans. Algar Thorold, London (Burns, Oates and Washbourne), 1927, p. 32.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

[4] St. John of the Cross, *Ascent of Carmel*, ii. 5, as quoted by A. Poulain, *The Graces of Interior Prayer*, trans. L. L. Yorke-Smith, London, 1912, p. 294, and cited by Maréchal, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

[5] " We think it useless to insist on the *interpretation which the mystics themselves give of the nature of their state*. They are unanimous in considering the mystical union properly so called as a grace of God, not only in the sense that God has allowed them by a special providence to benefit by an exceptional concourse of otherwise natural circumstances, but in the sense that a *direct divine intervention has produced in them a state absolutely unattainable* by merely natural means."—Maréchal, *op. cit.*, p. 123

Some Western mystics and even more Eastern ones induce trances by their own devices, without moral or religious preparation, in a purely naturalistic fashion. " The Christian mystics, however, formally

to maintain contemplation habitually at this intense degree and at the same time to perform admirably all the duties of their place in the world—which appears to be "the most perfect state to which the mystic can aspire on earth." [1]

A full ecstasy presents both negative and positive aspects. The disappearance of distractions and cares of the world, the deadening of senses and bodily feelings, "the effacement of the empirical Ego, the leaving aside of imagery and spatiality, the absence of all enumerable multiplicity . . . in a word, the cessation of conceptual thought," [2] all this, from our ordinary point of view, marks ecstasy as negative. But it is not merely that

> "I have ceased to think or to reason: there is nothing to ponder or prove:
> I hope, I believe no longer: I am lost in a dream of love." [3]

That savours more of a quietist caricature of ecstasy than the experience as described by the pre-eminent mystics.[4] Far from being a matter of drowsiness, pleasant but blank absorption, or complete unconsciousness, for them ecstasy is rather an enlargement and intensification of emotion and attention, until the process of concentration—the quietude of unimpeded action—, functioning to its highest pitch, results in an experience of superlative richness, empty-seeming only because it is so different from anything else the mystic has experienced that he cannot describe it, but, as an

vindicate the sovereign liberty of the divine initiative; for them the *ascesis* constitutes a condition normally necessary for ecstasy, doubtless, but it is never a sufficient one."—*Ibid.*, p. 202.

In this matter the Baron would not put too much stress upon the psychological form—the passivity the mystics felt in themselves and the objectivity they felt in the experience "given" to them—but would test such experiences by the value of their content when examined in the light of our broadest knowledge. His belief in the justness of ascribing valid mystical experiences to the prevenient grace of God lay more in his general philosophical and Catholic theological position than in his acceptance of the mystics' psychology.

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 194.

[3] E. G. A. Holmes, "The Creed of My Heart."

[4] The appeal to special mystics as greater than others, no matter how justified it may be, shows that von Hügel is not so much interested in describing the common run of mysticism as he is in discovering what is the best in mysticism and what mysticism should be.

" immediate assimilation " of God, incomparably positive.[1] " This is," writes Maréchal, and the Baron would agree with him, " in truth, the fundamental mystical phenomenon —the direct feeling of God's presence, or the *intuition of God as present.* The remainder—physical ecstasy, suspension of the senses, sensible or imaginary visions, interior words, levitations, miracles, clairvoyance, etc.—are pure accessories, which may or may not accompany the fundamental state, and the immediate causes of which may be diverse." [2]

If we have followed Maréchal in the last two paragraphs, that is not because von Hügel would necessarily agree with all the Louvain professor's speculations about the nature of mystical knowledge, but because Maréchal has treated the final stages of ecstasy with more detailed conciseness and with equal sympathy and fidelity to the sources. No matter how carefully one reads the Baron's works, one cannot find anywhere a compact and consciously worked out theory of mystical knowledge. At this critical point in regard to the apprehension of the supernatural, his readers are left to ferret out his opinions and to piece them together as best they can.

He does maintain, however, that there is no " specifically distinct, self-sufficing, purely Mystical mode of apprehending Reality." [3] *How* we apprehend reality of any kind, von Hügel was not rash enough to explain; but *that* our consciousness is always directly, though never exhaustively, of reality he assumed. Hence at the very outset he refused to embroil himself in discussions as to whether an " idea " of God really " corresponds " with God or not; refusing, presumably, on the ground that if the question really presupposes both knowledge of God and knowledge of a certain attitude of mind towards God, there is no need of assuming the existence of intermediate psychological entities like ideas; and that, if the question does not presuppose such a realistic situation, it is both meaningless and unanswerable. Although everybody does not consciously worship God in a

[1] Maréchal, *op. cit.*, p. 194.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 102.
[3] *M. E.* II., p. 283.

religious fashion, nevertheless, the Baron maintained, "in even the most purely contingent-seeming soul, and in its apparently but Institutional and Historic assents and acts, there ever is, there never can fail to be, *some*, however implicit, however slight, however intermittent, sense and experience of the Infinite, evidenced by at least some dissatisfaction with the Finite, except as this Finitude is an occasion for growth in, and a part-expression of, that Infinite our true home." [1] These symptoms of the influence of the infinite, and other symptoms mentioned in the chapter on intimations of the supernatural, taken together with the facts of religion and mysticism, indicate, von Hügel believed, that almost all men have some awareness of God unrecognized by themselves; that most have some conscious religious belief in Him, of varying degrees of adequacy; and that some, aided by congenital differences in constitutional endowment, by peculiar circumstances in their environment, by their own unusual efforts, and by divine grace, are able, by a special employment of the faculties common to all men, to obtain an unusually vivid sense of the presence of God.[2]

The sense of God's presence is, therefore, not confined to the extreme grades of mysticism. It may arise with the contemplation of natural beauty, the witnessing of a magnanimous action, the study of poetry or history, as well as from profound devotional attention to a religious dogma or

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 283.

[2] "Mysticism . . . becomes profoundly uninteresting, and indeed a pure and simple irritant, except it be conceived as existing, in some form and degree, in every mind. Only in its intensity and extension, in its quantity and quality will it then differ in various souls."—*S. L.*, p. 84.

The "best" mystics "do not claim any special faculty for the apprehension of the divine. Plotinus says that it is a faculty 'which all possess, though only a few use it.' "—W. R. Inge, *More Lay Thoughts of a Dean*, 1931, p. 74.

"The inspiration of the prophet [not infrequently, as in the Old Testament, an ecstatic mystic] does not make him abnormal; on the contrary, it is a heightening of normal human power. The prophet differs from other men in greater clearness and range of ideas, in an intenser conviction, in a more vehement passion, in a gift of poetry and eloquence. He does not lose his personality: he finds it exalted."—C. A. Bennett, *Dilemma of Religious Knowledge* (Yale University Press), 1931, p. 58.

person. Although the sense of God's presence is doubtless stronger in ecstasy than elsewhere, it is an error of exclusive mysticism, von Hügel declared, to assume that Nature and our more ordinary interests may not likewise serve as means of our becoming aware of Him. Indeed, mystical ecstasy, which seems to be so individualistic, so much a matter of "pure spirituality," depends closely upon religious institutions, which teach and foster mystical intercourse, and which, from their broad acquaintance with history and the many-levelled realities of the world, present the doctrines, the persons, and the objects on which mystics concentrate.[1] Since, then, mystical experience is not the only source of the apprehension of God, it must be tested and supplemented by other sources, by appeal to history, philosophy, the institution, the concrete, and daily experience,[2] just as these need to appeal to mysticism if they are not to sink to a less than human level. To assume that the sense of God's presence, no matter how immediate and convincing it is, is sufficient alone to justify anything more than itself, to warrant the truth of certain doctrines, for instance, without the consent of the rest of one's best knowledge, is to take refuge in a distinct mystical faculty superior to criticism, such as the Baron rejected.[3]

[1] Cf. Rufus M. Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. xxxiv–xxxv.

[2] Cf. *R. G.*, p. 91; *M. E.* II., pp. 305–6, 351–3, 356.

[3] The (ideal) mystic has no "interest in appealing to a faculty 'above reason,' if reason is used in its proper sense, as the logic of the whole personality. The desire to find for our highest intuitions an authority wholly external to reason and independent of it—a 'purely supernatural' revelation—has, as Récéjac says, 'been the cause of the longest and the most dangerous of the aberrations from which Mysticism has suffered.' This kind of supernaturalism is destructive of *unity* in our ideas of God, the world, and ourselves; and it casts a slur on the faculties which are the appointed organs of communication between God and man. A revelation absolutely transcending reason is an absurdity; no such revelation could ever be made. . . . What we can and must transcend, if we would make any progress in Divine Knowledge, is not reason, but that shallow rationalism which regards the data on which we can reason as a fixed quantity, known to all, and which bases itself on a formal logic, utterly unsuited to a spiritual view of things. . . . When, therefore, Harnack says that 'Mysticism is nothing else than rationalism applied to a sphere above reason,' he would have done better to say that it is 'reason applied to a sphere above rationalism.'"—W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, New York (Scribner's), 1899, pp. 19–21.

An objection frequently made against the experience of mystical ecstasy is that it deals only with

> " Thoughts hardly to be packed
> Into a narrow act,
> Fancies that broke through language and escaped "; [1]

that it yields no tangible results; that, since it is emotional, it cannot be cognitive. The fact that the mystics report nothing heretofore unknown to sacred or profane science fills some people with indignation.[2] The ecstatics go into their trances thinking, perhaps, about " the Trinity and the procession of the Logos "; [3] they have an indescribably wonderful feeling of somehow grasping the essence of those doctrines; but, when they resume ordinary consciousness, they cannot explain to us incredulous bystanders anything that we did not know before. The usual conclusion,—mysticism is wrong. To be sure, the mystics' faith is often strengthened and they have undeniably increased the spiritual vigour of thousands of believers; but—as that is apparently irrelevant—what contribution have they made to science, cosmology, or theology? Certainly next to nothing, *except* in so far as moral and religious zeal and inspiration indirectly affect almost every aspect of life.[4] But there is nothing strange in this lack of novelty,

[1] Browning, " Rabbi Ben Ezra."

[2] " I can find nothing . . . learnt during those states of absorption [St. Catherine's ecstasies] other than what, in a lesser degree, is probably experienced, during at least some rare moments, by all souls that have attained to the so-called Prayer of Quiet."—*M. E.* I., p. 228.

[3] Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 499.

[4] " Mystical experience does not add anything ' new ' to our knowledge. To insist that it does is to pass from Mysticism into the nebulous realm of theosophy. Mystics, like other human beings, receive their knowledge through ordinary rational channels. When it seems to them that an entirely new truth has been revealed through a vision, one of two things has really happened; either a forgotten truth has been recalled so vividly and forcibly as to impress the sense of a new discovery upon the mind, or thoughts which have long been shaping through hours of brooding attention, but which failed to come to actual birth, are made explicit and articulate to the mind, which cannot recognise them in the finished form. . . . Knowledge is never our own until it becomes part of the very stuff of our life, and the mystic experience through which it is thus vitally incorporated into our substance *does* add something ' new ' to our personality, and does so in the only real sense in which anything ' new ' can come to us. . . . There will always, of course, remain a distinction between the visions which are manifestly the soul's decipher-

at least as far as our hand-picked coterie of "best" mystics is concerned. Even St. Teresa, in spite of the "ecstatic folly" of her "pretensions" to have been specially introduced to "all the Three Persons of the Most Holy Trinity,"[1] was continually mistrusting her visions and running in a naïve and flattering way after theologians for the truth. Her example suggests that metaphysical and rationalistic utterances of mysticism must be tested in a philosophically and logically accredited fashion.

But the mystical sense of God's presence, when taken on its own merits, seems to have an intrinsic emotional, religious value; of this there is no doubt in the minds of the mystics. It is very definitely a pleasure, a "consolation," no matter how painful it may be or how austerely it must be desired and acted upon. If we regard any experience in a psychological fashion only, it becomes ridiculous, especially the more delicately abundant the experience is. Few scenes could be more silly or repulsive than those presented by devoted lovers, an audience intensely engrossed in a concert, or a person in prayer, provided that the observer knew only the external behaviour, and failed to understand and feel something akin to the inner experience involved. Those of us who are not mystics can merely guess what ecstasy must be like.

If we agree with von Hügel, we shall not assume that, because the experience is apparently predominantly emotional and not to any great extent cognitive in a conceptual and easily communicable sense, it is therefore less valuable or less revelatory of the nature of reality than discursive knowledge. We might have here a union of deep emotion with deep thought of a primarily receptive and attentive

ing of a message given for the first time, and those which are clearly the pictured reflection of what was already in the mind. But no sharp line of demarcation can be drawn—very probably most of the great dynamic visions were a compound of *both* kinds—and we cannot affirm that one is of greater value than the other. They must be measured by the extent to which they minister to the enlarging and deepening of the religious personality and to the building up of the life of communion with God."—E. Herman, *The Meaning and Value of Mysticism*, London (J. Clarke and Co.), 1925, pp. 62–4.

[1] P. E. More, *The Catholic Faith* (Princeton University Press), 1931, p. 239.

rather than critical nature. The whole conscious personality would seem to be engaged therein, but not the whole personality would then be conscious, since the exercise of the senses and ordinary reasoning is suspended. Nor, from the Baron's point of view, could the mystic be said to be focusing upon all reality; for, although God is reality *par excellence*, nature too, according to von Hügel, is not merely illusory but has a subordinate reality of its own. But as the union of deep thought and deep emotion, in all their varieties, on the part of the whole personality, with entirely conscious assimilation of reality in all its depths, is a high-flown ideal of knowledge never actually attained by us finite creatures, mystical knowledge, von Hügel reiterated, suffers the general limitations of human knowledge, being (in spite of the psychologists) a real, but (in spite of the extreme or exclusive mystics) a partial, as well as a unique, type of knowledge.

The overwhelming sense of God's presence, in Christian mystical ecstasy, resembles more than anything else, while apparently incredibly surpassing it in intimacy and satisfaction, the knowledge born of personal love.[1] Both experiences have deceptive counterfeits; both depend upon intricate psycho-physical preconditions; both, being immediate, inexhaustible, and ineffable, are later open to such innumerable conflicting interpretations, arising from the different backgrounds and characters of the participants, that the observer, instead of grading the interpretations upon their own merits, as being in varying degrees adequate, or misleading, rationalizations of the abundant reality experienced, is apt to treat the experience itself as relatively negligible and merely "psychological," deriving its value not to some extent from a direct contact with reality, but entirely from subjective and conventional interpretations of it. And both mystical ecstasy and human love, in spite of their inspiration and incontestable richness for those who experience them, in spite of some sort of knowledge and reality which they possess, are so insubmissive to the ordinary categories of

[1] See Pratt's remarks on "knowledge of acquaintance" and "knowledge about," *op. cit.*, pp. 401, 402, 406.

emotion and cognition that both agent and observer, hesitant at accepting them as they stand, are sometimes tempted to classify them either with illusions or with superficially similar but fundamentally different pathological conditions.

To disentangle and judge the worth of all the affinities and implications of religious ecstasy would lead us into an ambitious, interminable attempt to interpret an experience unknown to us, in a rationalistic fashion which is probably unsuited to it. Instead of following that procedure in any detail, the Baron ultimately asserted his belief that mysticism (of an " inclusive " type, tempered by consideration of other human needs) is indispensable to religion as a whole; that it can, and in some cases [1] does, result in real contact with, or assimilation of, God. A church or an individual believer whose knowledge of God is not enlightened and warmed to some extent by direct mystical communion with Him, knows Him about as well as one would know Helen of Troy, if one's acquaintance with her were confined to general deductions drawn from the nature of woman and from descriptions of her furnished by those who had met her. But to affirm this, as von Hügel virtually does, need arouse no concern on behalf of " spiritual modesty." [2] His was certainly a moderate and guarded mysticism. Those mystics who claimed to know all that there is to be known of God he felt deceived themselves more than others. Treating the distinction of St. John of the Cross between " union of love and union of essence " as more than a " verbal precaution," [3] the Baron insisted that Christian ecstasy reaches not an identification of the essence of the believer with God's essence but an indefinitely increasable apprehension of the divine.

To sum up von Hügel's decisions in regard to psycho-physical features of mysticism: some unusual conditions involving auto-suggestion and mono-ideism, usually resulting in trances, often accompanied by hysteriform phenomena,

[1] In exactly which cases? To put its finger on anything is more difficult for critical realism than to make sweeping gestures.

[2] P. E. More, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 252. Cf. *M. E.* II., p. 51.

downright abnormalities, and illnesses of many sorts, generally, but not always (not all mystics are ecstatics), seem to be necessary conditions and results of more or less continual and extraordinarily intense awareness of the presence of God. But mechanisms of this sort, far from being confined to mystics, appear in geniuses and specialists in all fields, particularly among scientists, philosophers, poets, and musicians. If " large range, variety, and delicacy of sense-stimulation is the normal condition, occasion, vehicle and material for any deep apprehension and vivid understanding of the profounder, spiritual levels, energies, and facts found by or given to the soul," [1] it is not strange that artists and poets should be in many respects unusually sensitive compared with the bulk of mankind, or that ecstatics should be endowed with a special psycho-physical organism the peculiarities and the sensitiveness of which are further defined by their type of sanctity.[2] Judged according to a neural standard only, Newton and Napoleon were " psycho-physical eccentrics," Kant and Beethoven, " hopeless and useless hypochondriacs." [3] Thus merely to point to an extraordinary psychological condition, to strange subjective interpretations, and the like, does not in itself preclude the condition from being perhaps under suitable circumstances a means of divine revelation, or the interpretations from aiding in bringing that about, or from being true to some extent.[4] Hence, von Hügel argued, a mystical experience is to be judged primarily not by its psycho-physical form,

[1] *R. G.*, p. 208.
[2] *M. E.* II., pp. 42 ff.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 41–2.
[4] Considerations like these, if true, may somewhat weaken the force of Dr. P. E. More's argument against " mystical pretensions " (*op. cit.*, pp. 206 ff.). Like von Hügel, he rejects extreme, " exclusive " mysticism, but largely because of its psychological form. It might be objected that in Dr. More's discussion his preoccupation with the similarity between the form of a non-religious experience undergone by J. A. Symonds and the form of some presumably religious experiences of extreme mystics prevents him from doing sufficient justice to subtle differences in the content of those two types of experiences and to marked differences in the form and the content of Symonds' experience as compared with the religious experiences of " inclusive " mystics. Hence, while in no way invalidating " inclusive " mysticism, Dr. More supplies reasons for suspecting exclusive mysticism just in so far as that abandons

which the mystics themselves disparage unless it brings forth good fruit,[1] but by the physical, mental, moral, and spiritual value of the experience to the mystic himself at the time and throughout the rest of his life and by its value to civilization.[2] As mystics and others will continually disagree about the worth of different sorts of spirituality and their effects, the test is by no means absolute or undeniable. It is perforce pragmatic, experimental, in the end, like religion itself, very largely a matter of individual experience and taste.

The application of this test will doubtless brand some mystics as fantastic or insane, and others as immoral in the sense that they wasted their lives to no personal or social good. Nevertheless the Baron warns those who are naturally disposed to condemn people whom they cannot understand, that the pertinent question about any life is not whether it is physically healthy or of immediate political, economic, utilitarian value, but whether it is worth its cost, if it must be paid for by such strange and untimely "general incapacitation" as appears, for example, in the careers of Sister Lukardis and Father Hecker.[3]

The final earthly judgment belongs neither to society nor to the institution, no matter how just their right nor how great their power to direct the individual. Since some people are definitely mystics and have as much right to live their own lives as anybody else, the feelings and the beliefs of non-mystics cannot be made the only fair basis for generalization.

the field of religion for that of neutral experiences of being "swallowed up . . . in an abysmal sense of absolute unity," such as Symonds occasionally suffered from. But the ultimate ground of dissatisfaction with Symonds' experience and with others like it lies not so much in its psychological form as in its insignificance and fruitlessness in relation to the rest of his life.

[1] St. Teresa "'never undertook anything merely because it came to her in prayer. For all that her confessors told her that these things came from God, she never so thoroughly believed them that she could swear to it herself, although it did seem to her that they were spiritually safe, because of the effects thereof.' This doctrine is still the last word of wisdom in these matters."—*M. E.* I., pp. 48–9.

[2] Cf. *M. E.* II., pp. 161–2. Cf. important passages from von Hügel's letter to Loisy, quoted by the latter in his *Mémoires*, Vol. I. p. 503, and Loisy's comments on pp. 504–5.

[3] Cf. *M. E.* II., pp. 52–6.

Whether ecstatic mysticism is worth its price or not is, von Hügel felt, a personal question which the ecstatics must decide for themselves. "Would that particular temperament and psycho-physical organism congenial to Sister Lukardis, to Catherine Fiesca Adorna, to Marguerite Marie Alacoque, and to Isaac Hecker, have—taking the whole existence and output together—produced more useful work, and have apprehended and presented more of abiding truth, had their ecstatic states or tendencies been, if possible, absent or suppressed? Does not this type of apprehension . . . stand out—in their central, creative periods—as the one thoroughly appropriate means and form of their true self-development and self-expression, and of such an apprehension and showing forth of spiritual truth as to them—to them and not to you and me—was possible?" [1] We have to remember, moreover, that the joy and vigour of their lives flowed from their intense preoccupation with religious realities; that their specifically religious ecstasies were, unlike pathological states, woven without break into the fabric of their most cherished purposes, and that these ecstasies, when genuinely religious, again unlike pathological states, were ordinarily not only spiritually but likewise physically strengthening. "And if, after . . . their productive period, some of these persons end by losing their psycho-physical health, it is far from unreasonable to suppose that the actual alternative to those ecstasies and their break-up, would, *for them*, have been a lifelong dreary languor and melancholy self-absorption, somewhat after the pattern of Catherine's last ten pre-conversion years. Thus for her, and doubtless for most of the spiritually considerable ecstatics, life was, taken all in all, indefinitely happier, richer, and more fruitful in religious truth and holiness, with the help of those ecstatic states, than it would have been if these states had been absent or could have been suppressed." [2]

Unlike exclusive mysticism, an inclusive mysticism, like that of Catholic Christianity at its best, contains its own safeguards of health. The condition of the soul being deemed

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 58. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

more significant than that of the body, unusual or unhealthy psycho-physical states are frowned upon, unless they can prove their spiritual worth.[1] Institutional and intellectual elements of religion, together with countless other preoccupations with nature and supernature in all its levels, supplementing the failings of mysticism, enable the believer to lead a more abundant and better balanced life. The stress upon the institutional, the social, and the commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," tends to check the *solus cum solo* tendency inherent in pure mysticism. This is strikingly seen in the contrast between the often exclusively mystical teaching of many Christian saints—with its treatment of the world as an illusion, and of other people as distractions from the solitary course of one's own individual salvation and from the one sufficient and acceptable love of God—and their lives and practice full of appreciation of the beauties of the world and selfless devotion to their fellow-men.[2] Thus the narrower streams of "exclusive mysticism" and "prophetic religion" combine in these saints to form, like the Rhone and the Arve, a river at first perhaps less homogeneous and "consistent," but ultimately, with the final mingling of conflicting currents, deeper, broader, richer, stronger than either stream was before.

Without the check of a concrete, historical, institutional religion, mysticism, thirsting for unity and desirous of escaping from itself into the snowy serenity of the impersonal, is only too likely to lose itself in pantheism or undifferentiated monism. Among its many attractions, pantheism keeps alive a dim sense of God, which is the basis of religion; emphasizes His immanence and ubiquity; and, in followers like Spinoza, shows the value of deterministic science and impartial law in the purification of the petty individual.[3]

Nevertheless no developed religion, above all Christianity, can permit any form of pantheism to have the last word. The first chapter set forth von Hügel's reasons for accepting

[1] *M. E.* II., pp. 59, 306.
[2] *Ibid.*, II., p. 59. Cf. P. E. More, *op. cit.*, p. 279.
[3] *M. E.*, II., pp. 325–32.

a preliminary pantheism; for giving science, the Thing, the impersonal, a midway position epistemologically, morally, and ontologically; and for refusing to consider it as self-subsistent or ultimate. From the point of view of religion, he felt that an Hegelian form of pantheism (using the word broadly) leaves no room for humility, contrition, or adoration.[1] God's unity with all that is, cannot be, as most pantheisms teach, simply identity of substance, an uninteresting, insignificant oneness. His unity with creation, and especially with human souls, is rather (as the Hegelians aver) somehow a unity within and (as they generally overlook) beyond diversity, " deriving its very close-knitness from its perfect organization of not simply identical elements or relations." [2]

What, then, shall we do with mystical affirmations of union with God? Even a Christian, and in many ways not an extreme, mystic like St. Catherine of Genoa claims: " My *Me* is God, nor do I recognize any other *Me*, except my God Himself "; " my Being is God, not by simple participation but by a true transformation of my Being "; " God is my Being, my *Me*, my Strength, my Beatitude, my Good, my Delight "; " the glorious God is the whole essence of things both visible and invisible." [3] The Baron interpreted these sayings and others even more pantheistic as being primarily enthusiastic awarenesses of God's presence " in " the soul (as well as " in " and " throughout " and " beyond " creation) and vehement longings for a more complete realization of that presence. " Such a *Panentheism* is all that many a daring, in strictness Pantheistic, saying of the Christian, perhaps also of the Jewish and Mohammedan, Mystics aimed at.[4] Only the soul's ineradicable capacity, need and desire

[1] *R. G.*, p. 32.

[2] *M. E.* II., p. 334. An indefinite, general statement, but indicating at least the direction of approach.

[3] *Ibid.*, I., pp. 265–6.

[4] " In profession these [Christian] mystics are . . . quite orthodox; but even so their language is often alarmingly extravagant, and when the fear of censure is out of mind and the emotions begin to have free play, doubt will arise whether the distinction they make between the union of love and the union of essence is anything more than a verbal precaution and has any practical validity."—P. E. More, *op. cit.*, pp. 251–2. " Oh, St. John [of the Cross] is careful here to guard against the open

for its Divine Lodger and Sustainer would constitute in this conception the intrinsic characteristic of human nature; and it is rather the too close identification, in feeling and emotional expression, of the desire and the Desired, of the hunger and the Food, and the too exclusive realization of the deep truth that this desire and hunger do not cause, but are themselves preceded and caused by, their Object—it is the over-vivid perception of this real dynamism, rather than any *a priori* theory of static substances and identities—which, certainly in many cases, has produced the appearance of Pantheism." [1]

The pantheistic flavour of some mystical sayings, especially if the mystic has not given himself over entirely to a form of

heresy of teaching an essential union of the soul with God such as would place him with the pagan mystics. But what practical force, what significance of any sort, has this thin dividing word 'essence' before the all-devouring, all-absorbing flame of Omnipotence?"—*Ibid.*, pp. 255–6.

"The obscurity and apparent extravagance of their language is due to their courage in struggling with the barriers and limitations of human thought and language in order to describe in some fashion what they experienced in the height of the mystic state. The same explanation is to be given of any seeming pantheistic tendency in their language when attempting to describe their union with God; no matter what the terms may be in which they speak of the transformation of the soul or its absorption in God, the Catholic mystics are insistent in asserting that the soul retains its own individuality and full personality in the union either of this life or of eternity."—Dom Cuthbert Butler, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–5; cf. pp. 323–4.

"It is true . . . that many mystics have been pantheistic and it is also true that the communion of the human with the divine, which all mystics claim in some degree to have experienced, tends to break down their belief in the sharp and eternal division of the two which the non-mystical so often regard as essential to 'orthodoxy.' It is also true that certain great mystical schools such as that of Neoplatonism and that of the monistic Vedanta in India, have been pantheistic or have denied the real independent existence of human personality. But in Christianity mysticism has usually been of a personal nature; and it is not true—though it is so often thoughtlessly asserted—that even the mystics of India always leave out personality. The majority of Indian mystics have not been adherents of Shankara's monistic Vedanta, but have belonged to the great *bhakti* schools whose emphasis has always been upon personality. The probability is that the great majority of mystics, taken first and last, have been very far from pantheistic; and there is nothing in the nature of mysticism which logically involves, or necessarily results in, a loss of belief in personality, either human or divine."—J. B. Pratt, *op. cit.*, pp. 471–2. Cf. E. Herman, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 336. Cf. von Hügel's "Experience and Transcendence," *Dublin Review*, April 1906, esp. pp. 372–6.

Neoplatonism, or to monistic speculations derived from some of the Upanishads and similar sources, is thus an expression of intense desire rather than of dry, ontological belief. This is obvious once the expressions are taken in their setting in a life of devotion to a freely, consciously loving and loved God quite distinct from an indifferent Nirvana, or all-inclusive Substance, or Absolute, or World Principle. If religious worship implies a likeness and an immediate communion between the believer and his God, it also requires two centres of consciousness and a distinction between the relatively insignificant worshipper and the absolutely real, transcendent, all-perfect Object of adoration.[1] The sense of God's transcendence is at least as prominent in mysticism as that of His immanence. If we desire a hearty, well-nourished religion, we must accept and build upon both the transcendence of God, which pantheism ignores, and His immanence, even though, unable to fit them neatly together, we may have to confess that a term like " panentheism " formulates rather than resolves the difficulty.

The one-sidedness of exclusive mysticism appears, in addition to its pantheistic penchants, in its tendency to overemphasize the eternal at the expense of the temporal; to exalt the in-going, recollective, meditative, passive otherworldly attitude to the detriment of the practical, social, active, out-going, this-worldly movement; to look so steadily into the skies, to the supernatural, to the action of God, as to fail to see the reality, the necessity, and the worth of nature and human efforts; [2] and to be so much impressed

[1] *M. E.* II., pp. 334–5; *E.* II., pp. 145–6.

[2] " There are, surely, few sadder and, at bottom more deeply uncreaturely, unchristian attitudes, than that which would seek or measure perfection in and by the greatest possible abstraction from all those touching contingencies which God Himself has vouchsafed to our nature —a nature formed by Himself to require such plentiful contact with the historical and visible. And if God's pure love for us can and does manifest itself in such contingent acts, then our love can and should become and manifest itself purer and purer by means, not only of the prayer of formless abstraction and expectation, but also by the contemplation of these contingencies and by the production of analogously contingent acts. . . .

" Not, then, the degree of disoccupation with the Contingent, even of the contingent of our own life, but the degree of freedom from self-seeking, and of the harmonization and subordination of all these con-

by the transcendence and the incomprehensibility of God as often, in negative theology, to lead from the renouncement of an illusory creation to the devastating conclusion that He, Who was supposedly the initiator of this drastic sacrifice and Who was to be its constant balm and ultimate delight, can in no way be either apprehended or approached. Every one of these tendencies, nevertheless, is so essential to religion and to an understanding of the supernatural, that practically if not theoretically, in view of the downward drag and sloth of humanity, they cannot be too thoroughly developed, *provided* that their counter-movements towards the temporal, the practical, the volitional, the rational, in short the natural in all its good manifestations, are cultivated with *equal* thoroughness.[1] A literal-minded person is here left in Leacock's luxuriant "tension" of mounting his horse and galloping off at once in all directions.

Such statements of negative theology as "God is not Being," "God is not thought," "God is not Reality," if unimaginatively taken as final, spread havoc in religion, philosophy, and logic. So great a gulf opens between God and man that neither can cross over to the other. To admit the existence of God, as negative theology generally does, but to protest that we have no knowledge of what it is that exists, is to render His very existence as emptily verbal as His utterly unknowable nature. Valid negative propositions, however, derive their strength from a positive source. Hence, in order to affirm His existence and maintain its denials about Him, negative theology presupposes some dim knowledge of God's nature. With the logic-scorning impulsiveness of religious emotion, it indicates our awareness of how radically He surpasses our clear, critical, reflex forms of thought and means of communication, while yet remaining somehow dimly but all pervadingly and effectively apprehended by us. "It is this dim, deep experience which ever causes our reflex

tingencies in and under the supreme motive of the Pure Love and service of God in man and of man in God, is the standard and test of Christian perfection."—*M. E.* II., p. 170.

[1] *M. E.* II., pp. 284–7; *M. E.* I., pp. 159–60, 277.

knowledge of God to appear no knowledge at all" [1]—so incapable is the latter of doing justice to the former. Without attempting to ascertain the various grades of truth in the differing pronouncements of mystical agnosticism, yet unwilling to leave his readers with the bare critical realist formula (which might be defined as, "There is doubtless *something* in what you say"), von Hügel sought to give substance to the idea of the divine by the homely expedient of rejecting "any absolute qualitative difference between the soul's deepest possibilities and ideals, and God," and of postulating "an absolute difference between God and all our downward inclinations, acts, and habits, and an indefinite difference, in worth and dignity, between God and the very best that, with His help, we can aim at and become." [2]

After this hasty survey of the Baron's study of mysticism, what do we find his conclusions to be? The value of mysticism is evinced by its fruits. Whether we call them good or bad is as much a judgment of ourselves as of them. Good fruit occasionally comes from bad trees, but not as a rule. We cannot expect, moreover, scientific or philosophic novelties as direct results of an essentially intimate, personal, religious experience. The fruits must rather be, as at best they are, means of rendering life more spacious and abundant.

> "Dies the beatific vision in the moment of its birth,
> Dies, but in its death transfigures all the sequence of my days;
> Dies, but dying crowns with triumph all the travail of the earth,
> Till its harsh discordant murmurs swell into a psalm of praise." [3]

"Intellectually, emotionally, religiously, the experience, according to all that they tell us, is of a fullness and a richness beyond all power of expression." [4] The richness seems

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 290. Cf. von Hügel's "Experience and Transcendence," *Dublin Review*, April 1906, esp. pp. 365–9.

[2] *Ibid.* Cf. *S. L.*, p. 84; *R. G.*, p. 182; *M. E.* II., pp. 287 ff.; Wm. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, New York (Longmans), 1928, pp. 416 ff.

[3] E. G. A. Holmes, "Nirvana."

[4] Dom C. Butler, *op. cit.*, p. 313. Cf. Heiler, *op. cit.*, p. 141. The intellectual richness, as we have seen, is rather one of increased mental vigour than one of increased acquaintance with entirely new truths.

to be a characteristic of the genuinely religious mystical experience. If present at all in speculative, monistic trances, it is not always by any means as evident there. The pathological parallels of religious mystical experience, while often endowed either with a sense of inexpressible plenitude and light, or with a feeling of serene melting away into an indifferent unity, are usually discontinuous with the main stream of their experient's life, strange eruptions bringing about no spiritual, moral, or physical benefit. Where the ecstasies generally associated with the highest mystical experience do not lead to definitely good results for the mystic, von Hügel, agreeing with the great mystics themselves, would urge, with Professor J. B. Pratt, that such ecstasies "should be emphatically discouraged";[1] because, instead of serving as the best vehicle for the experience, they actually become obstacles to it by deranging the weaker mystics, who would doubtless profit more from a milder type of mysticism.

But the mere fact that advanced forms of mysticism are dangerous for everybody did not impress von Hügel as an argument against the desirability of striving to attain such heights on the part of those whose lives would otherwise be miserable, provided that they avoid the excesses and failings of exclusive mysticism by following the temperate guidance of inclusive mysticism. If " all noble things are as difficult as they are rare," [2] they need to be approached with at least as much circumspection as is given to attempts to climb Mount Everest, to fly over an ocean, or to visit the moon. In addition to the testimony of many of the greatest mystics to the richness and value of ecstasy in their lives,[3] and in addition to what von Hügel has already shown to have been of value to St. Catherine of Genoa in her ecstasies, we might recall some other instances of the value of religious mystical experience, either fruitfully accompanied by ecstasy, or else not so accompanied but yet of an intensity far greater than is found in relatively non-mystical religious experience.

[1] Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 469. Cf. Wm. James, *op. cit.*, p. 413.

[2] Spinoza, last line of his *Ethics*, trans. by White and Stirling (Oxford Univ. Press), 1927.

[3] Cf. Dom C. Butler, *op. cit.*, pp. 308–9.

William James notes that the mysticism of St. Ignatius " made him one of the most powerfully practical human engines that ever lived." [1] With apparently equal historical accuracy, he states that " the great Spanish mystics [he refers here especially to SS. Ignatius, Teresa, and John of the Cross], who carried the habit of ecstasy as far as it has often been carried, appear for the most part to have shown indomitable spirit and energy, and all the more so for the trances in which they indulged." [2] Summing up, he writes, " Tolstoy does well to talk of " mysticism " as *that by which men live*, for that is exactly what it is, a stimulus, an excitement, a faith, a force that reinfuses the positive willingness to live, even in full presence of the evil perceptions that erewhile made life seem unbearable." [3]

Although it has been sometimes alleged that von Hügel's analysis of mysticism has no connection with the central trend of his thought, his ideal of the balanced and harmonious action of the whole personality (which motivated also his treatment of epistemology and religion) obviously dictates his preference for inclusive, as opposed to exclusive, mysticism. Is not, then, his apology for Catherine of Genoa irreconcilable with his general philosophy? The question admits of no hair-trigger answer. As contrasted, for example, with St. John of the Cross, St. Catherine's mysticism was mild. Yet even so one cannot help noting the Baron's cautious and not wholly approving attitude towards her occasional pantheistic, " negative way," and other exclusively mystical tendencies. While actually rejecting or considerably qualifying those features in her own case and in those of exclusive mystics, does he not nevertheless inconsistently readmit them as exceptions? Probably the Baron's outlook was so broad, flexible, and close to experience that

[1] Wm. James, *op. cit.*, p. 413; quoted by Butler, *op. cit.*, p. 314. But is St. Ignatius's influence on the whole for good or bad, for a broad and radiant, or for a dark and narrow, idea of the supernatural? The fact that different people of equal authority arguing in good faith cannot agree on this matter would seem to confirm the Baron's belief (referred to on p. 153 above) that the test of mysticism by its fruits is always open to debate.

[2] Wm. James, *op. cit.*, p. 413

[3] Charles A. Bennett, *A Philosophical Study of Mysticism* (Yale University Press), 1931, p. 158, quoting Wm. James.

it included exceptions and " tensions " as naturally as more rigid systems exclude them. Since, as a rule, an individual's life is fruitful in proportion to the well-organized functioning of his different abilities, von Hügel adopted such a functioning as his ordinary, though subordinate, norm. But as in actual life the balance and the combination of talents vary enormously, these exceptions, which are as real and significant as the normal majority, must likewise function in their own most fruitful ways. Those ways are exceptional in comparison with the usual standard; but *in so far as they are* the best available outcomes of their own peculiar circumstances and *in so far as they do* contribute, in spite of their imperfections, something of value to civilization, they are not, the Baron seems to intimate, inconsistent with his ultimate and fullest conception of fruitfulness.

Thus, although but a fraction of experience, and one without much of which most people can do well enough, mysticism is, primarily in its *inclusive* form, generally a beneficial element of religion and life. In the higher reaches of mysticism and ecstasy men probably best assimilate the supernatural, if that experience is fitly interpreted by, and incorporated within, the rest of their body of appreciation and practice. The fact that there have been few great mystics and none without faults no more invalidates mysticism than the fact that there have been few great painters and many worthless ones invalidates painting. The pre-eminent mystics, through their lives, teachings, and writings,[1] have left hardly a level of civilization in its cultural and spiritual aspects untouched. That is the shame of it, those might claim who look upon the supernatural and its manifestations as a curse. Von Hügel, on the contrary, was grateful to mysticism in proportion to its success in bringing about, by its quickening contact with the supernatural, the " resuscitation of religion, as by far the richest, the most romantic, the most entrancing and emancipating fact and life extant or possible anywhere for man." [2]

[1] Cf. J. B. Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 468; A. E. Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, Series I., pp. 204, 284, 349.

[2] *E.* I., p. 280. See Appendix.

APPENDIX

WHETHER von Hügel was sympathetic towards mysticism has been frequently debated. The answer depends in part upon the definition of mysticism. Oman, for instance, claims that according to mysticism the natural is " in no form a manifestation of the Supernatural, but a mere confusing manifold, the illusory evanescent," [1] and that " mystical religions seek to be rid of the concrete individual with his rights and his responsibilities in his special sphere, so as to reach a unity of soul which, as unchanging and undisturbed awareness of the mere self, is without distinctions which could divide it from Absolute Unity." [2] He can then conclude that " in the strict sense there is no such thing as a Christian mystic, because, in so far as there is use of an historical revelation and of a church, with its cult, fellowship and active service of others, the religion is not mystical. . . . English writers usually understand by mysticism this mixed form. . . ." [3]

" Among French writers there is both more precision and adequacy and Delacroix's definition fairly covers the ground. ' Mysticism,' he says, ' going beyond religion, aspires after ultimate union with the Divine, even to the penetration of the Divine into the soul, to the disappearance of individuality, with all its ways of acting, thinking and feeling, into the Divine Substance.' " [4] The same continental tendency to reserve the name " mysticism " for only what von Hügel called " exclusive mysticism " appears fairly steadily in Heiler's discussion of mysticism in *Das Gebet.*

Dr. P. E. More, ultimately making the same reservation, has nevertheless classified more carefully the other grades of religious experience that are ordinarily included under

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 411.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 409; cf. pp. 421–2, 496.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 420.
[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 495.

the word " mysticism," as used in its vague, popular, English sense. He prefers to " divide the mystical experience into these three planes :

" (1) *The conviction of supernatural realities accompanied with a sense of the illusory nature of the phenomenal world.*

" (2) *An immediate contact with supernatural reality, whether given* (a) *through sensuous sights and sounds or* (b) *by spiritual communication.*

" (3) *Absorption of the soul in this reality, whether conceived as a pancosmic or a transcendental Absolute.*

" (1) Now the first plane is the prerequisite of all religion, the *sine qua non*, I should even say, of all true philosophy. But strictly speaking it is not mysticism, though often so named, and does not necessarily lead to mysticism. It may be called loosely a mystical habit of mind, or mysticality; but for the purpose of marking the distinction I should like to adopt the barbarous though expressive word of old Walter Hilton, *mystihood*. It is, so limited, peculiarly the note of Platonic Idealism and of normal Christian faith. [Gregory Nazianzen is cited as an example of a theistic Christian of this plane.]

" (2) The second plane belongs more properly to the field of mystic experience, and in a higher or lower degree occurs frequently among religious enthusiasts. But in itself it still is rather a quasi than an absolute mysticism. As a rule, in this plane of experience the supernatural takes the form of a single entity, at once infinite and personal, which reveals itself to the human soul by an act of grace. Quasi-mysticism [as seen in St. Augustine] is thus normally theistic, and is a development out of theistic rather than out of Ideal mystihood.

" (3) Actual, complete mysticism is attained when we pass beyond the second plane and hold that the soul may, and does, lose itself in the object of its intuition. In this belief the notion of personality, whether in the soul or in the Absolute, becomes a part of the illusion to be transcended, and the final state is inexpressible in the terms of theistic devotion, or even in the language of vision. [Plotinus

reached this stage.] This is the consummation of religion as conceived in the Orient, particularly in India.

"Naturally these three planes are not separated by impassable barriers, and individual men or specific movements may alternate between two of them or waver in an uncertain equilibrium. Notably, there is a form of ecstatic vision peculiar to monotheistic religion, which hovers irresolutely between the second plane of quasi-mysticism and the third plane of absolute mysticism, and which therefore may be particularly characterized as mixed." To represent mixed mysticism he chooses St. John of the Cross.[1]

Towards the first and the third non-Christian planes, in spite of finding some truth and value in each, von Hügel is clearly antagonistic. When St. John of the Cross, for instance, becomes too Neoplatonic, the Baron objects, as he would have objected if, going in the other direction, Christian theism were in danger of being watered down to a Platonic idealism. Hence von Hügel finds most congenial what Oman would apparently describe as a "mixed mysticism," or what Dr. More would call a Christian "quasi-mysticism," or what the Baron himself termed an "inclusive mysticism."

If we are going to use "mysticism" in its narrowest, most extreme, and hence most definite meaning (that of "exclusive mysticism," or of "absolute mysticism"), then the Baron obviously had slight delight in mysticism. Perhaps for the sake of clarity it might be well to ascribe such a rigorously technical meaning to the word. But, pending the ratification of that proposal by an œcumenical council of philosophers and philologists, in the meantime, since the word actually possesses such a broad meaning in English, it would seem less dictatorial not to reserve it for "exclusive mysticism" only, unless that were expressly stated whenever it was so employed. Otherwise, while an author was accurately describing mysticism in that narrow sense, he might irritate a reader thinking of mysticism in its "more comprehensive sense." Such confusion may be avoided by using either von Hügel's rough division of "exclusive" and "inclusive" mysticism, or Dr. More's

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 207–10.

amplified classification, which does justice both to the demands of popular usage (by allowing those who will to speak of degrees of mysticism) and to the necessities of technical precision (by making it clear that the unique element of mysticism lies in " absolute," or " exclusive," mysticism).

About the innumerable other definitions and classifications of mysticism, doubtless, after the terminology had once been settled, one would arrive at a similar estimate of the Baron's position. (In regard especially to von Hügel, see M. D. Petre, " Von Hügel and the Great Quest," *The Modern Churchman*, Dec. 1931, No. 9, Vol. XXI. pp. 475–83. Note also Rufus Jones' protest against defining mysticism too narrowly, *New Studies in Mystical Religion*, New York (Macmillan), 1927, p. 47.)

DOCTRINES ABOUT GOD

SYNOPSIS

God's " givenness "; the sense in which He is " given "—The personality of God implies " the possibility of personal relations . . . between oneself and God "—His personality infinite—Relation of God's infinity to finites—Relation of science to religion similar to that of Thing to Person—Anthropomorphism—Personality in God one thing, another thing in man; difficulties in its employment—The " many and one " approach to the personality of God—Doctrine of the Trinity—Action and activity—In what sense dogmas are final—God " an act that doth communicate "—Adoration and morality—God's " otherness "—Pure love of God—Transcendence and immanence—Grace and free will—God's liberty perfect; man's, imperfect—The problem of evil—Discussion of whether or not God suffers.

CHAPTER V

DOCTRINES ABOUT GOD

. . . " The sight
Is deep and infinite,
Ah me! 'tis all the glory, love, light, space,
Joy, beauty and variety,
That doth adorn the Godhead's dwelling-place;
'Tis all that eye can see." [1]

WE have now reviewed the Baron's beliefs about knowledge, culminating in his critical realism; about the intimations of God and the supernatural, present in nature and in the constitution of man, as discernible by a religious person of " critically realistic " tendencies; about the means whereby religion defines and preserves the general awareness of the supernatural; and about the relation of mysticism to the supernatural. It remains for us to try to obtain some idea of the content of the supernatural, as von Hügel apprehended it, by studying his favourite doctrines about the nature of God.

If, on the whole, he starts from essentially Christian and Catholic premises, it is only fair to recall that he does so because he believes those to be the least inadequate premises from which to start. Those who knew him well unanimously agree that he sought truth first, holding to Catholicism not simply because it was Catholicism but only in so far as he believed it to be true and fruitful.[2] Whoever regards von Hügel as a sectarian apologist rather than a soul freely searching for God deceives himself and awards

[1] Traherne, " The Vision."

[2] " Oui, vous avez horreur de ' bonne philosophie,' ' bien-pensant,' parceque vous cherchez la vérité, point l'orthodoxie; il faut que l'orthodoxie s'arrange avec la vérité—c'est son affaire à elle."—Huvelin, *S. L.*, p. 61.

to the Baron, who was "quietly conscious of being but a dog," the perplexing honour of a "first prize among cats."[1]

Mature religion, according to von Hügel, involves a keen sense of the objective, full reality, of the "givenness," of God.[2] By givenness the Baron does not mean merely intuition, or an undeniable feeling of objectivity transmitted by some special mystical sense. The givenness of God is mediated to us by normal faculties of knowledge, when these are properly directed to that end and suitably trained and assisted by divine grace. Hence givenness does not exclude, for example, inference. Both inference and immediate intuition seem to be inseparable in every step of the process of knowledge. Our awareness of the givenness or objectivity of nature, for example, is the result of converging impressions, intuitions, and inferences, varying in amount and quality among different individuals. The same holds true concerning our knowledge of persons. Thus the antithesis of givenness, or objective reality, is not a reality reached by inference, or by intuition, or by something else, but is no reality at all, or a purely fictitious one. Failure to recognize this has led many a hasty reader of von Hügel to suppose that in his stress on "givenness" the Baron was defending an intuitionalism; whereas he was really proclaiming his belief in the objectivity of God, without, for the moment, discussing how God is known, or, least of all, recommending a truncated epistemological theory like intuitionalism.

The givenness of God has two sides, God's own reality and our awareness of it. The latter should not be limited to any one of its manifold features. Christian mystics, for instance, maintain that their union with God depends upon His will, not entirely upon their own efforts.[3] Their experience of

[1] London *Times Literary Supplement*, Dec. 22, 1921.

[2] *E.* I., p. 90.

[3] Some psychologists have attempted to explain the givenness of mystical experiences as an "up-rush" from the subconscious—a description which reveals nothing about the truth or the value of the experiences. The difference between the part played by the subconscious in abnormal and in normal experience lies more in its spiritual and human value than in its psychological form. (Cf. Pratt, *op. cit.*, pp. 64–66, esp. his remark on James's "Judge by fruits, not by roots.") Hence it would seem more suggestive to look for the soul in the flowering of consciousness than in

Him is, as it were, doubly given, in the sense that their dim knowledge of His reality is increased by His free gift of an exceptionally strong conviction of that reality. But all normal religious experience of God, where it is true to the impulses of prayer and unspoilt by timid adulterations arising from doubts not met but surrendered to, is likewise persuaded of the objective reality of God. The fact that it is also highly coloured by the influence of the human mind does not, for a critical realist, do away entirely with belief in its objective reference. That merely brings it in line with all other delicate, valuable, intangible but vivid experiences, which, whenever they are encountered at all, are easy to deny and ignore but hard to kill and forget.

Thus God is not given in the sense that knowledge of Him is rudely forced upon us or may not occasionally be missed through wilfulness, negligence, or unfavourable circumstances. Nor do those that seek Him find Him in the same way as they find anything else. He appears not as limited by conditions of space and time nor as one object among others, but as in all and through all and above all, as the immanent, transcendent source of all reality and all knowledge.[1] In seeking to understand or to picture such a state of affairs, we can resort, as Plato did, only to myths. Happily for us, the imagination of Professor Albert A. Cock has devised a picturesque expression of this truth.

"Suppose the subject to be himself located upon the inner surface of a hollow and transparent sphere and to find that the act of attention reveals to him illuminated tracts upon that sphere. Will he not presently be drawn to seek the ultimate source of that illumination? Will not the Light so shine as presently to attract him in such a way that he diverts his searchlight [of attention] from the limited and finite tracts upon the hollow transparent sphere to the circumambient and unbounded Source of the diffused radiation? Will he not find indeed that the hollow sphere

any subconscious, often spiritually negligible ground or environment (as some have proposed), no matter how admittedly valuable and influential that background and atmosphere of our conscious life sometimes is.

[1] Cf. *E. L.*, p. 368.

owes all its illumination, all its transparency, and he all his powers of receiving that illumination to a Source other than itself, a circumambient Light he cannot limit or define but in Whose light he sees light, and seeing must adore? That Light indeed is the source of life. Now indeed is the immanental illumination diffused throughout man's little sphere seen to derive from an utterly Other Source of circumambient transcendental Light. . . .

" Religion, then, is the act of attention directed upon God: the act of attention directed upon the circumambient Light that diffuses its radiancy throughout our otherwise dark and all too hollow sphere. We do attend: the act of attention were impossible without an object to which to attend, were impossible without the power to illuminate and to be illuminated; the ultimate Object thus given in the very fact and act of selective attention is in its ultimacy the very Source of all our day, Light of Lights and Life of Life." [1]

The God Whose objective reality is experienced by religion is, von Hügel insisted, a personal God. But he never traced in detail, as adequately, for instance, as Dr. Clement Webb has done, the suggestions of the existence of a personal God furnished by religious cults. Nor, although he had much to say about personality, did the Baron investigate as fully as that other writer (or at least not from the same approach) the meaning of the phrase " personal God." As, wherever it is possible to enrich our conception of the supernatural without an irrelevant digression, it is desirable to fill in the gaps of von Hügel's thought, through the next few pages we shall not hesitate to draw copiously upon Dr. Webb. Considering the esteem the Baron had for his friend's work and character, it is natural to turn to Dr. Webb's studies, even though von Hügel found in them passages which he could not understand " except somewhat pantheistically." [2] Most of what may be presumed to be those passages we shall try to avoid.

[1] Albert A. Cock, " Friedrich von Hügel and His Work," in *Speculum Religionis*, Oxford (Clarendon Press), 1929, pp. 207–8.
[2] *M. E.* I., p. xv.

It should be remembered, nevertheless, that in his later years (when he made that remark) the Baron was believed by some of his friends to be prone to see pantheism even where others scarcely suspected it and never intended it. Dr. Webb, like von Hügel, describes God as Ultimate Reality and at the same time scrupulously emphasizes His transcendence. Both writers agree that God is not merely personal in the same sense as we are. The Baron would seem to think of Him, however, as ever inconceivably more and more personal, while Dr. Webb admits that and suggests that He may be also other than personal. But as long as this otherness is never only less than personal or never involves any derogation to God as ultimate, all-perfect, adorable Reality, there would seem to be nothing dangerously pantheistic or irreligious about it. In fact, it would seem one with von Hügel's realization of the inexhaustible plenitude of His being.

The " personality " of God (when spoken of " without reference to any plurality within the unity of the Divine Nature ") suggests, according to Dr. Webb, " the possibility of personal relations—of worship, trust, love—between *oneself* and God." [1] The relationship is not a one-sided, unreciprocated *amor intellectualis* of an indifferent, Spinozistic world whole or of an equally indifferent Aristotelian God; [2] but is a relationship reciprocated by deity, a fulfilment and a return of personal intercourse,[3] although the fulfilment may be baffling to the creature and the return chasteningly different from the one desired.[4] The fact that any full-blooded religion includes worship, trust, and love of God, the ultimate reality, the fact that truly religious persons are convinced that their approaches are not empty gestures of spiritual calisthenics but meet with response from God and lead to communion with Him,—these facts, if their pretensions are essentially true, indicate the presence in the Supreme Reality of whatever is necessary for the maintenance of such aboundingly fruitful personal relations.[5] " So far as the demand that God should be ' personal ' is a

[1] *God and Personality*, p. 70. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 105.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 70. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 131. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

genuinely religious demand, it is the demand for an assurance that the possibility of such a relation to God as is exemplified in the Godward attitude of Jesus is no vain dream, but is rooted in the fundamental structure of ultimate Reality." [1]

This does not mean that God's being is exhausted in personal relations to His worshippers.[2] He doubtless has countless other relations with other grades of reality and, if one accepts Trinitarianism, with the Persons in the unity of His being. Thus while at least personal, in the sense proposed by Dr. Webb, He is, as Anselm states, " not only that than which no greater can be conceived, but is also greater than anything which can be conceived." [3] " Assuredly God *is* for us ' Thou ' and a Person. But this Personal character is that side of His nature which is turned manward—it is like a ' Cape of Good Hope,' jutting out from a mountain range which, as it recedes, is lost to view in the ' tenebræ æternæ '—only to be expressed by the suspension of speech and the inspiration of sacred song." [4]

The personality of God is not that of another separate, finite person. If personality cannot be torn from finitude, then God cannot be called personal; [5] He would still have to be considered as capable of maintaining the intimately satisfactory personal relations of religion, but would have to be described in groping, supra-personal terms, if that is at all possible. The believer, in his deeply religious moments, thinks of God not as merely another person like himself, nor even as a superior being whom he might reverence and love, whose aid, like that of an archangel, he might invoke. But he is aware of Him as perfect, ultimate Reality, Who, as the fullness of beauty, goodness, power, truth, and being, is alone worthy of unreserved adoration; on Whom he and nature in every way depend; Who permeates all things and knows every thought, so that it is fundamentally unnatural and

[1] *God and Personality*, p. 142; cf. *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, p. 231.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 145.
[3] *Ibid.*, Dr. Webb quoting from *Proslogion*, c. 15.
[4] R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 208.
[5] *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, p. 252.

dismal even to imagine being outside that adorable Presence.[1] Such, probably von Hügel and Dr. Webb would agree, is the spontaneous claim of hungering and thirsting Christianity and of any other profound religion well weaned from polytheism or Manichæan-like dualisms.

Too exclusive attention to other interests will cause this vision of the incomparable grandeur of God to fade into the light of common day. Many a sensitive mind racked by the difficulty of reconciling evil with a good and omnipotent deity has denied the vision for the sake of plausible ethical or intellectual relief. As should be apparent later, such a course impressed the Baron as being pernicious. It tampers with an experience essential to the robust autonomy of religion and the buoyancy of human life. Instead of suspending theory or humbly adapting it to reality and spiritual convictions, it grabs at *a priori* speculations about evil, usually based on insufficient evidence. This tampering, moreover, leading to specious " solutions " of the " problem of evil," ultimately leaves evil just as bad and unintelligible as before. In failing to safeguard the goodness of God, which it set out to do, it offers us in the end some sort of limited, well-meaning demiurge—a cosmic amalgamation of school teacher, lifeguard, and parent, who, having bitten off more than he can chew, and having prematurely begotten more children than he can possibly save from drowning in alien waves, is a creature sufficiently like ourselves for us to understand, pity, and be willing to help, but fails woefully as a substitute for holy, almighty, perfect, although incomprehensible God.

We cannot here go into the difficulties and the alleged advantages of a finite God, a topic which never long engaged von Hügel. So contrary to the affirmations of whole-hearted religion did that notion strike him as being, that for him the real problem was to try to picture in some way the relation of infinite, omnipotent goodness to a finite, sinful

[1] *God and Personality*, pp. 144, 147; cf. *Problems*, etc., pp. 253–4. Or is all this nonsense, as the anti-metaphysical religionists maintain? Was Bradley right when he said that this approach to God ultimately eliminates Him, by substituting an Absolute in His place?

world, rather than to spin hypotheses about a warrior deity fighting, like St. George, a devilish dragon, or about the possibility of the divine character's being almost as evil as it is good.[1] Postponing the ethical perplexities involved, we might lapse again into myth in an attempt to picture the relation of God's infinity to His creation.

"Now 'infinite' is a term of infinite pliability."[2] It might as well be confessed at once that when applied to God it is generally a shamefully loose and ambiguous word striving to express intellectually the emotional awareness of His inexhaustible richness. Thus, in part, theology is a branch of lyrical poetry. Few people take mathematics so seriously as to worry whether God's is a mathematical infinite. But many at times imagine that if God is not this table, this continent, this solar system, He must be just so much the smaller for it and hence cannot be infinite. If

> "It is not growing like a tree
> In bulk, doth make man better be,"[3]

there is even less reason to think of God in such a clumsy fashion. Others, disdaining to treat Him as a material object among other similar objects, treat Him as a person among persons, as scarcely more than a *primus inter pares*. Since one person can limit another by thwarting his will or corrupting his character, if God's will is supposed to exist on the same plane as ours and if those wills are presumed to be fairly impermeable one by another, hopeless conundrums arise, such as, "If we are free to a certain extent to will what we want, how can God still be infinite while we thus defy His will?" or, "How can we be free if He wills us to will contrary to His will?"

Such reverent inanities spring partly from our failure to look for more enlightening analogies than those drawn from human discord; partly because of the inherent difficulty members of a lower grade of reality experience in seeking to

[1] That "there is an element of potential evil in God Himself . . . should be fought to the death."—*L. N.*, p. 112.
[2] P. E. More, *op. cit.*, p. 259.
[3] Ben Jonson, "The Noble Nature."

apprehend a higher and the highest grade of reality; and partly because failure to take religion seriously, honestly to trust in God, leaves one in the embarrassment of trying to wend one's way out of a strange forest without consulting the guide, whom one suspects (as one has hardly ever put enough confidence in him to permit him to prove the possible groundlessness of the suspicion) of being an impostor. If we represent God, for the moment, as an Absolute novelist and ourselves as actually living, humanly conscious characters in his imagination, we can conceive very roughly two grades of reality intimately interconnected, both real, but one utterly dependent for its being and significance upon the hypothetically self-subsistent other. As it is a peculiarity of consciousness, unlike matter, to grow by going out of itself, by being worn, by dying, by being given rather than by being saved, the perhaps indefinitely great yet finite creation of cities, castles, scenes, and scenery in the story, far from detracting from the supreme, unique novelist's infinity (except from the narrow point of view of characters who could conceive of nothing greater than the aggregate of setting, plot, and actors), would suggest that infinity. As love desires to attain, each for the other and for himself for the sake of the other, the greatest independence and eternal perfection and at the same time the greatest unity amid this diversity,[1] the novelist, loving the children of his fancy, would grant to each the greatest independence in will and being, while himself remaining at the same time the unrecognized, or the adored, transcendent and immanent ground of their will and being—closer than breathing, nearer than hands and feet, yet farther away than their dim awareness of his transcendence and incomprehensibility can ever begin to hint.

Although this tale is no less a mare's-nest of inconsistencies and question-begging assumptions than those it would supersede, yet as long as God's omnipotent goodness *and* the reality of evil, of finite minds, and of finite objects, are held as of " the soul's invincible surmise," stories like this will be always told and always falling through. Without

[1] Cf. Webb, *God and Personality*, p. 148.

inventing such fables himself, von Hügel makes it clear that he holds firmly both horns of the dilemma; another fruitful tension, doubtless, like remaining faithful to each of two sweethearts until polygamy is legalized.

Dr. Webb moves, then, and von Hügel would second him, that, "As the æsthetic experience reveals in Nature a spirituality which apart from that experience cannot be shown to be there, so does the religious experience reveal in the ultimate Reality something which apart from religious experience is not there discoverable. This may be properly called Personality, for it is revealed in and through an experience of personal intercourse." [1] If the experience of personal intercourse is one of the essential features of religion, it is natural to find in Christianity's exceptionally full awareness of divine personality an indication of its superiority in that respect to other religions.[2] That that intercourse is indispensable to normal religion of almost any type, Dr. Webb shows convincingly by an able analysis of two widespread features of religion, namely, the feeling of sin and its forgiveness,[3] and the conception and the practice of sacrifice.[4]

But religion's affirmation of the personality of God is often popularly believed to be refuted by the findings of science. That the belief is popular rather than the one held by foremost scientists and theologians is proved by the recent deluge of books on that subject written by eminent men in both groups. The scientists, on the whole, content themselves with pointing out the highly limited, artificial, and abstract methods and results to which, as scientists, they are confined when each roams about in his own minute fraction of reality; and with exhibiting, especially in physics, the spectacular discoveries and the fruitful confusion of conflicting theories. The theologians, frequently overlooking the important admissions of science's limitations, and treating scientific method as a piece of armour in which they would not regret to find breaks, gloat over its momentary turmoil and pick out little points here and there, such as

[1] Cf. Webb, *God and Personality*, p. 240. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 247 ff.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 250 ff. [4] *Ibid.*, pp. 258 ff.

signs of indeterminism,[1] or the statements of personal belief which scientists sometimes slip into their volumes, but which, no matter how sincere and valuable they are in other respects, in regard to the relation of science and religion are as irrelevant as allegedly devout, death-bed confessions of renowned atheists. The point is not whether some scientists have religious beliefs or whether by hook or crook one can occasionally introduce so-called "spiritual" explanations into science instead of strictly scientific ones. The point is whether, regardless of such external professions and of such futile introductions of foreign concepts into science's proper sphere, science in its most rigorous form is compatible with religion at its best.

It is certainly not compatible with many a tattered theological formulation, the discarding of which should no more injure religion than the shedding of old skin hurts a snake. There will always be debates over the frontiers, skirmishes in no-man's-land, while the capitals bask peacefully in their sidewalk cafés. But if, as noted in Chapters II. and III., not only religion but the deepest aspirations and needs of all departments of life push irresistibly beyond the phenomenal level of conditions and occasions, of merely naturalistic and humanistic requirements,[2] and inarticulately, perhaps, but none the less insistently, demand the reality of an infinite, true, eternal, personalistic ultimate ground and *raison d'être* of their being, then religion, in the sense of an active adoration of that supernatural reality, in the sense of an effective transmission of that supernatural vitality into the whole body of nature, is the very fulfilment of all conscious endeavours. Science itself, as one of these endeavours, together with all other intellectual attention to Things, presupposes, according to the Baron, a deeper spiritual level;[3] is, as it were, the desirable, necessary, purifying,[4] partially suggestive, partially obstructive stage of thought and will

[1] How their ancestors must have made the most of Lucretius' atomic swerve!

[2] Cf. *L. N.*, p. 14; *E.* I., p. 90. "Humanistic" is here taken to refer to the satisfaction of the immediate, lesser, this-worldly desires of humanity to the exclusion of its greater, more ultimate, other-worldly ones.

[3] *M. E.* II., pp. 303–4.

[4] Cf. *E. L.*, p. 388.

between the definition of a question and its answer, between the individual mind and the divine Spirit, between the first pricks of conscience and the power of goodness—a mountain slope between the valley and the summit. Thus science of some sort is indispensable to religion, and religion in its most spacious sense can alone provide the "large room"[1] needed by science for the exhilarating realization of its limits and the unhampered pursuit of its ideals.

So important is an understanding of von Hügel's conception of the relation of science to religion that, at the risk of repetition but for the sake of clarity and vividness, a long passage is here inserted in order to allow the Baron to speak in his own way on a topic so critically connected with belief in a personal God.[2]

"If Science of this Thing-type be all that, in any manner or degree, we can apprehend in conformity with reality or can live by fruitfully: then History and Religion of every kind must be capable of a strict assimilation to it, or they must go. But if such Science constitute only one kind, and though the clearest and most easily transferable, yet the least deep, and the least adequate to the ultimate and spiritual reality, among the chief levels of apprehension and of life which can be truly experienced and fruitfully lived by man; and if the Historical and Spiritual level can be shown to find room for, indeed to require, the Natural and Mechanical level, whilst this latter, taken as ultimate, cannot accommodate, but is forced to crush or to deny, the former; then a refusal to accept more than can be expressed and analysed by such Physico-Mathematical Science would be an uprooting and a discrowning of the fuller life, and would ignore the complete human personality, from one of whose wants the entire impulse to such Science took its rise.

"As a matter of fact, we find the following three alternatives.

[1] Ps. xxxi. 8.

[2] As he pointed out at the end of "Caterina Fiesca Adorna, the Saint of Genoa," *The Hampstead Annual*, 1898, von Hügel derived many of his ideas about the relations between personality and thing from Maurice Blondel, *L'Action*, Paris (Alcan), 1893, and R. Eucken, *Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt* and *Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker*, Leipzig, 1896.

" Level all down to Mathematico-Physical Science, and you deny the specific constituents of Spirituality, and you render impossible the growth of the Person out of, and at the expense of, the Individual. Proclaim the Person and its Religion, as though they were static substances adequately present from the first, and ignore, evade or thwart that Thing-level and method as far as ever you can, and you will, in so far, keep back the all but simply animal Individual from attaining to his full spiritual Personality. But let grace wake up, in such an Individual, the sense of the specific characteristics of Spirituality and the thirst to become a full and ever fuller Person, and this in contact and conflict with, as well as in recollective abstraction from, the apparently chance contingencies of History and Criticism, and the seemingly fatalistic mechanisms of Physics and Mathematics: and you will be able, by humility, generosity, and an ever-renewed alternation of such outgoing, dispersive efforts and of such incoming recollection and affective prayer, gradually to push out and to fill in the outlines of your better nature, and to reorganize it all according to the Spirit and to Grace, becoming thus a deep man, a true personality.

" Once again: take the intermediate, the Thing-level as final, and you yourself sink down more and more into a casual Thing, a soulless Law; Materialism, or, at best, some kind of Pantheism, must become your practice and your creed.—Take the anterior, the Individual-level as final, and you will remain something all but stationary, and if not merely a Thing yet not fully a Person; and if brought face to face with many an Agnostic or Pantheist of the nobler sort, who is in process of purification from such childish self-centredness by means of the persistently frank and vivid apprehension of the Mechanical, Determinist, Thing-and-Fate level of experience and degree of truth, you will, even if you have acquired certain fragmentary convictions and practices of religion, appear strangely less, instead of more, than your adversary, to anyone capable of equitably comparing that Agnostic and yourself—you who, if Faith be right, ought surely to be not less but more of a personality than that non-believing soul.

"But take the last, the Spiritual, Personal level as alone ultimate, and yet as necessarily requiring, to be truly reached and maintained, that the little, selfish, predominantly animal-minded, human being should ever pass and repass from this, his Individualistic plane and attitude, through the Thing-and-Fate region, out and on to the 'shining table-land, whereof our God Himself is sun and moon': and you will, in time, gain a depth and an expansion, a persuasive force, an harmoniousness and intelligibleness with which, everything else being equal, the Pantheistic or Agnostic self-renunciation cannot truly compare. For, in these circumstances, the latter type will, at best, but prophesy and prepare the consummation actually reached by the integrational, dynamic religiousness, the Individual transformed more and more into Spirit and Person, by the help of the Thing and of Determinist Law. Freedom, Interiority, Intelligence, Will, Grace and Love, the profoundest Personality, a reality out of all proportion more worthy and more ultimate than the most utterly unbounded universe of a simply material kind could ever be, thus appear here, in full contradiction of Pantheism, as ultimate and abiding; and yet all that is great and legitimate in Pantheism has been retained, as an intermediate element and stage, of a deeply purifying kind." [1]

Although, as Loisy points out,[2] personality as an abstraction is on the same level as any other abstraction, nevertheless the realities referred to by abstractions may well differ in ontological status. To display the full grounds of von Hügel's

[1] *M. E.* II., pp. 383–5. Cf. *E. L.*, pp. 133–5; and *S. L.*, p. 96: "We require then just this otherness of the two worlds, worlds one *behind*, one *within* the other, and not *alongside* of each other; worlds so related, that determinism is everywhere on the surface and nowhere at bottom or ultimately; worlds of which you can hold, phenomenally, the phenomenal one without troubling about the spiritual one, but of which you cannot securely and deeply hold the spiritual one, if you will not find a place, *in and for the spiritual life*, for the phenomenal, taken with all its stimulating, purifying edges and othernesses. The day on which the Christian ascetical spirit shall have woken up to the irreplacable value for it of *the thing*, of a preliminary *fatalism*, on that day will the good man . . . have a horror of ignoring these bitter waters, prepared by God Himself to bring death to his merely natural, petty anthropomorphism, and will have done for good with all deliberate hankering after a juxtaposition of Faith and Science."

[2] *Op. cit.*, Vol. II. p. 51. Cf. *S. L.*, pp. 100–2.

belief that " self-conscious spirit is by far the widest yet the deepest reality known to us at all " [1] would involve a lengthy exposition of the whole logical structure of idealism and theism in regard to that tenet, which is fundamental to them both. Thorough acquaintance with that logic and approval of it, at least in respect to the ultimacy of personality, is implied again and again in the Baron's writings. Only when that mighty but invisible ally is taken into account can the actual strength of von Hügel's position in the face of plausible, naturalistic objections be rightly estimated. The well-informed reader will be able to make such an adequate estimation for himself; the uninformed will find elsewhere better sources of information than this brief outline can pretend to supply.

If the necessity of treating " the ultimate and deepest Reality *as though* it were Intelligence, Will, Spirit, springs not only from our subjective wants, but also from the actual nature of that Reality being, in ways and degrees unpicturable, Inconceivable by us, not less than all that we find ourselves thus forced to attribute to It,' [2] then, in order to make the best of our inevitable anthropomorphism, we seem bound to strive in all ways to spur our petty individualities [3] along

[1] *E.* I., p. 50; cf. *E. L.*, pp. 204–6. [2] *S. L.*, p. 150.

[3] An individual, for von Hügel, has no particular value except in so far as he may and does become a conscious person rising above the natural order; in so far as he develops into wider complexes and spheres of reality; above all, in so far as he lives in God. (*E.* I., pp. 113–14.)

St. Catherine of Genoa, for example, before her conversion, was more or less a mere individual, a leaf fluttering to and fro. Her first four post-conversion years were better, guided by conscious purpose, but still on a level of predominantly unthinking social conformity. It was only after those earlier years that she manifested " Spiritual Individuality, Liberty, Variety and Subjectivity," marks of personality in the fullest sense with which we are acquainted with it in human beings. (*M. E.* I., pp. 242–3.)

The soul, according to the Baron, is static in the sense that " each soul is doubtless intended, from the first, to express a particular thought and wish of God, to form one, never simply replaceable member of His Kingdom, to attain to a unique kind and degree of personality; and though it can refuse to endorse and carry out this plan, the plan remains within it, in the form of never entirely suppressible longings." (*M. E.* II., pp. 301–2.) But it is also dynamic in the sense that we find ourselves possessed of capabilities of going either towards or away from God, of either expanding or contracting. (*S. L.*, pp. 88–90.) Thus the goal, and not the beginning, of life, is a soul, a personality like " unto a full-grown man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ " (Ephesians iv. 13). " For a man does not come into the world endowed

the road to personality. " Épurer, élargir, spiritualiser notre propre caractère et, surtout par là notre conception de la personnalité humaine; éveiller et tenir de plus en plus en éveille, notre sens de l'inadéquat nécessaire de toute idée que nous puissions former à Dieu, l'esprit absolu; mais enfin l'appliquer avec ces deux conditions continuelles, comme étant ce que nous connaissons le mieux, et de mieux, et ce que, à un degré et d'une façon pour nous inconcevable, Dieu ne peut manquer d'être." [1]

As there is such a gulf between us and God in the matter of personality, it seemed best to the Baron to " hold with Lotze, not only that Personality is compatible with Infinitude, but that the personality of all finite beings can be shown to be imperfect precisely because of their finitude, and hence that ' Perfect Personality is compatible only with the conception of an Infinite Being; finite beings only can achieve an approximation to it.' " [2]

with a soul; he dies with one provided he has forged it for himself. And the goal of life is to forge a soul, an immortal soul."—Miguel de Unamuno, *The Agony of Christianity*, New York (Payson and Clarke), 1928, p. 21.

[1] *S. L.*, p. 101. Cf. his approving lines on Eucken: " Deeply convinced as he [Eucken] is of the existence and constant action, and sustaining power of God in and upon the soul, and profoundly persuaded as he is that we cannot ever get to a deeper and more adequate conception of Him than as an Infinite Personality, which has and combines within itself (in a manner and degree quite beyond anything but a dim, analogical apprehension on our parts) at least all that we have of most truly spiritual and personal within us: he is yet equally certain that though it is this God Who made and sustains us, yet that *He made us in order that in a sense we might* make Him—in and for our minds and wills.—Not as though He were not entirely and equally, whether we thus make Him for ourselves or not; but because otherwise He is as though He were not, as far as we ourselves, as our knowledge of Him is concerned. What God is in Himself, we, strictly speaking, do not know. All our true knowledge of Him is limited to what He is to us and in us. And this knowledge is necessarily not at the beginning but at the end of our struggles and endeavours, since it grows with the growth of our own personality, ever the joint work of ourselves and God. And hence it is . . . that E. shrinks so much from definitions or even from frequent mentions of that Personality of God, which he is sure motives and decides *in fact* even our first instant of existence, but which *as a conception of our own* (if it is to become and remain at all not an idol or a caricature, but is to be as true and helpful as possible), must, it too, be conquered and again reformed and reconquered by us, with and through the conquest of our own Personality."—*S. L.*, pp. 90–1.

[2] *E.* I., p. 50. Cf. Webb, *God and Personality*, p. 21: " Personality is

In agreeing thus with Lotze, how could von Hügel defend himself before M. Le Roy? "Either we define personality and fall inevitably into anthropomorphism; or we do not define it, and fall no less inevitably into agnosticism." [1] The dilemma brings out some curiosities of contrasting temperaments. Von Hügel hated (as is surely obvious by now) "to get things too clear." Apparently if M. Le Roy cannot define, he cannot believe. The Baron, on the other hand, found one of the bulwarks of belief in the refusal to define. M. Le Roy's dilemma could never have been more than verbal for von Hügel, simply because the latter's nature was such that failure to define, or even to approach a consistent view of, personality led him unruffled out of the snares of both anthropomorphism and agnosticism.

That failure sprang from his conviction of the organic unity and interrelatedness of reality. He seems to have regarded concepts, including that of personality, not as flower-beds, each neatly trimmed and separated by a path from all the rest, so that there is no informal melting of one bed into another, but rather as regions on the surface of a pond, which, though distinguished by changing lights and shifting motions, all flow imperceptibly into one another. Thus human personality shades into divine personality as the temperate zone merges into the tropical zone; despite the difficulty of defining the boundary between them, they are realms at once continuous and discontinuous, somewhat alike and much more unlike.

Although the statement that God is personal, combined with the statement that He is not personal in any sense clearly known to us, may logically "only create illusion," [2] practically it has an effect (resulting from a muddling of the known and the unknown) similar to that of learning that

not merely something which we observe in men; rather it is something which, though suggested to us by what we find in men, we perceive to be only imperfectly realized in them; and this can only be because we are somehow aware of a perfection or ideal with which we contrast what we find in men as falling short of it."

[1] A. Leslie Lilley, *Modernism, a Record and Review*, London (Pitman), 1908, pp. 155–6, quoting Édouard Le Roy and analysing the latter's *Dogme et Critique*.

[2] *Ibid.*

somebody whom you have never seen is a fifth cousin of yours. That really tells you nothing explicit about the character of the person; but the fact of kinship, although in itself opaque, brings about a sort of "pre-established harmony" between you.

Surely von Hügel would demur at this illustration. The reason why we say that God is somewhat like our personalities and yet different from them is based upon a confused experience that that is so. Unlike the fifth cousin, God is dimly known to us; otherwise we could not say that He is less than personal or greater than personal. M. Le Roy grants to the dogma of divine personality a negative speculative import.[1] Although telling us nothing definite about God's nature, it preserves us from falling into the error of thinking that He is an impersonal force, a mental category, or an abstract principle, thus fostering religion's cultivation of personal intercourse with Him. But why, if we had no anterior awareness of God, should we revolt at the notion of His being less than personal? Doctrines of impersonal and finite gods have multiplied in *a priori* brains, as long as they were sheltered from the harsh tests of religious experience. It is the apprehension of God, no matter how misty, which, if the Baron has interpreted it correctly, justifies the doctrine of His personality or supra-personality. The doctrine may be as hazy and inchoate as M. Le Roy justly points out, a desperate grappling with obscurity, but that does not prevent it from being of protean, positive, speculative significance, which is probably the ultimate basis of its emotional, practical, and negative values.

Another approach to the personality of God, used by the Baron, is the well-worn path of "the many and the one." We know nothing so simple that it is a sheer, undifferentiated unity. Even a point is an intersection of two lines, and things simpler than that are at least particulars manifesting universals.[2] A mere individual without any diversity within itself or any relation to anything else, even if it could exist, would be something we could probably neither know nor

[1] A. Leslie Lilley, *Modernism, a Record and Review*, p. 161.

[2] For von Hügel's principal passages about universals and particulars, see *M. E.* II., pp. 310–19 and *R. G.*, pp. 45–47.

appreciate in any way.[1] But although, from the point of view of knowledge, nothing in the universe is a simple unity, for practical purposes we treat many inorganic things as being relatively simple unities. We may have one stone, for instance, or a pile of stones, but, roughly speaking, material things are either one *or* many. A billiard ball is not for itself (since it has no self), or generally for us in our practical moments, one *and* many. It is simply one; or, if it is many, that is because it is composed of many external parts which, added together by us, make for us one billiard ball; but the parts are many, not many *and* one. Among living organisms, however, unity is as important as diversity. My hand is a hand not only because it is different from any other part of my organism, but also because it is one with the rest of my organism. Cut off my hand: my whole organism is upset thereby; and the hand, separate from the body, is no longer a hand, but only an inert mass of decomposing flesh and bone.

While organisms seem to possess, unlike inorganic things, amid diversity a unity intrinsic to themselves, neither the unity nor the diversity being so largely a product of our desire for convenient classification as in the case of merely material things, yet a more perfect unity in multiplicity appears in consciousness. In a conscious person these two factors are present in the knowledge of outside observers, and are at work within the person without his awareness of them, and are also to some extent recognized by him as being in him even more complex and subtle than they are in any other instances of unity and plurality. Though material objects are many *or* one, and parts of an organism, in spite of their being many *and* one, are nevertheless here *or* there, conscious experience may be many *and* one, and frequently here *and* there, now *and* then,—in so far as spatio-temporal relations appropriate to spheres within experience may be metaphorically applied directly to that experience itself. Not only in his relatively abstract mind and body, but especially in the concrete mind-body whole, and most of all in satisfactory social intercourse does an individual find the greatest variety together with the greatest oneness and

[1] *R. G.*, p. 43.

interrelation. Yet if we are to judge consciousness " by the extent to which all . . . [its] ends are realized, each distinctly, yet all at once," and if we are to measure personality in similar fashion, since it is consciousness that makes one the same person, we must conclude that we are all " very imperfectly conscious." [1] Following the assumption, which seems to be well founded in observation, that reality rises in intrinsic value and self-subsistence according to its degree of internal organization, and width and depth of external relatedness, we are led to think of ultimate reality as being the supreme form of unity in variety, a form which cannot be less than our human personality, but must rather be something " far more deeply interfused," rolling through all things and at the same time dependent upon nothing else, sufficient in its own perfect society.[2]

Reflections like these confirmed the Baron in his belief that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity and the inarticulate stutterings of Negative Theology, " where it is sound and not really agnostic or pantheistic," are but attempts " to utter vividly this stupendous richness of God." [3] Man needs all the God that he can imagine—and more; he needs a God far greater than an assuager of his wants or those of the universe; he needs a God with an intrinsic existence and absolute worth of His own; and this God the doctrine of the Holy Trinity attempts to describe.[4] A conception of God as merely the totality of the universe or as an unconscious principle of unity immanent in it, reaches at best the organic stage; a conception of Him as the mind, and the universe as the body, of the one ultimate reality, reaches the subject-object stage of unity and diversity; but no conception less than the even greater multiplicity and oneness involved in the personal communion of subject with subject could the Baron accept as an adumbration of the divine nature. From this in part arises his assent to the Trinitarian suggestion of intercourse among persons, not merely the limping, one-sided return that man can give to God plus

[1] Warner Fite, *Individualism*, New York (Longmans, Green), 1924, especially sections 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 44, and 50.
[2] Cf. *E. L.*, pp. 232, 369–70.
[3] *E.* II., pp. 217–18.
[4] *E.* I., p. 277.

the gift so great from God that man can neither receive nor apprehend it fully, but a relation between perfect persons so congenial that their unity is as real and absolute as is their utter diversity, so complete that anything outside that society, or supra-society, is a superfluity of loving goodness.

The doctrine of the Trinity, forbidding any co-ordination of God with His creation,[1] any identification of Him with the sum of the physical and the spiritual universe,[2] affirms " that the inner life of God is something far fuller and richer than is the whole of His creative and providential activity." [3] Let us compare for the moment two well-known characters, the " flutterbudget " and the " strong, silent man." The " flutterbudget " is rushed and swamped in " a restless, intermittent, feverish, self-occupied, moving to and fro of some ineffectual wishings, imperfect willings and the like, in the midst of numerous unactualized capabilities." [4] The " strong, silent man " accomplishes ten times as much as the " flutterbudget " with only a tenth of the latter's ineffective activity. That is because the being of the former is far greater than his activity, of which it is the source. The " flutterbudget " is exhausted in his activity; the activity of the " strong, silent man " is, like sparks from a conflagration, only a pleasant by-product and decoration of his inexhaustible action. He knows his power; he knows what he wants; he says to this one, Go, and he goeth; and to another, Come, and he cometh; [5] he does a great deal and it does not tire him; he is a paragon of efficiency. We can understand why a " sound," sober, realistic Tory like Aristotle would classify all activity, motion, and process as " only an imperfect kind of Energeia " [6] (Action). If we agree with him, St. Thomas Aquinas, and von Hügel, we cannot think of God as anything less than *Actus Purus*— " the full Functioning of the Spirit and Personality, in which all its Potentiality is actualized, and where the very fullness, richness, and harmony of the Action produces an overflowing joy and peace, an equilibrium of the profoundest, purest

[1] *E.* II., p. 152.
[2] *R. G.*, p. 81.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 66.
[4] *E.* II., p. 51.
[5] St. Luke vii. 8.
[6] *M. E.* II., p. 250.

Energizing." [1] It is to this abundant, inexhaustible Action of God in His transcendence, of which His immanental activity is only a spark, that the Trinitarian dogma tries to do justice.

Why not a Holy Infinity? Would not that be more "glorious" than a Holy Trinity? Or why not, wielding Occam's razor, worship a Holy One? A vacuous unity, we noticed, is one of the mind's meanest figments. The doctrine of the Trinity comes not to destroy its monotheistic and unitarian predecessors and running mates, but to fulfil and enrich them. Although not only the Godhead but each of the three, roughly distinguishable Persons within it is infinitely rich, the Baron did not suggest a Holy Infinity, because he believed that to avoid doctrinarianism one should temper *a priori* impulses by submissiveness to historic fact. In the course of Christian history any attempted description of God simpler than the Trinitarian one has generally proved to be inadequate.[2] The Trinitarian one, on the contrary, is apparently so flexible and inexhaustible that, lacking further revelation or better substitutes, it seems to be our duty to attempt to understand it more thoroughly rather than to seek food richer than that which we are still unable to assimilate. Yet von Hügel never desired to close the door to legitimate speculation and the possibilities of the future. He gives the impression of having accepted his church's articles of faith as final in the sense that, like stones placed under the wheels of a wagon going uphill, while the horses stop for breath, dogmas are to be used as an obstacle to retreat and an aid to advance.[3]

Does not the Trinitarian defence of the all-zero relation

[1] *E.* II., p. 51.

[2] Cf. *E.* II., p. 152.

[3] Cf. "Nos formules définissantes ont pour objet de préserver de l'erreur, non de borner la vérité; ce sont des parapets, des garde-fous ou, si vous voulez, des haies protectrices, mais elles ne barrent jamais la route, car la vérité en elle-même est inépuisable, et jamais nous n'aurons fini de la scruter."—Léon Ollé-Laprune, *De la Virilité Intellectuelle*, Paris (Belin), 4th ed., p. 23.

Cf. "Le développement de l'instruction et de la raison ne sera jamais un danger pour la foi d'un homme qui ne confond pas la vérité religieuse avec les formules qui lui servent de véhicule."—Loisy, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I., p. 474.

between God and man, by its " witness to the self-completeness, the independence, and the awe-inspiring pre-eminence of God," [1] rush straight into deism, point directly towards an isolated, indifferent, intellectually egoistic, Aristotelian divinity? It will do so only if philosophy ignores the intuitions of Plato, the revelation of the unsurpassed life of Jesus, and the experience of countless Christians and other religionists, testifying to " the impulse to give Itself intrinsic to Goodness, so that God, as Supreme Goodness, becomes the Supreme Self-giver." [2] " God is found so lovable and so love-impelling, precisely because He who has no essential need to be loved by finite spirits, still less to attain to self-consciousness by their existence and by His love of them, nevertheless does love them far better than ever they can love themselves, and invites their love of Him because it alone is the adequate means and end of their happiness." [3]

" His goodness infinitely does desire
To be by all possest;
His love makes others blest.
It is the glory of His high estate,
And that which I for evermore admire,
He is an Act that doth communicate." [4]

Before God there is one attitude and disposition more natural and satisfactory than all others, that of adoration. Although the greatest saints of every religion and clime have taught or implied this, nevertheless, whenever it is proposed, opposition never fails to cast its vote also. As there is always a tendency to equate religion with morality, it is not surprising to see the ranks of the opponents of adoration, from Kant downwards, composed chiefly of moralists. They object ordinarily because they believe that adoration is advocated as a substitute for ethical responsibility and effort, or else because they believe that religion cannot be decent once it passes the limit of clear thought and conscience.

It should be obvious that von Hügel considers no one

[1] *E.* II., p. 151.
[2] *M. E.* II., p. 252; cf. pp. 251–4 and *E.* II., p. 154.
[3] *E.* II., p. 153.
[4] Traherne, " The Anticipation."

aspect of life so sufficient to itself that it can function properly without the co-operation of the rest of personality. That is perhaps even more true of religion than of many human interests, because religion requires other branches of experience as material on and through which to work, whereas those other branches can frequently live a passable, although not a full, life without religion. Hence adoration is put forward by the Baron not to take the place of other factors within religion or to supersede morality, but to be accepted on its own merits as one of the means of rejuvenating life and rendering it more abundant. As religion cannot thrive without morality, so morality has much to gain from religion.[1]

They can supplement one another because each is distinct from the other. Their rates of development differ.[2] One frequently finds a race with elaborate religion and primitive morality, or with a weak sense of religion and yet much ethical integrity. Their dominant categories are unlike; "responsibility, prudence, merit, reward, irretrievableness" commonly being associated with ethics, and "trust, grace, heroism, love, free pardon," and "spiritual renovation," with religion.[3] Although morality usually contents itself with a merely human stage, nevertheless, like a public speaker, it is stimulated by a greater audience and a larger setting, like that supplied by the metaphysical reaches of religion.[4] This, we have seen, comes from the realistic tendencies of religion, which deals with existences, adoration itself involving a keen sense of the objectivity of God.[5] Ethics, on the other hand, as well suggested by the contrast between Kant's two *Critiques*,[6] has to do primarily with that which "ought to be" but which is not necessarily already existent.[7] As religion "consists centrally in the sense of Presence—the sense of an overflowing Existence distinct from our own and in the

[1] *R. G.*, p. 94.
[2] *M. E.* II., p. 272; *R. G.*, p. 80; Webb, *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, p. 261.
[3] *M. E.* II., p. 274.
[4] *Ibid.*, II., p. 275.
[5] *L. N.*, p. 14; *E. L.*, p. 160.
[6] *R. G.*, pp. 86–8.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 71–3, 81.

Adoration of" this true, holy, beautiful, good, and hence beatific ultimate reality[1]—, the end of religion lies not so much in the observance of law[2] as in joyous personal communion with God in His happy presence.[3] This joy in the presence of ultimate reality von Hügel found in those who, like Plato, Plotinus, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Spinoza,[4] are commonly termed "spiritual" people, as distinguished (rather indulgently) from "moral" people, of whom Kant[5] is an imposing example. That religion, which claims to have found reality and to be living by it, should be more joyful than morality is natural, since the latter commonly insists upon duty, search, process, lonely struggle, things in themselves often harsh and discouraging.[6] Religion, by way of contrast, emphasizes not so much what a man does as what he is;[7] it links up his necessary and important "activity" with his more ultimate "action"; and it derives (to continue the Baron's language) its secondary "oughtness" from its primary "isness."[8] Nevertheless, the interdependence of character and conduct, as exhibited by the fact that for a good man virtue is its own reward, prevents one from forgetting, in the midst of the differences between religion and morality, the need of developing them both together for their mutual advantage.

In adoration, the creaturely awareness of "the *otherness* of God and the littleness of men,"[9] mind and body, thought and emotion bow, as it were, in disinterested and loving contemplation of God. Bowing, prostration, veiling almost invariably mark the external expression of this experience. "Cherubim and seraphim veil their faces with their wings." "Do they inquire," asks Chrysostom, "and reason meticulously among themselves about God's nature? By no means.

[1] *R. G.*, p. 71. Cf. *E.* I., p. 90.
[2] *R. G.*, p. 95. Cf.: "God is not thought of as a director whose guidance is to be used in the conduct of life: He is not means but end; He is not used but loved."—C. A. Bennett, *A Philosophical Study of Mysticism* (Yale Univ. Press), 1931, p. 26.
[3] *R. G.*, pp. 94–5; *E.* I., pp. 130–31.
[4] *R. G.*, pp. 96–100. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 103.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 104; *E.* II., pp. 239–42.
[7] *R. G.*, p. 105. [8] *G. S.*, p. 73.
[9] *L. N.*, p. xvii.

What do they do? They praise Him. They fall down and worship Him with a great trembling. They turn their eyes away, and can themselves not endure the vouchsafed revelation of God. . . . Wherefore do they cover their faces and hide them with their wings? Why, but that they cannot endure the dazzling radiance and its rays that pour from the Throne? "[1] They "have learned to honour by silence that which transcends reason and thought."[2]

And those cheap objections—outworn conception of God as an Oriental potentate; humiliating and useless position for a man to be in; God is my dynamo, my engine, and I'll run Him until a better model comes out, etc., etc. How utterly they miss the point! How completely do they reveal an incapacity for even suspecting what adoration is!

Let it be admitted at once, on their behalf, that in our wretched and long-to-be-endured state of self-debased creatures we need all the petitions, thanksgivings, confessions, and intercessions that can be devised or commandeered. We need every grain of utilitarianism, practicality, science, socialism (in its widest sense), humanitarianism, and this-worldliness that we can possibly scrape together. And we require much more and other.[3] We must now and then come out of the hot, black mines and see the sunset and hear the birds singing in the tree-tops; or canter on a frolicsome horse over sparkling fields as dawn, breaking through wood and hill, whitens the mist in the valleys. Spectacles like these transform our being by opening it to some extent to the

[1] Quoted by R. Otto, *op. cit.*, pp. 187–8.

[2] Gregory of Nyssa, quoted by R. Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

[3] "*We men need God much more than, and very differently from, the way and degree in which God needs us men.* God is the Absolute Cause, the Ultimate Reason, the Sole True End and Determiner of our existence, of our persistence, of our nature, of our essential calls and requirements. God is all these things for man. Man is not one of these things for God. Man comes to his true self by loving God. God is the very ocean of Himself—of Love—apart from all creation. Thus the positions between God and Man, and between Man and God, are entirely uninterchangeable. Hence the most fundamental need, duty, honour and happiness of man is not petition, nor even contrition, nor again even thanksgiving; these three kinds of prayer which, indeed, must never disappear out of our spiritual lives; but *adoration*."—*E.* II., pp. 223–4. Cf. *M. E.* II., p. 335.

entrance of qualities of the object beheld. Without occasional disinterested expansion of the soul in the sheer joy, beauty, and love of reality, we should be suffocated in the routine details of life. These faint analogues of adoration are as significant ontologically and epistemologically as "the trivial round, the common task," which must rightly make up the "bulk" and the "roughage" of our daily bread. We take to them as naturally as the religious soul takes to adoration, not chiefly because we know that we must have them and that they will do us good, but simply because they are intrinsically lovely.

> . . . "True hearts spread, and heave
> Unto their God, as flow'rs do to the Sun." [1]

Well did von Hügel's St. Catherine recognize the fresh-morning singleness in the relations of God and men—God delighting in the spontaneous love of His children somewhat as we rejoice in the love of ours, and we exulting in His glory as in its lesser splendour in an Andean sunset. She taught, in accordance with the principal tradition of Christian mysticism, that God created the world from pure love; that He loves us more than we love ourselves; that the love of God is true self-love and alone brings happiness, as distinct from pleasure; and that the true self therefore hungers instinctively after God. Thus, although she knew well enough the woes and the wants of the world, she could assert, "Pure love loves God without any *for* (any further motive)." [2]

Nobody supposes that St. Catherine of Genoa, or anybody else, could live always on that peak. Our lives are so complex that as long as we remain on earth they cannot be safely simplified in a too heavenly or a too hellish fashion. That does not disprove, however, the Baron's indiscriminate and unguarded generalization, "Religion is Adoration." [3] It merely shows that that crowning jewel of religion is

[1] Henry Vaughan, "Rules and Lessons." Cf. C. A. Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 34: "Worship to be worship must be wholly disinterested."
[2] *M. E.* I., pp. 262–8.
[3] *S. L.*, p. 51.

one of great price. It intimates how difficult it must be, and how refreshing, to sing truthfully with St. Francis Xavier,

> " E'en so I love Thee, and will love,
> And in Thy praise will sing;
> *Solely because Thou art my God,*
> And my eternal King."

M. Loisy, by his frequent references [1] to von Hügel's " idée fixe " of the " purement transcendent " and to his " hantise de l'immanentisme," especially Loisy's own immanentism, which became for the Baron, according to the French exegete's claim, " une sorte de cauchemar douloureux, créé et entretenu pour la préservation de sa foi," creates a misleading impression of von Hügel's position as a whole.

A recollection of some of the Baron's beliefs should convince anyone that in the comprehensiveness of his thought he welcomed the immanent as cordially as he did the

[1] *Op. cit.*, Vol. III., pp. 155 ff., 159 ff., 166 ff., 366 ff., 458 ff. Loisy's charge that von Hügel almost unreasonably over-emphasized the transcendent is plausible only for the Baron's declining years and even then is exaggerated. It is regrettable that in this most detailed and often penetrating account of von Hügel's rôle in Roman Catholic Modernism several passages about him, especially in the hundred or so pages beginning with p. 360 of Vol. III., should be vitiated by inexact generalizations, irritability, and a native incapacity for metaphysics.

Towards the end of his life von Hügel tried to study God's objective, transcendent reality as fully as he had previously analysed the subjective and immanental aspects of religion. As both immanental and transcendental convictions were strong in him from the start, this was a natural development of his thought. Which side should be elaborated first was largely dependent upon the spirit of the times. His later thought, far from repudiating his earlier work, presupposes and supplements it.

" Pour ce qui pourrait, sans doute, être allégué au sujet d'une quasi-réaction, qui peut, indubitablement, être perçue dans son attitude d'esprit des dernières années, tant que cette réaction n'a été qu'un mouvement de modération et de recul, sans aboutir à une nouvelle ligne de pensée, on ne peut pas dire qu'elle marque un véritable changement dans l'œuvre de sa vie, dans sa philosophie, ni dans les traits essentiels de sa pensée religieuse."—M. D. Petre, " G. Tyrrell et F. von Hügel, Un modernisme de croyants catholiques," *Congrès d'histoire du christianisme* (*Annales d'histoire du christianisme*), Paris (les éditions Rieder), 1928, Vol. III., p. 227.

" . . . je ne trouve, dans les œuvres de cette dernière période, aucun véritable changement d'orientation, et certes pas de *conversion* de ce modernisme qui était l'essence de sa philosophie religieuse."—*Ibid.*, p. 228.

transcendent, if the two were accepted not as antagonistic, mutually exclusive concepts but as interpenetrative and complementary. In worship, even in mystical union, there must be, the Baron maintained, two centres,[1] the worshipper and His God; but worship would be inconceivable without enough likeness between the two centres to render personal intercourse possible.[2] Were the likeness one of identity, communion would lapse into soliloquy; hence the need of regarding God's immanence in a more panentheistic than pantheistic fashion.[3] From the point of view of ethics and earthly efficiency, only transcendence and immanence, "taken and working thus together, give to the soul a height without inflation, and a concrete particularity without pettiness." [4] So closely must they be kept together that to take merely one or the other mutilates personality. On this score von Hügel disapproved Kierkegaard's excessive emphasis on the transcendence of God, which pushes Him so far off that the creature is left in anguished despair at the impassable distance between them.[5] That "deep solitary Dane's" theory of transcendence overlooks the Christian conception of "God's utterly prevenient, pure *ecstatic* love of Man," [6] His ceaseless overflowing into creation. The Baron's insistence, which we have noted all along, upon the presence of God, the infinite and the eternal, in the finite and the contingent,[7] in all the departments of life, in institutions, sacraments, body, matter, above all in the Incarnation;[8] his motto, no nature

[1] *E.* II., pp. 145–6. [2] *E. L.*, pp. 366–7. [3] *M. E.* II., p. 325.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 359. [5] *Ibid.*, pp. 343–7. [6] *Ibid.*, p. 335.
[7] *R. G.*, p. 114.
[8] Cf. *E.* I., pp. 85–6, for Jesus as a revelation of God's prevenient love. The Baron's hazy, embryonic theory of the Incarnation has sometimes been criticized as being too immanental, because (it is said) it does not distinguish clearly enough between the unique divinity of Christ and God's universal immanence. Von Hügel did not sufficiently elaborate his theory to render fruitful here a minute examination of his tendencies; it is enough for our purposes to observe that he recognized Jesus Christ as our best normative revelation of God, by which all other revelations and intimations of the supernatural must be measured.

"It would be disastrous if there were an official church explanation of the Incarnation, every explanation is bound to be inadequate; it will be rare that any explanation is other than positively misleading. What the Church must safeguard is the fact; individual Christians may offer

without grace and no grace, at least in its direct relation to us, without nature;—these should remind us of the enormous importance he attached to the immanent and the natural in connection with the transcendent and the supernatural.

But religious " experience itself is *essentially* as truly of God transcendent as of God immanent; of a Spirit indefinitely more spiritual, a reality which is nobler and of a higher nature than our highest, and leaves us with a noble thirst—as well as of this same Spirit as penetrating us through and through, and as satisfying our cravings. If one were to take . . . clear-cut Immanentism as final and complete, that noblest half of the religious experience of tip-toe expectation, of unfulfilled aspiration, of sense of a Divine Life, of which our own but touches the outskirts, would have no place." [1] " It is this immediate recognition of the numinous, the wholly other and transcendent, in persons, things, events, which is at the root of worship, and so of religion." [2] Let us see with what success, then, von Hügel meets the demands of immanence and transcendence in his well-known discussions about the nature of liberty and suffering in God and men.

The most living root of the doctrine of grace is probably the one that bores deepest into the soil of familiar religious experience. When he is in tune with God, the believer feels that God is the secret strength and inspirer of his actions.

explanations, provided that in doing so they do not deny or explain away any part of the fact."—Wm. Temple, *Christus Veritas*, p. 134, London (Macmillan), 1924.

As has been pointed out by S. C. Carpenter (*Supernatural Religion in its Relation to Democracy*, London (Nicholson and Watson), 1932, pp. 51–2), " the actual Christology that would follow from " von Hügel's " starting-point would be somewhat on the lines traced out by the Archbishop of York, or by Father Thornton, or by Dr. Leonard Hodgson,"—in their respective (1) *Christus Veritas*, (2) *The Incarnate Lord*, (3) *Was Made Man* and *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation* (ed. A. E. J. Rawlinson). Cf. W. N. Pittenger's articles in *The American Church Monthly*, entitled " The Finality of Christianity " (Nov. 1932) and " The Doctrine of Christ " (March 1933).

[1] *S. L.*, p. 139.

[2] A. E. Taylor, *Faith of a Moralist*, Series II., p. 186.

" And every virtue we possess,
And every victory won,
And every thought of holiness,
Are His alone." [1]

Those homely lines express too real and frequent a state of soul to be lightly dismissed. The relation of divine grace to human will may be suggested by the relation of master to pupil. The master's work is to help the pupil to use his own mind; hence the more the pupil thinks for himself, the better he carries out his master's will. The two wills thus operate indivisibly,[2] almost indistinguishably [3] (like the minds of Plato and Socrates in the earlier Dialogues), so that the most complete surrender the pupil can make to the master is not to repeat him, not to beg him limply for every answer, but to seek to work out things for himself, which best accords with his master's spirit.[4] God's grace and man's free will interpenetrate yet far more intimately, in so " utterly one-seeming " [5] a fashion that, as St. Ignatius advised, a man should " pray as if all depended on his prayer, and act as if all depended upon his action." [6] To do otherwise, to

[1] Cf. *E. L.*, pp. 387–8: " A vivid consciousness of the deep distinction and difference (within all their real affinity and closeness of intercourse) between God and man, and the continuous, keen sense that all man has, does, and is of good is ever, in its very possibility, a free gift of God, constitutes the very core of religion."

[2] *M. E.* I., pp. 69–70, 79–81.

[3] Since " the empirical effects of grace, considered in isolation, hardly ever transcend the apparent power of natural causes " (J. Maréchal, *op. cit.*, p. 42), one might ask why grace should be lugged in at all. It is brought in, among other reasons, partly because a spiritual metaphysics, like von Hügel's, finds science itself presupposing an ultimate personalistic background or reality acting in such a grace-full manner, and partly because the theory of grace seems to be necessary in order to do justice to the religious experience which in turn animates and clothes that metaphysics. (Vicious circle?)

[4] *M. E.* I., p. 370. Cf. W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 223: " In theory, it may not be easy to reconcile ' earnest striving ' with complete surrender and abrogation of the will, but the logic of the heart does not find them incompatible."

[5] *M. E.* II., p. 134.

[6] *Ibid.*, I., p. 80. " I know he [Eucken] feels the scheme of God *plus* man, grace *plus* nature, predestination *plus* free-will,—all this putting alongside of each other, as though they were two separate material bodies, what really are two living energies, completely interpenetrating each other, in various forms and degrees,—to be utterly misleading. With St. Bernard he feels that the grace and the free-will interpenetrate each other throughout, and that the grace is in the free-

" rely " quietistically on God in as false a sense as that of a pupil who thinks that he pleases his master by making the master do the work the pupil can and should do, would, according to St. Catherine of Genoa, " be simply to tempt God." " Without work on our part grace refuses to save." [1] Von Hügel's entire philosophical outlook, like any Christian incarnational or sacramental scheme, opposes the thought of God's acting in a void, preferring the figure of " yeast working in meal, which manifests its hidden power in proportion to the mass of meal which it penetrates and transforms." [2] Surely God's immanence is here enounced sufficiently for those who believe in Him at all. In fact it is proclaimed a little too thoroughly for those who like to separate nature from supernature and to tabulate knowingly the specific contributions of each.

> " Draw, if thou canst, the mystic line
> Severing rightly his from thine,
> Which is human, which divine." [3]

These two wills, however, externally so indistinguishable, are felt to differ not merely in strength, scope, and quality, " but in *nature*." [4] God's liberty alone is perfect; ours, imperfect. The Baron adopted St. Augustine's famous text: " ' *Posse non peccare, magna est libertas; non posse peccare, maxima est*' (it is already a great liberty to be able to avoid sin; but the greatest liberty is to be unable to sin at all). This doctrine cannot but be true, unless God, Who cannot sin, is thereby a slave; and unless human souls

will, and the free-will in the grace. Here again, I think, the clarifying business (of which we are so immensely proud) misleads and impoverishes us; and that so little is it true that, in the spiritual world, two realities cannot (as with two bodies) be in the same place, that, on the contrary, one spirit or spiritual force or idea has not really penetrated the other, unless it *is* in the same point and centre of energizing as the other, each as it were passing right through the other, and not *adding* to the quantity, but profoundly *modifying* the *quality* of the other. Grace so little interferes with, or even simply adds itself on to, or runs parallel with the autonomy of the spiritual personality, that it actually constitutes that personality."—*S. L.*, p. 91.

[1] *M. E.* I., p. 265.

[2] *Ibid.*, II., p. 136; cf. pp. 286–7.

[3] Emerson, " Worship." Cf. *E.* II., p. 196.

[4] *E.* II., p. 220.

which, in proportion to the length and depth of their devotedness, very certainly grow less liable to grave sin, thereby become less free. Thus the Liberty of Choice is an imperfect kind of liberty, and Perfect Liberty consists in willing fully and spontaneously the behests of a perfect nature, and in the incapacity to will otherwise. Hence the more arbitrary an act, the less really free it is." [1] God, as ultimate reality, has nothing outside Him, as it were, to impel Him to express anything but His true nature; as perfect goodness He is " not only not actually sinful at all—He is incapable of sin, incapable of temptation to sin." [2]

Our liberty of choice is the characteristic of a divided, distracted creature, or of one ever potentially so, if not always actually so.[3] We are not free, the Baron argued against vulgar opinion, because we can sin, which is a negation and thwarting of our personalities, but in spite of our ability to sin. We are free in so far as we fully and consciously control and express our true natures, without committing or desiring sin.[4] Sin and hell are possible results not of freedom but of mankind's imperfect liberty.[5] The joy and freedom of the saints appear to increase with the lessening of the power of evil over them. " As Matthew Arnold puts it, with delicate perception: what entrances Christendom in St. Teresa is not directly her long years of struggle and of suffering to be faithful to conscience; it is the rapt joy, the gracious spontaneity, the seeming naturalness of the supernatural,

[1] *E.* I., p. 17. Cf. *L. N.*, p. 112; *R. G.*, pp. 121–6; *E.* I., p. 221; *E.* II., pp. 203, 220–1.

[2] *E.* II., p. 220. God incarnate, having taken on the imperfections of human quasi-liberty, " was in all points tempted as we are, yet without sin," " the closeness of the union of His human nature with the Divine nature " rendering " actual sin impossible even in that Human nature." Cf. Wm. Temple, *op. cit.*, pp. 147–8: " . . . the Will, which is the whole being of a man organized for conduct . . . always shows its strength chiefly in certain splendid incapacities—as when we say of a good man charged with some mean offence, he simply could not do it. But in Christ this incapacity towards evil was absolute; His perfect freedom showed itself, as perfect freedom always does, in an inability to sin—the *non posse peccare* of St. Augustine. This is nothing contrary to human nature; rather it is exactly what human nature is always aiming at; indeed it is the effort towards this that distinguishes human nature as personal."

[3] *R. G.*, p. 123.

[4] *E.* II., p. 203.

[5] *E.* I., p. 221.

in the last years of her lifelong service, a service which has at last become the fullest freedom." [1]

> " Serene will be our days and bright,
> And happy will our nature be,
> When love is an unerring light,
> And joy its own security." [2]

Although we cannot understand exactly what perfect liberty is, nevertheless we must attribute it to God, von Hügel insisted, as being that which is farthest removed from the obvious imperfections of our inferior pseudo-liberty, and which is best suggested by the highest type of freedom observable in daily life, the freedom of confident expression of the soul's ideals. Far from being a dead, mechanical process like the workings of a clock, this freedom rises in conscious life and value as it passes through the graded ranks of persons and reaches its culmination in God. The realization of our inferior liberty has the Mephistophelian advantage of ever spurring us on to attain a better stage, and the even greater merit of awakening in our hearts the often naturally bitter but purgatively humiliating and, in the end, decidedly grateful pang which comes with the realization that many souls are not merely temporarily better than us but are intrinsically far superior to us.[3]

Doubtless it was in part the " vehemence " of his temperament, to which he often refers, that heightened the Baron's admiration of St. Teresa's " great table-land of full balance and overflowing peace." [4] Richly and sensitively endowed with some more than average talents and materially and spiritually independent enough to be able to do what he wanted, how could von Hügel have been more miserable?

> " Me this uncharter'd freedom tires;
> I feel the weight of chance desires:
> My hopes no more must change their name;
> I long for a repose that is ever the same." [5]

" You see," he wrote to a young relative on the day of her confirmation, " when I began to try to be good—to serve

[1] *E.* I., p. 18. Cf. J. Maréchal, *op. cit.*, p. 322, in regard to " theopathic " states. [2] Wordsworth, " Ode to Duty."
[3] *R. G.*, pp. 123–4. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 122.
[5] Wordsworth, " Ode to Duty."

God—I already, alas, found myself involved in gravely bad habits and inclinations. But this, once I was, by God's grace, awakened to long to be straight and true—to go direct to God and Christ—had one great advantage. I saw young fellows all around me fretting to be *free*, to be their own sole, full masters. They fretted against this and that thing; against this and that person. They thought if only they could get away from these, they would indeed be free. But I myself *could not feel that to be nearly enough*; I was too little happy in myself to fiddle-faddle at such little things! I wanted, *I had to*, get rid of—not those outside conditions, not those other people and their orders, etc.: but I had, somehow, to become free from *self*, from my poor, shabby, bad, all-spoiling *self!* *There* lay freedom, *there* lay happiness!" [1] It was *there*, in something *beyond* him, in something *other* than him, in something incomparably better than himself, that freedom lay. Does not this fundamental strain in his character partially explain the tenacity with which he clung to the transcendence of God? Does not a similar need, implanted in all mankind, account in part for the warmth with which such doctrines are held?

But if God is good and omnipotent, why should He have allowed us to remain so imperfectly free that we are always in danger of ultimate ruin? If He made us so capable of sin, why should not He go to hell for our sins, since had it not been for Him we should never have sinned? There is certainly a difficulty here, although to religious ears it is probably rudely expressed. In no developed religion does God appear as tempting man to sin. Indeed, if we were only honest with ourselves, abandoning our perpetual self-coddling, and striving to live a truly human, supernatural life, we should admit at once the truth of St. Paul's assertion, "There hath no temptation taken you but such as man can bear: but God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able; but will with the temptation make also the way of escape, that ye may be able to endure it." [2] Religion should—and for some people occasionally does—overcome evil and even death, to avoid which, either

[1] *S. L.*, p. 352. [2] 1 Corinthians x. 13.

for ourselves or for those whom we love, we are ordinarily willing to commit almost any sin, so weak is our faith, even if our scale of values is nominally superior to that of the noblest Stoics and ancient pagans of world-undaunted wills. There is no doubt that God does everything He can, short of enslaving us, to deliver us from evil, though not from misery and anguish, from which, according to the Christian story, He did not spare His own Son (something doubly harder, as has been pointed out, than merely suffering directly Himself, since a loving parent often undergoes greater, although different, anguish than that of his child, when the latter is in misery). In His incarnation God descended as nearly as possible into hell for our sins. No saint has accused Him of evil; few have so taxed the inanimate world. Evil comes from what man has done, or has failed to do, to man and to himself, in spite of the groanings and travail of the Spirit. Religion testifies, at its best, to the everlasting goodness and sovereign reality of God. That positive testimony grows in strength with the spiritual advance of mankind. The tormenting question, why we should be created with the imperfect liberty that makes evil possible, bothers us in proportion as we move away from the religious affirmations which would temper our anxieties, and rely upon our own immediate capacity for explaining everything, forgetting that our abysmal ignorance should ever lead us to give the good the benefit of the doubt on pain of otherwise annihilating what little good we already have. " I do not see, I never have seen," von Hügel wrote with feeling, " why any man should be called upon to answer everything, or why a position may not be profoundly true though it involves at once difficulties beyond solution by the wit of man." [1]

In rather distrustfully presenting an answer from Aquinas, the Baron did not hesitate, however, to strike out beyond his depth. Divine omnipotence, as taught by the scholastic, does not mean that God can do anything. He must remain true to His own nature and its reflections in the laws of the universe. But to create a finite being with perfect liberty would be impossible even for God, since that means creating

[1] *R. G.*, p. 124.

" a finite infinite, a limited God, an intrinsic contradiction." He could have granted our wills less imperfection, but if we are to exist at all it must be as creatures, that is, as finite beings to some extent inevitably imperfect, never immune to possible evil. To this von Hügel could only add that under these circumstances God doubtless deems it better to create us as we are than not to create us at all, the good in the matter outweighing the evil;—and " let the man who sees further kindly give us a big conclusive book about it." Recognizing that we are just where we were, he advises us to " stop asking questions " and to try to understand better the lights that we already possess.[1]

The problem of whether God suffers or not the Baron considered highly important.[2] Significant theoretically in leading to either a finite or an infinite deity, it is also closely connected with conceptions of divine personality, liberty, transcendence, and immanence. If it is true that we want in God a companion and friend not too unlike ourselves to share our daily life, it is also certain that we need in Him a parent possessing an authority and character essentially superior to our childish whims and capable of communicating to us a higher type of reality than can be transmitted by any companion who is merely an aggrandisement of one of our own finite generation. As grieving children find in their parents a sympathy as soothing as that of their playmates and also—that which their playmates have not yet acquired—a freedom from childish woes, in the presence of which those trials evaporate, so, von Hügel felt, we need in God not only a suffering companion but even more a serene, sympathetic parent. To be ultimately satisfactory, the parent must be, unlike a human one, absolutely perfect, supremely real, God Himself. As a patient gains more from a sensible, sympathetic, healthy nurse than from one so sensitive and sentimental that

[1] *R. G.*, pp. 124–5; cf. *E.* II., pp. 205–6.

[2] On this point see A. E. Taylor's review of *E.* II., *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XXV., pp. 374–7; and B. R. Brasnett, *The Suffering of the Impassible God*, London (S.P.C.K.), 1928, pp. 115–140, which is the most detailed criticism of the Baron's position; and W. M. Horton, *Theism and the Modern Mood*, New York (Harpers), 1930.

she weakens almost into her charge's own condition, so finite, imperfect, suffering creatures like us can never be exposed too much to the fortunately contagious influence of God's perfect, infinite bliss and well-being. The universe and our race supply us with all the companionship and suffering we can use, the Baron seems to say, so that if we imagine God as being nothing more than a sociable, finite sufferer we have added nothing new or necessary and might just as well leave Him out altogether. What the vast creation longs for, von Hügel was convinced, is something more comprehensive, something other, than itself, which by supplying its deficiencies renders its very existence possible and tolerable. The pained imperfect can no more endure without the perfectly serene than can the sick without the sound.

After referring to the tradition founded on Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus,[1] in whose affirmations of the joyousness of ultimate reality the Baron found evidence for believing God to be exempt from suffering (or to transcend suffering, as in His eternity He transcends time), and after noting that for the ancient Hebrews Jahveh was too awful to suffer,[2] von Hügel reviewed the reasons for believing the Christian revelation to maintain joy in God and suffering in the manhood of Jesus, which he believed to be the best available solution of the problem. As a critical realist he was not disturbed by the fact that the " solemn definition " by the Council of Chalcedon of the " Two Distinct and differing Natures of Christ " in no way helps us to distinguish in detail which acts and aspects of the historic Jesus were human and which divine. Here, as in any case of separating nature and supernature, we are attempting what " no mortal mind can achieve." It is so undeniable, however, that the Chalcedonian formula has enormously enriched speculation about God, Christ, and the relations of God and man in all their ramifications, and the Baron was so profoundly aware of this in his own thinking, that, in spite of the muddledness

[1] *E.* II., pp. 175–83.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 183–6. Cf. pp. 187–8 for sketch of the Patripassian current in the Bible and early Christian fathers.

of the doctrine, he believed it to " stammer out and protect a nucleus [1] of truth . . . of priceless practical worth." [2]

One of the principal objections to a non-suffering God is that if He truly sympathizes He must also suffer. Two kinds of suffering are here involved: antecedent suffering on our part, which later permits us to sympathize with others in similar misfortunes; and suffering subsequent to sympathy, the pain more often psychical than physical which the suffering of others produces in our nervous systems. Subsequent suffering should not be pressed too much in respect to God, since it is not true that those who sympathize most are always the most nervously upset, and since incorporeal Spirit has no nervous system to be upset. Nor does sympathy depend upon antecedent suffering. Whereas it is generally true that the poor are more generous than the rich, very largely because the former know by grim experience the misery of poverty, yet who has never met the man rendered so callous by his own successful emergence from wretchedness that his only reply to those in need is, " If I pulled through alone, you ought to pull through too; so don't whine for help from me "? Father Damien's abounding sympathy for lepers, which even before he caught the disease was certainly more intense and delicate than that of the average leper for his fellows, shows that sympathy does not blossom automatically from suffering but depends upon strong imagination and altruistic emotions, which attain their maximum only in God.[3]

There are, von Hügel hastened to add, other emotions in God besides joy, notably those of love [4] and delectation, together with all their derivatives and varieties, organized and directed in every possible way towards the Persons of the Godhead and the innumerable hierarchies of intelligent, conscious, animate, and inanimate beings composing creation. If the systematization of emotions is a *sine qua non* of

[1] Unspecified, as most of his nuclei are.
[2] *E.* II., pp. 188–97.
[3] *E.* II., pp. 197–8.
[4] It might seem that love and altruistic emotions would now and then lead to as extraordinary suffering as on other occasions they lead to happiness unequalled. But on these points the Baron merely stated his general position without criticizing every step in detail.

personality, a more pervasive, intricate system of positive, primary emotions [1] could hardly be suggested. Faced with the protest that suffering too should be included, because it is a means of developing personality, the Baron admitted that, rightly used, it has that beneficial effect on our imperfect characters; but he saw no reason for ascribing it to the eternally perfect personality of " the Realized Ideal." [2]

Even if the difficulties involved in the notion of a non-suffering God cannot be easily or ever fully exorcised, the objections to suffering in God, the Baron felt, by their more fundamental nature, greatly outweigh them. He observed that the staunchest Patripassians hardly ever venture to flout religious experience to the extent of maintaining that God is evil. Instinctively, if not explicitly, recognizing the intrinsic evil of suffering, they transmute pain and anguish into something plausibly good before acknowledging it in God. His joy is " overcome " suffering. Suffering appears as a " mere vantage-ground for an advance "; [3] " all partial evil, universal good." [4] But if human suffering is an evil and if divine suffering is a good, there is so little in common between them that it is fantastic to call them by the same name. It would seem to be more natural to relax from the

[1] Cf. *R. G.*, p. 131, for reference to Aquinas's method of classifying emotions and ascertaining which belong to God.

[2] *E.* II., pp. 198–9.

The Baron's attempt to explain how God has emotions without a body betrays creditable hesitancy and pardonable confusion. Our bodies, he points out, exist as means of feeling and thought. Yet as our minds do not entirely create their objects, so is it not likewise possible that the process of learning facts emotionally does not do away with a certain amount of independence belonging to emotional objects and qualities, which furnish one of the many mansions of reality? (This line of thought might be developed in connection with James Ward's suggestion that emotional and intellectual experience is not caused, but is restricted, by the body.) As God is the ground of all existence, intelligibility, and value, why cannot He know emotional objects in a manner analogous to our feelings yet superior to them, because He is aware of them directly rather than through the mediation and limitations of a body? Keeping in mind the otherness of God and a preference for looking at matters in a theocentric, rather than in an anthropocentric, way, von Hügel warns us not dogmatically to deny God the possibility of emotion simply because creatures like us require a body for it. (*R. G.*, pp. 131–7.)

[3] R. B. W. Noel, " Pan."

[4] Pope, " An Essay on Man."

strain of such a *tour de force*, by postulating that all suffering is evil and present in man and God (which coarsens the religious sense); or by assuming that all suffering, in man and God, is intrinsically good (which ignores common sense); or, finally, by admitting with von Hügel that suffering is an evil found in man but not in God (which, he felt, remains true to the dictates of religion and normal experience).[1]

The otherness of God and His perfect liberty preclude in Him all sin, suffering, and evil.[2] For purposes of popular apologetics, He is sometimes portrayed as suffering, in order that thereby seeming more like us He may appeal more strongly to us. Although much of this is so weakly anthropomorphic that it discredits itself,[3] it does preserve the truth that God must be like, as well as unlike, us. But all the necessary likeness to suffering, sinful man, von Hügel repeated, is found in the immense suffering of God Incarnate, the sinless Christ. The unlikeness of divine reality, which constitutes part of the fascination, power, and refreshment, of religion, lies in the joyful holiness, the sympathetic otherness, of God.[4] In short, once granted that God, as the Baron apprehended Him, is absolute, unconditioned, ultimate reality, to some extent self-limited by His unstinting overflow in creation, but, far from being absorbed in that creation, retaining an inviolable, good, holy, and perfectly free, eternal nature of His own, it is hard to see how, as thus defined, He could be anything short of "Perfect Love, Unmixed Joy, Entire Delectation,"—"not a Sufferer, but indeed the Sympathiser, God Joy, the Ocean of Joy, our Home."[5]

In the definition and the demonstration of his favourite doctrines about God, which we have reviewed in the hope of enriching our ideas of the content of the super-

[1] *E.* II., pp. 199–200. The ease with which Patripassians turn suffering into good augurs ill, von Hügel indicated by examples, for conscience and the sense of sin, which are not likely to retain their native authority once the transformation of such a stubborn fact as suffering has been accepted. *Ibid.*, pp. 200–2.

[2] *E.* II., pp. 202–4; *L. N.*, p. 112.

[3] *L. N.*, pp. 135–6.

[4] *E.* II., pp. 204–5, 212, 222–3; *E.* I., p. 43; *R. G.*, p. 79.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 205–10; cf. *L. N.*, p. 132.

natural, von Hügel never strays from the "twilight" of his critical realism. Although there can be no doubt of the genuineness and resiliency of his faith, nevertheless, in his attempts to bring his depths to the surface, in order to formulate his beliefs, he creates the impression of continually starting, going ahead as far as he can, and then concluding, as one convinced of the increasing incomprehensibility and apprehensibility of reality must, that he has not yet even begun. Thus no more than anybody else does he escape the tensions characteristic of religious belief. Alone, in the end, with the whisperings of his soul, he knows neither how these things can be nor how they can be otherwise.

DOCTRINES ABOUT MAN

SYNOPSIS

Evil—Christianity and evil—Suffering and Christ—Evolutionary theory of sin—Sin and imperfect liberty—Sin and the body—False self, true self, and God—Asceticism and religious celibacy—Alternation.

Von Hügel and after-life problems—Historical considerations—Ethical difficulties—How is continued consciousness possible after death of body?—Objections of naturalism—Three moral obstacles—Eternal life—Its presence in this world—The Baron's postulate of immortality for all—Basis of his speculation about the world to come—Purgatory—Limbo—Hell—Heaven.

CHAPTER VI

DOCTRINES ABOUT MAN

" Thou art a toylsom Mole, or less
A moving mist,
But life is, what none can express,
A quickness, which my God hath kist." [1]

As the supernatural and the problems connected with it occupied von Hügel not as dialectical exercises but only in so far as they arose from experience, kept in touch with it, and returned to enrich it, we should be remiss if we did not examine his conception of the place of the supernatural in the practical conduct of life. If reality is on the whole somewhat as he has described it, how ought we to face the facts of outer evil and inner sin? What should our attitude be towards ourselves, our bodies, and the world which is always with us? What may we imagine, in spite of our ignorance, lies on the other side of those ever larger, less welcomely looming doors of death?

Evil is probably the most disheartening practical and theoretical obstacle to a supernatural life. By annulling the distinction between good and evil and by laughing conscience and moral tradition out of court, the coarser types of naturalism and most varieties of determinism, despite certain merits which the Baron conceded to them, here shirk the difficulties. Pantheism, by its confusion of the world as it stands with good and ultimate reality, so that all that is is good, only makes matters more strained and hypocritical. The brutal murder of your daughter then becomes as adequate a manifestation of divine goodness as a life of heroic love or the chattering of a chipmunk. " There are people who pretend that the earthquake at Tokio was a good thing—to have cancer in the face is somehow splendid,

[1] Vaughan, " Quickness."

and shows the goodness of God! I hate all that talk. Evil is a mystery and you don't do away with it by calling it good." [1] In spite of its valuable testimony to beauty, equilibrium, and peace, in its proneness to deny positive character to evil, to treat it as a lesser good, a good out of place, a mere defect, a privation of goodness and reality, and hence ultimately as something negative, insubstantial, or non-existent, the Baron found mysticism in theory generally too optimistic.[2]

Not all mystics are as Neo-Platonic in theory as that; the vast majority of Christian mystics show in practice their orthodox colours by fighting evil as a positive, destructive force. As God alone is ultimately real, evil, even if it has a reality deeper than our own, cannot be absolute or in any way as powerful as, or ontologically comparable to, God.[3] If there are cosmic forces of evil—a devil and his demons[4]—, for practical purposes we can ignore them until after we have taken the beams out of our own eyes.[5] By its emphasis upon self-centredness and self-idolatry as for us the festering core of evil and our most immediate point of contact with it,[6] mysticism allies itself with much

[1] *L. N.*, p. xxvi. On evil and suffering, see Lester-Garland, *op. cit.*, Chap. VI.


[2] *M. E.* II., pp. 291–5.

[3] *Ibid.* II., pp. 291, 295; *E.* I., p. 214; *M. E.* I., p. 231.

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[5] Following the example of St. Catherine of Genoa: "If I do anything that is evil, I do it myself alone, nor can I attribute the blame to the Devil or to any other creature but only to my own self-will, sensuality, and other such malign movements. And if all the Angels were to declare that there was any good in me, I would refuse to believe them, because I clearly recognize how that all good is in God alone, and that in me, without divine grace, there is nothing but deficiency."—*M. E.* I., p. 264. Cf. also *S. L.*, p. 84: "We ought to . . . eliminate . . . from . . . the Mystics . . . that dreary diabolic Mysticism business. . . . Here I would rely . . . on the two universally admitted but woefully forgotten doctrines: that fear is ever only to take the place of love, when (always through our own faults) love, the real King and Vice-Regent of the soul, fails; and that God alone can ever directly touch our souls. Fight self constantly, and you need never think of the devil."

[6] *M. E.* I., pp. 230, 235; *M. E.* II., pp. 221–2.



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
[2] *M. E.* II., pp. 291–5.

[3] *Ibid.* II., pp. 291, 295; *E.* I., p. 214; *M. E.* I., p. 231.

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that is most concrete and vital in religion and morality. In addition to the notorious sloth, cowardice, self-indulgence, and self-deception, of human nature, there is, as Kant honestly maintained, an actively evil disposition beyond all simple selfishness, a marked tendency, which can develop into an apparently irreformable habit of will, to fly from, or to revolt against, the light;[1] "hatred and envy, even where the hater's self-interest is not touched; an antipathy of things great and divine; a pleasure found in the disfigurement or destruction of the Good."[2] Anybody can find ample evidence for such a disposition in himself. To do this we have only to consider the often deliberate and bitter narrowness of our sympathies, our unjust suspicions and prejudices; or to remember those unadorned proverbs about the subtle jealousy that even good men are disgusted to find in themselves now and then when they are informed of the success of their friends, or, worse still, the curious contentment that sometimes assails them when their most intimate companions have met with misfortune. The presence in our consciousness of an occasionally devastating, seemingly irrational, almost instinctive will to evil is as much a matter of observation as is the presence of an equally real and rare all-transforming power of goodness.

Not to pretend that there is no evil nor to bother with "fussy," "hopeless" worrying about its possible origin,[3] but, trusting in God in spite of difficulties, to meet it and as far as possible to conquer it, struck von Hügel as being our most practical course of action.[4] Far from denying or

[1] *E. L.*, pp. 144–5.

[2] *M. E.* II., p. 296, quoting from R. Eucken, *Wahrheits-gehalt der Religion*, 1901, pp. 271, 272.

[3] *R. G.*, pp. 16, 17.

[4] The Baron's discussion is limited almost entirely to the consideration of the individual sufferer. Passing by suffering in sub-human life, he deals with the sufferings of others only in so far as that is enlightened by his own experience. In our lives the problem of evil generally disturbs us less in regard to ourselves than in regard to God or others,—in the sense that in our own cases we see that we are usually more to blame than anybody else, and are ready, if not willing, to take the consequences. We suffer but we know, as far as we need to for practical purposes, why we suffer, which removes some of its sting. But not knowing usually why other people, or animals, should suffer, and not knowing to what

explaining it, the Baron's type of Christian theism deepens "our perception of evil, in making us note the most poignant sufferings in precisely the most God-united souls, and, still more, in making us see and admit the worst evil in the possibility, in the actual existence, of the voluntary perversion of the will and character, as furnished by more or less deliberate sin." [1] Having thus intensified evil, Christianity overcomes it not in theory but in practice. "Our Lord's agony of fear and desolation in Gethsemane and on the Cross become the very instruments, occasions, and expressions of the fullest, tenderest love of God and by God; and a Magdalene and an Augustine stand forth, as penitent saints, as true moral miracles of spiritual recreation." [2]

The suffering connected with evil and our finitude we can no more evade than we can avoid the process of ageing. As von Hügel was fond of repeating, either we must suffer to expand, or, if we recoil from that, we condemn ourselves to the worse suffering of stagnation and contraction.[3] Although suffering, in so far as it impairs our proper functioning, is certainly not desirable for its own sake,[4] yet so great is the hope and joy of accomplishment

extent their attitudes counteract their circumstances, we are generally more oppressed by the mystery of suffering in their cases than in our own. Perhaps this is just as well; if we knew more we might be inclined as much more to cruelty as to greater kindliness.

"Our position, then, is that the problem of pain presses least where we know it best from within; most where we least know what it is from within. I do not know that we can get farther than this, but this is a consideration adverse to despair of the problem."—C. C. J. Webb, *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, p. 272.

[1] *R. G.*, p. 183.

[2] *Ibid.* Cf. *E.* I., pp. 93–4, 109–113; *R. G.*, pp. 17, 18.

[3] *R. G.*, p. 132; *E.* I., p. 219; *E.* II., pp. 161–2; *S. L.*, p. 89.

[4] "Suffering merely as such, suffering alone does not, cannot soften or widen any soul; it can thus, of itself and alone, only harden, narrow and embitter it. Hence what I here witness to,—and these facts are as certain as that the earth spins round the sun,—is explicable only by the presence, the operation of a power, a reality, so immensely powerful and real as to counteract and greatly to exceed the suffering and this suffering's natural effects. This power comes from God,—comes, and can come, only from the fact that He exists—that He exists most really, and that His reality and aid are more real and more sustaining by far than is all suffering and all the soul's natural sensitiveness and weakness in face of such dread pain."—*E.* I., p. 110.

that the " three-parts pain " of expansion ordinarily no more daunts an energetic man than the imperativeness of study upsets a student or the necessity of commencing work before dawn discourages a farmer. In this sort of suffering, if it is not excessive, we recognize without complaint the bitter-sweet uses of adversity, the value of discipline. More humiliating, more exhaustive of patience (as they seem to be only the payment of past debts and to lead nowhere in the future), but admittedly just, are the sour fruits sprung from the seeds of selfish, neglectful, and evil imaginations and choices. But hardest of all to bear, and often harder in the case of one we love than in our own cases, is the unexpected scourge of some apparently unreasonable, humiliating, sterile, or ruinous evil.

This " last straw " is the sharpest test of supernatural belief. In the moral and practical sphere it holds a place analogous to that of opaque Thing in the sphere of epistemology and ontology. " Though He slay me, yet will I trust Him,"—upon whether the affirmation or the question lurking there predominates depends the sufferer's relation to the supernatural. If he rants and rages, blaming God, blaming the government, blaming himself for not having killed himself before this day, it avails him nothing; he " contracts." It were better merely to stagnate, to grin and bear it, like a dog. Can he fool himself, saying, " This is not evil," or endure it with the strength of pride? Such Stoic grimness petrifies; such optimism reels before the storm. Self-pity is left and pessimism,—who wants them may take them.[1]

Von Hügel's prescription for meeting suffering is that of calmly, consciously accepting it—just as one best greets any Thing—and utilizing it for the purification and strengthening of the soul. He welcomed it [2] calmly, because for him evil did not overthrow the positive evidences of a

[1] *S. L.*, p. 228; *E.* I., pp. 294–5.

[2] During the frequent illnesses of his life he several times came near enough to death to test the method that he preached. Cf. *S. L.*, pp. 255–6. In regard to von Hügel's health see Loisy, *Mémoires*, Vol. I. p. 322 and *passim*. The *Journal* of Elisabeth Leseur, Paris (Gigord), 1927, furnishes abundant evidence of how Christianity can fructify suffering.

religious, supernatural, ultimate reality,[1] although it did make belief in it, like any precious belief, "costly" to maintain. As too much fuel will put out rather than increase a fire, so there is a limit to human endurance of anguish, but a limit depending probably more upon moral than physical constitution. Indefinable, however, are the bounds of endurance, especially when the individual, abandoning all effort to "stand" it in his own strength—"to cut a decent figure in his own eyes"—, turns himself over entirely to God to let Him do with him as He sees fit.[2]

The most striking and universally helpful example of suffering thus nobly, faithfully borne by divine grace is undoubtedly that of Jesus Christ. "Notre Seigneur a gagné le monde, non par ses beaux discours, par le sermon sur la Montagne, mais par son sang, par sa douleur sur la croix."[3] As people who have suffered much and suffered well generally possess a strength, an acquaintance with "the few things that really matter," an insight, a sympathy, and an influence not even approachable by surface lives, one would be a stickler to begrudge "devoted suffering" von Hügel's title of "the greatest Grace,"[4] "the highest, purest, perhaps the only quite pure form of action."[5] When one is showered with blessings, there is no intrinsic difficulty in supernatural belief, aside from the usual distraction of attention from the Giver to His gifts. But it requires an exceptionally robust and disinterested character to preserve faith in God when to all appearances God has forsaken him. This is the death everyone must die if he

[1] *E.* I., p. 43.

[2] *S. L.*, p. 230. Somebody is sure to protest that this is "fatalism" or quietism. But, to be fair, we must recall that the Baron's universe is a natural-supernatural one, so much so that it is difficult at times to distinguish which is which. As grace and will rise and fall together, every "natural" means must, of course, be called upon to mitigate evil. But external remedies often avail so little that those of disposition must likewise be evoked. Indeed, even if external measures superficially succeeded but if the soul remained as bad as, or worse than, it was before the evil began, the evil would not be truly overcome. Self-abandoning reliance upon God's grace, moreover, is as "natural," active, and positive a measure as a legislative enactment or a surgical operation, and often more effective for the sufferer, as putting him more intimately in touch with God.

[3] Huvelin, *S. L.*, p. 62.

[4] *S. L.*, p. 256.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 70; cf. *M. E.* I., p. 27.

would live. The resurrection of Christ suggests, among other things, the truth known to those who, in lesser ways, have made of suffering an occasion to give themselves over deliberately to God, without reserve, reward, or any motive except that His will might be done. Some have thereby died—the *reductio ad absurdum*, or the birth, of a supernatural life? Those who were never ready to die, in spirit as well as in flesh, but who "recovered" continue the existence most of us know so well. Those who were ready to die but are still "here" now realize for the first time what life is. By fighting evil to the point of resigning themselves to death, and in thus discovering their weakness and that of their foe, they have first tasted the indomitable goodness and joyous power of God. We disbelieve this if we have not "died" and do not know. Von Hügel believed but was not ashamed to implore grace to help his creaturely unbelief.

In his treatment of sin the Baron disengaged two of the commonest immediate derivations of it: the evolutionary account of it as a lapse into the animalism from which we have arisen, and the closely allied description of it as springing from the body. The former account seemed to him to hold well enough for descents below the human level into impurity, gluttony, and sloth.[1] Even here, however, it should be remembered—although von Hügel does not mention it—that there is no such thing as an animal sin. Sin can exist only in a being conscious of following a course of action which he knows or feels—for any one of a variety of reasons—to be less worthy than a possible alternative. As far as can be ascertained by those psychologists who have consecrated their lives to the subject, nobody, itself included, "passes judgment on" a dormouse for its torpidity, as the dormouse knows and can no better. Much of the sombre fascination of *Oblomov*, on the other hand, lies in the vividness with which its victim's career awakens in us a sometimes almost terrifying consciousness of a similar tendency to let things slide along in neglectful dreaminess, in spite of our vague awareness of the debilitation of such a course. If

[1] *E.* I., pp. 9–11; *E.* II., p. 236.

von Hügel held that sins like impurity, gluttony, and sloth, are below the human level, in the sense that they are sins even for animals and that they can be accounted for fully in humanity as atavisms, that would be inconsistent with his refusal to accept as entirely adequate a genetic account of morality. On his own theory, as indicated earlier, the history of the conditions under which morality arose should be of value as exhibiting the force of the downward tug of those aspects of our nature which we have inherited from an animal past. But that history comes to an end with the emergence of genuine, conscious morality, which can be profitably discussed and measured only by criteria drawn from its own qualitatively different level.

If the evolutionary derivation of "bodily" sins breaks down more than the Baron supposed, because it overlooks the fact that a sin is not simply a natural event but is at least a consciously recognized personal discord, that derivation fails even more flagrantly in the case of "spiritual" sins. Only a hasty perception could confuse the healthful feeling of elation, the innocent desire of attracting attention, in a strutting peacock, a spirited horse, the supposedly lively Pithecanthropus, or in any gay youth or maiden, with a settled and deep-rooted conviction of one's superiority to everybody else, not perhaps in this or that incidental inherited gift or acquired advantage, but in ultimate worth and essence; a conviction of being not merely "as good as anybody else" but decidedly better, which speedily gains such momentum that it outstrips amusing vanities and irritating conceits long before coming to rest in a complacently self-sufficient, sepulchral pride. The sins of the body are generally so clear and objectionable that a predominantly scientific, external age condemns at least their outward, antisocial, and excessive manifestations as much as predominantly ethical, religious eras condemned also their inner sources.[1] But sins like pride and absolute judgment —especially the formation of a closed and irrevocable opinion about the character of another[2]—, unlike the frailties of the flesh, often strike us as belonging almost justly to otherwise

[1] *E.* I., p. 11. [2] Cf. *S. L.*, pp. 231–2.

irreproachable persons above the average run of mortality. Such qualities occasionally serve to order and stiffen society in times of need. They have a near-sighted, Napoleonic glamour about them like that of war. Without evoking admiration, even in spite of betraying hard, walled-in, despairing features, they nevertheless cast a spell over mankind far subtler than that of the sins of the flesh.

As a pointer is restless until he spies his bird, so von Hügel was never fully content until, sinking below the surface, he found the metaphysical ground of a phenomenon. The roots and the occasion of pride he found in man's imperfect liberty, in the fact that although we are finite and dependent upon God we are nevertheless endowed "with a certain independence, a certain limited force of initiation, acceptance or revolt." [1] Thus pride and humility, which apply to all self-conscious, moral creatures, are more fundamental than impurity and purity, which concern such creatures only if they have bodies. Though the influence of other vices is considerable, they do not necessarily pervert the whole nature; as long as humility remains, improvement is possible. But the presence of pride, like the absence of Pauline charity,[2] puts a man in such a false position of believing that he is all that he needs to be that even his virtues are thereby tainted and the hope of advance withered. Humility, as von Hügel saw it, is the intellectual and the emotional realization of our finite position in the universe, of our perpetual need of God and our fellow-creatures. While humbling us before God, this realization also convinces us of the indispensability of daring initiative on our part in order to retain and better our flimsy place in reality and opens our eyes to the necessity of temptation in building and testing character. Our imperfect freedom of choice implies liability to temptation but not inevitably the commission of sin. As the latter, even when repented, leaves, if not violent reactions, at least stains, scars, and real even if slight warpings of judgment and will, and as temptations overcome, not temptations succumbed to, strengthen and purify character, a man grows in personality in spite of his

[1] *E.* I., p. 10; cf. *E.* II., p. 236. [2] Cf. 1 Corinthians xiii.

sins and on account of his positive sinlessness, his aggressive goodness.[1]

The lack of balance resulting from former yielding to temptation stands out clearly in St. Paul's ascription of the origin of sin to the body. "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?" "In my flesh dwelleth no good thing."[2] This harmonizes better with Platonic and Neo-Platonic conceptions of the body as the tomb, or the prison, from which the soul escapes at death, than with the attitude of Christ's "unbroken, unstrained nature" towards it as weak but not intrinsically evil.[3] Although we must counteract this weakness as much as possible, the weakness itself falls into place within the whole personality, which in all its ramifications requires salvation through the narrow gate of death to self and whole-hearted life in God. In his doctrine of bodily as well as spiritual resurrection, however, St. Paul, atoning for much of his one-sided and bitter dualism, attains a more comprehensive, Christian point of view. His dualism reminds one of St. Catherine of Genoa's. But as hers is a fight against natural claimfulness and self-absorption rather than bodily temptations and passions, room is still left in her case also for the Synoptist position that the flesh is weak but not in itself bad nor the source, although a frequent occasion, of evil. Her dualism, besides, is at bottom more pragmatic than ultimate; she combats her baser desires not because they are bad in themselves but because they are not as good as the ideals of her aspiration.[4]

Although he must be exceptionally numb who is never sensible of conflict within himself, yet the magnification of the fissure between flesh and spirit into an ultimate dualism unsettles practice by defeating the struggle for unity and cannot be justified in theory. It is unsound psychologically, since even abstract thinking—to disregard sensuous experience—and bodily stimulation are interdependent. It is cosmologically narrow, because man's body links him to the

[1] *E.* II., pp. 237–9; *M. E.* II., p. 138.
[2] Romans vii. 24, 18, quoted *M. E.* II., p. 123.
[3] *M. E.* II., pp. 121–2.
[4] *Ibid.*, II., pp. 123–6.

rest of material creation. If "morality consists in the formation of the non-moral material of nature into character," and if sin consists not "in the material awaiting moralization, but in the will's failure to completely moralize it"; [1] if the commonly accepted fact that we are both body and soul [2] requires the training of the body as an important means of developing the soul; [3] and if such fundamental virtues as purity and temperance necessitate the submission of the body to "spiritual standards and laws extending to and transforming . . . merely physical inclinations": [4] then an ultimate dualism between body and spirit cannot be but ethically ruinous. It is a dualism that Catholic, sacramental, incarnational Christianity, which deals with everything essential to full personality, cannot tolerate. As an ellipse, in spite of its being one geometrical figure, has two foci, so the Baron's interpretation of Christianity manifests a similar bipolarity within unity: a belief in the ultimate harmony between spirit and matter, combined with the immediate task of alternating fruitfully between physical, bodily, worldly attachment and spiritual detachment;—and this not as a compromise, but for the sake of perfecting nature and realizing supernature, each as far as possible in itself and through the other.[5]

By his acquittal of the past and the body, as the two most plausible and commonly alleged immediate springs of sin, von Hügel was led back again to his original belief in an evil will as the most infectious and fundamental source of

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 300, quoting from F. R. Tennant, *The Origin and Propagation of Sin*, 1902, pp. 82, 95, 107, 108, 115.
[2] *R. G.*, p. 32. [3] *M. E.* II., p. 238. [4] *Ibid.*, II., p. 126.
[5] *Ibid.*, II., p. 127. Cf. "We are told that we must find a place for something of necessity and something of freedom, something traditional and something independent, something of the mind itself and something of the external world. We are treated to the well-worn illustration of life as an ellipse with two foci, and not a circle with one centre, and then incompatible things like a faith which is a relic of tradition and one that is of living insight are yoked together, so that the universe comes to look like a bench of unruly boys who have to be kept very carefully in their places lest they push one another off into the void. We only begin truly to face our problem when we begin to ask how all these aspects of one reality go together and make a universe, embracing the Natural as well as the Supernatural." Oman, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

iniquity. It is not self-centredness as such that is wrong; for God, in spite of His " overflowing " into creation, is primarily the very concentration of good self-centredness, utter perfection complete in itself. But the goodness or the evil of the self depends upon what it centres its whole being. At least as much as upon the grade of reality in which it is absorbed, it depends also upon the motives with which it applies itself. A man intensely interested in people, but merely for the sake of exploiting them for his own uses, may well be more self-centred than a society-shunning but disinterested entomologist; so too, although God is a richer, more all-pervasive reality than is any group of human beings, a man in his theological attitude towards Him, if he considers Him only as an object of fear, or a means to an end, may be definitely narrower and more selfish than he is in his loving and self-sacrificing devotion to others.

But if in all cases his attitude remains equally open and single, his self expands as it feeds upon ever fuller and richer grades of reality. The reason for this corresponds to the reason for preferring to the multiplicity-or-unity of things the multiplicity-and-unity of consciousness, as a better hint of the nature of ultimate being. Engrossment in lower grades of reality entails a greater degree of self-isolation than does a similar occupation with higher grades. The essence of selfishness is the adoration of something divisive to which one clings through thick and thin as the very core of one's personality.[1] If, for example, one pursues

[1] Cf. A. E. Taylor, *Faith of a Moralist*, Series I., p. 307. In practical affairs it is not so much our different and apparently ultimate points of reference—our nearest empirical approach to ontological souls—that separate us, as it is the interests that these active centres entertain. " I am severed by my interests from the world-life of the Whole " more than " I am severed by my self-hood from the world-life of the Whole." (E. G. A. Holmes, " Nirvana.") Its loves and purposes make the self, not vice versa. These apparently can even change the character of the point of view, although the structural pattern of our being—the fact that there must be an ultimate point of reference, no matter how highly variable that point may be—remains the same. If in some way each centre shared as fully as any other in a common love, knowledge, and action, the unity of humanity would be as real as its plurality. In one form or another this idea has often been pressed into the service of the doctrine of the Trinity, as, for example, by William Temple in his *Christus Veritas*.

exclusively something like wealth or power, one generally has to slight what is commonly called " culture." Culture, on the other hand, leaves room for a subordinate consideration of economic security, but frequently tends to an egoistic minimization of the importance of other people. But when for their sakes the self is sanctified,[1] its natural and rightful longings for knowledge, pleasure, power, and peace can be more satisfactorily estimated and organized in relation to the individual and society, because of its now wider outlook. If, finally, religion is the most fundamental characteristic of mankind, and if it effects humanity's most intimate, rewarding communion with all grades of reality, then the love of God should furnish the broadest panorama, the highest scale of values, the best self available. It should —and for many souls does—expand an individual into full personality; not in any merely disjunctive " negative Way," as if the choice of God automatically and under all circumstances excluded everything else; but by showing him gradually, as his capacities increase, the place of everything; by imparting to all creation, as the sun irradiates the globe, an otherwise unobtainable and priceless quality of divinity.

The true self thus being God loving Himself in and through us,[2] the false self is the substitution of anything else in the place of God.[3] Although the combating of this falsity requires the adoption of less constrictive attitudes and interests, that alone, without self-oblivious devotion to God, results in only a more spacious yet still essentially cramping egocentricity.[4] For this reason saints are judged more by the intensity and universality of their love than by the actual number of hospitals they founded or of beggars whose feet they washed, since such performances, open likewise to the proud and scheming, are generally dependent upon

[1] St. John xvii. 19.
[2] *M. E.* II., p. 39.
[3] Cf. *M. E.* I., pp. 206, 230, 235–6, 264; *M. E.* II., pp. 36–7.
[4] " So long as a man seeketh his own highest good because it is his, he will never find it. For so long as he doeth this, he seeketh himself, and deemeth that himself is his highest good." Tauler, quoted by W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, New York (Scribner's), 1899, p. 186.

circumstances which they cannot control. "Holiness consists primarily, not in the absence of faults, but in the presence of spiritual force, in Love creative, Love triumphant,—the soul becoming flame rather than snow, and dwelling upon what to do, give and be, rather than upon what to shun." [1] As our knowledge of God reaches us through contact with people, the material world, and contingencies, and always in relation to ourselves and our purposes, our love for God, despite the increasing disinterestedness that we seek to foster in it, must live and work in this environment wherein it was born and bred.[2] Not the success with which it avoids the world but the effectiveness with which it brings natural virtues to their culmination tests the quality of this love.[3]

Admitting that humanity is never exempt from venial sins, always liable to mortal ones, and never fully supernaturalized,[4] how can our earthly loves be interpenetrated by the love of God so that, neither type being injured for the sake of the other, each may reach its maximum efficiency? Von Hügel replied, by doing everything immediately for its own sake and ultimately for the love of God. "Sylvius, in his highly authoritative commentary on St. Thomas, puts the matter admirably: 'We may not love God in view of reward in suchwise as to make eternal life [or anything else] the true and ultimate end of our love, or to love God because of it, so that without the reward we would not love Him. . . . We must love God in reference to the eternal reward in suchwise that we put forth indeed both love and good works in view of such beatitude, —in so far as the latter is the end proposed to these works by God Himself; yet that we subordinate this our beatitude to the love of God as the true and ultimate end,' so that 'if we had no beatitude to expect at all, we should nevertheless still love Him and execute good works for His own sake alone. In this manner we shall first love God above all things and for His own sake: and we shall next keep the eternal reward [or anything else] before us, for the sake of

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 238.
[2] *Ibid.*, II., pp. 169–70.
[3] *Ibid.*, II., pp. 167–8.
[4] *M. E.* II., p. 169.

God and of His honour.' [1] A man in these dispositions would still hope, and desire, and fear, and regret, and strive for, and aspire to conditions, things, persons both of earth and of the beyond, both for himself and for others, both for time and for eternity: but all this, for the most part, from the ultimate motive, penetrating, deepening, unifying all the other motives,—of the love of Love, Christ, Spirit, God." [2]

It might seem as if von Hügel were trying to make the best of both worlds, which is, in fact, his reasonable, Christian intention. Anything short of that would betray man's "amphibious" character. As supernature is known best in relation to nature, so this world functions fully only when its secondary and intermediate place between our petty selves and the supernatural is recognized. Thus the desire for the best of both worlds does not imply that religion simply blesses things as they are. Religion exists not to soothe and console man as he is, but with a sharp sword to cleave the false from the true self.[3] "Without that dividing up of the true self against the false, without a fear and dread of self that will drive you to God and Christ, without a taking in hand daily, and ever humbly beginning anew, but *not in your own strength, but in a despair of self*, which, if true, means *an utter trust in God and Christ*, so utterly near you day and night,—religion is fine talk, at least it has not become fully alive; and without such a life as *that* . . . —note what I say—you will *never* be happy, you will become feverish, bitter, hard, odious, or will shrink into a poor surface-thing." [4] Although in this matter von Hügel's experience might have been sharper and more effective than that of most good-natured men, he knew that it was not eccentric, but characteristically human—a pale indication of the exceptional but equally normal and far more profound experience of saints and masters in many other fields.[5]

Asceticism is one of the means taken to effect the cleavage

[1] *Summa Theol.*, II., ii., qu. 27, art. 3. [2] *M. E.* II., p. 167.
[3] *S. L.*, p. 72; cf. p. 323. [4] *S. L.*, p. 189.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 188. "I should not be physically alive at this moment, I should be, were I alive at all, a corrupt or at least an incredibly unhappy, violent, bitter, self-occupied destructive soul were it not for religion—for its having come and *saved me from myself*—it, and nothing else; it, in the place of everything else; it, in a sense even against everything else."

between the false and the true self. A purification, training, or discipline of body and mind,[1] it belongs to religion as to any worthy enterprise. The Baron felt bound to accept of it only that which he believed was good and true, leaving that for which he had no use to others who might benefit by it. Although, as much as any contemporary psychologist, he would curb pathological, wrongly motivated, or stupidly executed forms of asceticism, some sort of asceticism intelligently adapted to individual needs he deemed as indispensable to religion as exercise is to the body. "The man who laughs at the plank bed and the discipline is a shallow fool," [2] because some people by constitution and circumstances need to whip themselves into shape as much as others need beer and sleep to have any shape at all. St. Catherine's hair shirt, scanty diet, and self-imposed silence, he admired in so far as they put her mentally and physically in as good a condition as possible for human and divine service.[3] The external manifestations of asceticism are secondary—varying with character, profession, and environment—, their value depending upon how intimately and selflessly they rest in, foster, and transmit the love of God and man. That love alone and its diffusion, not mere self-aggrandizement, pride, or insensibility to the significance of nature, justify the voluntary, informed acceptance of unusual hardships.[4] Although a sacrifice should be estimated not by its size but by what it costs the one who makes it, since a trifle may require great effort; although occasions of superb heroism are rare, whereas one can do daily inconspicuous things heroically; and although von Hügel recommended, with St. François de Sales and Abbé Huvelin,[5] the most tranquil, patient, unstrained hatred of our false selves;

[1] On this see Rufus Jones, *New Studies in Mystical Religion*, Chap. II., New York (Macmillan), 1927, and J. B. Pratt, *op. cit.*, pp. 375–9, 384–6. Of course, asceticism will take on different tinges in different religions, as in Christianity it is often coloured by reference to the sufferings of Christ; see E. Herman, *op. cit.*, pp. 189–90.

[2] *E.* II., p. 240.

[3] *M. E.* I., pp. 131–3. Cf. E. Leseur, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

[4] *E.* II., p. 241.

[5] Huvelin, *Quelques Directeurs d'Ames au XVII. Siècle*, Paris (Gabalda), 1923, pp. 15–18.

nevertheless, without asceticism, such a moderate, harmonious attitude may easily degenerate into a weak parody of religion. Von Hügel knew the world too well to imagine that, if learning to play the piano requires extraordinary effort, the training of the spirit can be left to chance; or to assume that to "take trouble" to do anything properly is the equivalent of unnecessarily "making trouble" for oneself.

It is nowadays widely conceded that, for those who care for it, asceticism is permissible, if it does not damage health. The Baron certainly appreciated health, but he prized love more, both in its natural form of personal devotion and general benevolence and above all in the form described by W. E. Hocking as the desire to confer eternal life. At this moment, perhaps the least popular element of major asceticism is voluntary celibacy, the decision to lead a life of as complete sexual abstinence as possible for the sake of devoting one's attention exclusively to what one feels are more important ways of serving God and humanity. Von Hügel never supposed that there is an intrinsic merit in celibacy merely as a minimum of physical and mental sexual expression, or that, regardless of persons, motives, and circumstances, it is as such superior to marriage.[1] He never pretended, either, that celibacy is especially meritorious if it involves no sacrifice; or that the sacrifice ordinarily involved is not grim.[2] Even the

[1] ". . . Man was originally created by God, in body and in soul, not for celibacy but for marriage; . . . only owing to the accidental event of the Fall and of its effects,—the introduction of disorder and excess into human nature, but not to any corruption of its substance. . . . —does any inferiority,—the dispositions, motives, and circumstances being equal,—attach to marriage as compared with virginity. Hence, still, the absolute ideal would be that man could and did use marriage as all other legitimate functions and things of sense, as a necessary, and ever more and more perfected, means and expression of truly human spirituality, a spirituality which ever requires some non-spiritual material in which to work, and by working in which the soul itself, not only spiritualizes it, but increasingly develops its own self."—*M. E.* II., p. 128.

[2] "What a splendid man he [Father Raymond Hocking] was! What I learnt from him! He saved me from sin. I remember he said to me once, 'You think I do all this for pleasure? for show? Give up marriage, live in discomfort and cold, eat fish all the year round, that I do it to please myself? I don't, I hate it, but I do it for God. I do it to keep alive in this world the spirit that the world forgets—the spirit of renunciation, sacrifice, the supernatural life.' "—*L. N.*, p. xxiv.

"sublimation" effected with a large degree of success by intelligent training and mental, corporal, and social activity does not so completely banish the strain, with its attendant heightening of the possibility of noble or base results, that rightly inspired celibate chastity ceases to be perhaps "the culminating form of self-renouncement";[1]—a form, as history shows, often effective in strengthening others whose belief in the spiritual nature of reality is not sufficiently robust to raise them above a conduct of compromise or worse. Yet, in spite of its difficulties, the Baron respected those who knowingly and freely adopt celibacy as a means of convincing themselves and others of the fact that the body is a servant of the spirit, a lantern of the supernatural.[2] He no more upheld celibacy as the general rule for average human life than he recommended that all people, regardless of a keen sense of obligation and a readiness for heroic endurance, should become firemen. Excesses, however, exact exceptions. As long as flesh kindles against spirit, so long, he felt, will wisely tempered celibates, as firemen of the soul, be uniquely helpful in guarding for humanity a sense of the supernatural.

[1] *S. L.*, p. 185.

[2] ". . . though he [von Hügel] was anxious to see the Roman discipline in some ways mitigated and made more elastic (and he quoted the different rites which obtained in some parts of the world), yet of the necessity for the celibacy itself he had no doubt whatever, it was almost objective to him. 'The priest can *never* be the *same* as the ordinary good man; he is called to a *special* life. Christianity is a supernatural religion, and the priest has a supernatural call. He must reinforce the supernatural sense by the evidence of his own life. He must give up marriage, not because he despises it, but because he must give *all* to God, and for souls. He must live a life of utter self-abandonment, utter self-renunciation for souls. Look at Huvelin! Do you think he could have done what he did for de Foucauld, and for all the souls at large that he saved (for he worked in souls), if he had married? Do you think he could have become the saint he was without his utter self-sacrifice? Read him on the training of priests. *He* knew what a priest has to be, has to do, has to give! To suffer for and with souls, the poor, the sinner, the broken-hearted—what is a priest without all that? We want, too, the extreme of religion, religion's very pole, for the sake of religion itself. What would Christianity mean without this heroism? Is its highest inspiration the decent family man? Could St. John have been the father of a family? St. Paul a comfortable married man? What of our Lord Himself? It is unthinkable.' "—Gwendolen Greene, *Mount Zion*, London (Dent), 1929, pp. 62–3. Cf. p. 59 above.

Besides the spur of asceticism, the fullest appreciation of life requires as much alternation as possible between nature and supernature. It is not a question of loving this world less, but of loving it more and better by so loving the other world. Could we at all times see things as they are and behave accordingly, alternation would be unnecessary. But our narrow attention, like the rays of the sun focused through a magnifying-glass, burns rather than brightens what it rests upon. The very things that we most seek, no matter how good they are, even contemplation itself,[1] we must at times renounce; and this not fanatically but earnestly,[2] as a divinely sanctioned means of understanding and utilizing them better. "Le détachement," the Baron's esteemed spiritual adviser wrote, "ne doit jamais être pratiqué pour lui-même; je ne me détache que pour m'attacher. Je lâche le mauvais ou le moins bon, pour saisir le meilleur ou le parfait. Jamais je ne lâche, pour tomber en un trou." [3]

Each of us has two sets of elements on which he must nourish himself as well as he can in compounds of varying proportions. In the set of attachment and cultivation are the visible, the material, the multiple, the contingent, the temporal, the spatial, the finite, the immanent, affirmation, marriage, and this-world ethics. The set usually requiring detachment and renouncement in respect to the first set is composed of the invisible, the spiritual, unity, abstraction, recollection, the absolute, the eternal, the infinite, the transcendent, negation, monasticism, and other-worldliness.[4] The Fathers of the Desert furnish striking examples of the desire for the barest, most abstract, yet ardent union with God and detachment from the world, which characterizes the second set; Sir Thomas More and Edmund Campion, on account of their variety and attachment, belong predominantly to the first set. Von Hügel found his ideal in people who, like St. Paul, St. Augustine, and St. Catherine of Genoa (during "her great middle period"), combine

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 354.
[2] *E.* II., p. 82.
[3] Huvelin, *S. L.*, p. 59.
[4] *M. E.* II., pp. 127–9, 348–51; *E. L.*, p. 254.

with considerable success the virtues of both sets, welding depth of unity and detachment to breadth of attachment and variety.[1] Since individually and as a race human beings tend to be occupied chiefly with this-world aspects of their experience, the Baron felt particularly grateful towards those who have preserved our awareness of the transcendent. Having chosen the more difficult, less obviously necessary, specifically religious path of life, in their most impressive embodiments they restrain mankind from becoming too much of the earth, earthy.[2] Nevertheless, von Hügel's ideal of spiritual perfection remains, for those who are capable of approximating it, the fusion of " other-worldliness without fanaticism " with " this-worldliness without philistinism." [3]

In himself he tried to effect this by alternating prayer, study, and sacraments, with external business; for one person he would recommend not more than fifteen minutes a day devoted to rudimentary contemplation, while he rejoiced to see another pass several hours at a time in the very same practice.—" It is evidently impossible in such a matter to do more than insist upon the necessity of both movements; upon the immensely fruitful friction and tension which their well-ordered alternation introduces into the soul's inner life; and upon the full ideal and ultimate measure for the complete and perfected man, humanity at large, being a maximum of multiplicity and attachment permeated and purified by a maximum of unity and detachment. The life which can englobe and organize both these movements, with their manifold interaction, will have a multitude of warm attachments, without fever or distraction, and a great unity of pure detachment, without coldness or emptiness; it will have the, winning because rich, simplicity and wondrous combination of apparent inevitableness and of seeming paradox furnished by all true life, hence exhibited in its greatest fullness by the religious life which, at its deepest, is deeper than any other kind of life." [4]

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 129.
[2] *M. E.* II., pp. 354–5; *S. L.*, pp. 72–3.
[3] *E. L.*, p. 255.
[4] *M. E.* II., p. 129; cf. pp. 151, 250; also *E.* II., pp. 100–1, 229; *S. L.*, pp. 72–3, 252–3; *E. L.*, p. 255; *L. N.*, pp. xxi, 67.

If this résumé of von Hügel's attitude towards some of the familiar features of daily existence has been too much confined, for the sake of brevity, to a wintry outline of bare principles, the reader has only to stroll through the Baron's works to find those principles clothed like branches in gorgeous foliage of detailed elaboration. Such exuberance, however, could hardly be expected in a living man's handling of after-life problems. Von Hügel busied himself with immortality only " in the sense of a heightened, or at least an equal, consciousness after death, as compared to that which existed before death." [1] Approving St. Thomas's dictum, that to raise difficulties without answering them is comparable to digging a well and leaving it uncovered in another's path, sometimes von Hügel must have found the review of objections to immortality embarrassing. As dwelling upon doubts about articles held to be *de fide*, or public display of such tenets as being so questionable that the belief of the faithful might be undermined, is commonly reprehended by Roman Catholic authorities, it was fortunate that von Hügel's personal acceptance of life everlasting prevented any friction on that score with his ecclesiastical superiors. By waiving an examination of " the reasons for holding any immortality of man's soul or personality at all," and by addressing himself to those " who are already convinced of the reality of some kind of After Life, and who, besides, accept the historic reality and the character of Jesus and the trend and implications of His teachings," [2] the Baron withdrew creedal assent to the fact of the soul's immortality from criticism, but at the same time allowed himself freedom in interpreting this belief and in marshalling considerations likely to support it. As a Roman Catholic convinced of the authority of his church on that point, or persuaded of the fact of immortality by its congruence with his metaphysics, von Hügel had the advantage over most

[1] *M. E.* II., p. 182.

[2] *E.* I., p. 195. His taking the fact of after-life for granted is more patent in this address than elsewhere. Probably he had no opportunity to go into the subject further at that time. Nevertheless, his other passages on this topic deal at bottom not with the question, is there an after-life? but with the question, what is that immortality like?

philosophers in that he could start building his sky-scraper at the fiftieth floor. This architectural anomalousness, of which he seems to have been aware, results in a curious blending of motives in his dealing with some of the common obstacles to faith in everlasting life. We find, on the one hand, an earnest desire to know the full strength of the opposition and all the weaknesses of his own belief. Combined and contrasting with this outdoor directness is, on the other hand, an unconscious tendency to expatiate on dubious matters in such an edifying and unctuous bedside manner that casual or sympathetic readers, carried away by the Baron's own conviction and more sincere than austere solicitude for the preservation of their faith, are apt to be persuaded by him rather than by his arguments.

The objection that belief in an after-life is "non-universal" and of comparatively recent origin well illustrates the Baron's two trends—which are worth noting here in passing, because they are idiosyncrasies variously colouring his entire work. Such an adventitious stricture he might have dismissed by pointing out that the number of people maintaining a proposition and the date of its promulgation decide neither for nor against its truth. Though this is indeed the quintessence of his position, it is too blunt as it stands to satisfy his twofold impulses. First he must show at scholarly and impartial length the validity of the objection. Then, by turning the reader's attention to such "precious truths" as monotheism, monogamy, "the Illicitness of Slavery," and the earth's rotation around the sun—truths, he carefully notes, which, like belief in immortality, have been attained by only a few profound men after heroic struggle (a minority to which we, gentle reader, have—through no deserts of ours—the privilege of belonging)—, and by mentioning, quite parenthetically, that "reasonably conclusive evidence" for immortality and its implied explanation and transcendence of the elements of truth contained in its predecessors and opponents is the only ultimately satisfactory but not herewith supplied ground of belief, the Baron leaves the average reader in the com-

fortably stupefied condition of feeling that, after all, dear old monogamy, immortality, and " the Illicitness of Slavery " are still pretty " sound," although there will always be some relatively unimportant people to carp at them.[1]

Almost anybody else using such conjurer's " patter " to leave the mind favourably disposed towards a belief in support of which nothing had been offered beyond what would warrant a suspension of judgment would be liable to conviction of *argumentum ad hominem*. He would be accused of using " high-pressure salesmanship " methods in philosophy, similar to those of the dealer who tries to sell one a motor-car not on its merits but on those of the people who own it. But no one aware of the ingenuousness of the Baron's character could bring a charge like that against him. His personal belief that there is " reasonably conclusive evidence " for faith in immortality and for holding it to be the most comprehensive hypothesis of its sort available—a belief which he nowhere deals with separately and fully but in support of which much may be gathered here and there from his pages, as we hope we have already to some extent suggested and shall indicate—, and his own engrained piety and reverence for that of others amply account for these peculiarities of his style.

Another difficulty connected with belief in after-life, but more weighty than those of the rise and the geographical distribution of the belief, since this one is ethically as well as historically significant, pertains to the unsatisfactory character of some of the earlier manifestations of faith in immortality. In spite of much of their repulsiveness, the abnormal excitations connected, for example, with Orphic and Dionysian celebrations certainly succeeded in revealing to men much about their natures that might never have been discovered in unbroken sobriety. What they believed they learned in startling and devious fashions about the differences between mind and matter and between discursive reasoning and intuition, about the kinship of mind with the cause of all things and the need of purification for an ecstatic return to their eternal home among the gods,—these dis-

[1] *M. E.* II., pp. 182–91.

coveries, criticized and sifted in the light of increasing years, have furnished fruitful themes of meditation to Pythagoreans, Platonists, and philosophers of succeeding generations. The tumultuous and childish excesses of these early experiences von Hügel was willing to overlook and forgive, since he found lurking in them " what, even now, are our most solid reasons for belief in Immortality: for if man's mind and soul can thus keenly suffer from the sense of the contingency and mutability of all things directly observed by it without and within, it must itself be, at least in part or potentially, outside of this flux which it so vividly apprehends as *not* Permanence, *not* Rest, *not* true Life." [1]

Perhaps the most persistent objection to immortality issues from the failure to understand how one can live after one's body has died. This difficulty presses hard upon Christianity, which " requires the survival of all that is essential to the whole man,"—thought, senses, emotions, volitions, and actions, none of which, as far as we know, can exist without the body. Contemporary psychology seems to have virtually demonstrated that the concrete human being is not a mind and a body, but a mind-body, so intimately does the content and the concept of the one depend upon those of the other. The myths of popular Christian theology about the resurrection of our present bodies, even if " glorified " (a word vainly used to hide ignorance), only muddle things more. If after death and before resurrection a period of unconsciousness intervenes, the future life would apparently be interrupted in a purely external fashion for no ethical or spiritual reason. If consciousness continues during that interim, then there would seem to be no need for the revivification of the earthly body, since one managed to do just as well without it. " And if we take the resurrection as effected, we promptly feel how mixed and clumsy, how inadequate, how less, and not more, than the best and noblest elements of our experience and aspirations even here and now is such a, still essentially temporal and spatial, mode of existence." Far

[1] *M. E.* II., pp. 191–4.

from being anything that we can clearly picture, the after-life, we must admit, is a postulate of faith in the more than transient worth of human character and in the spiritual nature of ultimate reality. If any of mankind's aspirations now cramped within the cage of earthly horizons are worthy of development, then those who would not in theory sign their own death-warrants must assume the possibility of another phase of existence capable of providing conditions necessary for the growth and flowering of those and better aspirations. Although it would be absurd to predict the full nature of those conditions, nevertheless the Baron deemed himself modest in supposing that they must involve the survival of more than the reason or intellect, which has usually satisfied past and present dualists. Since it is neither easier nor more difficult to postulate the fulfilment of one condition rather than all, we might as well help ourselves generously.[1]

Closely connected with the problem of how consciousness survives the body is naturalism's more general contention that it is arbitrary to except insignificant human souls from the all-embracing flux of nature, which alone and only as a whole is perhaps eternal. A critical realist, with his desire to be fair to both subject and object, here finds himself in a particularly awkward situation. Simply to point out that our knowledge can presumably englobe the universe and in fact contributes as much to the structure of nature as even Kant proposed does not wholly dissolve the element of seemingly hostile objectivity. If the " material " on which the mind " works " is wholly pliable (yet even so to some extent objective; for it is not—or is it?—the creation of the mind), the element of objectivity would seem to retire within the mind itself and there betray itself through the mind's apparently intractable mode of functioning in such a way as to portray nature ever in deterministic, impersonal mien. But if it could be shown that the evanescent confusion of nature presupposes mind, the supernatural, and the eternal, then the negations of naturalism and materialism

[1] *M. E.* II., pp. 194–6. Cf. *E.* I., p. 213.

would sink to the intermediate but indispensable level of that apparent death through which human beings in all their endeavours must pass before they begin truly to live.[1] To what extent von Hügel managed to rout or to make an ally of naturalism, and thus to ward off this attack upon faith in immortality, the reader can best judge for himself by recalling the Baron's analyses of the characteristics of that system of thought, as referred to particularly in Chapters I and II.

Yet three more perplexities [2] the Baron felt called upon to meet before setting forth his positive views on immortality. For instance, it has been held that hope of an after-life, "where operative at all, can but dwarf and deaden all earthly spiration and endeavour." That is true if after-life of the same desirable quality for saint and sinner is assumed to be inevitably appended to this life. But, according to von Hügel, the quality of the soul's continued existence depends intimately upon the worth of its previous deeds and motives. The hope of an after-life, therefore, should be a delightful or terrifying incentive for the improvement of this life. If immortality is a corollary, as the Baron was convinced, of belief in the objective and obligatory nature of beauty, truth, and goodness—a postulate that in so far as we participate in these ultimate values we take on some of their eternal reality—, then it would seem that the denial, rather than the affirmation, of immortality, by setting an arbitrary limit to human possibilities and by treating those fundamental values as insubstantial beyond their mundane convenience, would engender an enervating moral indifference.

It has also been maintained that attention to the joys of individual immortality fosters a type of religion contemptibly selfish in contrast with the noble aloofness exhibited, for example, by Spinoza and Schleiermacher. But

[1] *M. E.* II., pp. 196–7.

[2] *Ibid.*, II., pp. 197–9. Von Hügel "has a way of arguing by what may be described as the method of pistol-shots—clear-cut 'articulations' and 'discriminations' (to use phrases of his own which continually recur), numbered and ticked off with answers to correspond." —Lester-Garland, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

this merely indicates a way in which the belief, whether true or false, may be wrongly held. Von Hügel saw no point in denying the utility of the pleasure attendant upon acts of self-conquest contributing to the soul's advance, nor did he see anything censurable in the realization of the possibility of a similar concomitant happiness in the world to come. But as facts like "the Family, Science, the State, Humanity" —not to mention less haloed affairs like polygamy, dogmatism, political corruption, and cut-throat competition, which could hardly lend to immortality the accidental charm of their reflected light—, no matter how good they are in themselves, may be selfishly abused, so too may immortality. Should one then "impoverish truth and life in order to exclude the possibility of their abuse"?—And as for Spinoza, he was a magnificent, illogical exception, with whom it is unfair to contrast the average believer in immortality. As a matter of observation and personal judgment, does one find the majority of deniers of immortality exhibiting a greater intrinsic nobility than the majority of its affirmers?

"No," one might answer. "The belief's slight influence on the conduct and interests of even serious people is another ground for distrusting it." But it seems open to doubt "whether those who are indifferent or sceptical as to Immortal . . . Life are appreciably fewer and largely other than those who are careless as to the other deep implications and requirements of spiritual experience." Meditation on the celebrated platitude with which Spinoza closed his *Ethics* should convince one of the vanity of expecting our race to be easily persuaded in such matters, though one rose from the dead. On the other hand, it is possible to be convinced of the reality and importance of life after death and yet to have no interest in pursuits like psychical research. Such a spiritualism pictures immortality "as simply a prolongation of this our earthly life, less its pain and (usually) its grossness." To substantiate its hypothesis, it seeks communication with "the very persons, thus still thoroughly their old selves, who are now living in the Beyond." Unscientific in method, "shrunken, banal and boring" in content, spiritualism, by its preoccupation with the mere

continuance, regardless of the quality, of life, is religiously insignificant.[1]

A verse from the Psalms (appropriately inscribed on the Baron's gravestone) suggests the way back to what von Hügel believed to be the right trail: ". . . For what have I in heaven but Thee; and beside Thee what do I desire on earth?" [2] The religious, supernaturally awakened soul is devoted primarily to God. God makes this life worthwhile for him; the hope of a fuller life with God gives significance to immortality. In other words, he is interested in everlasting life only in so far as that is a condition for the most abundant possible eternal life. ". . . 'this,' already and of itself, 'is life eternal, that they should know Thee, the only true God, and Him Whom Thou didst send, even Jesus Christ.'" [3] The content of eternal life is thus to some extent familiar here and now to all who love God. Though the Baron found the meaning of divine love best revealed in Christ, he recognized it in diluted form often elsewhere and insisted that Christian love of God should work in and upon all nature and social relationships as its material. Hence, in addition to, and as a setting for, the opulence of Christianity, the experiences of supernatural good heretofore described [4] should be included in the content of eternal life.

One becomes aware of the supernatural quality of experience in so far as one devotes oneself wholly, "in the deepest search and work within the visible and temporal, the contingent and relative," to invisible, eternal, and unconditioned values, regardless of one's metaphysical theories about this self-surrender to ideals. Father Damien, Joan of Arc, or "the average trooper on the *Birkenhead* going down, without moving, at attention, with the women and children being saved alive before his eyes in those boats where he was deliberately refusing to take a place at the cost

[1] *E.* I., pp. 196–7.
[2] Psalm lxxiii. 25. Cf. *L. N.*, p. xxxii. Cf. pp. 74 ff. above.
[3] *M. E.* II., p. 90, quoting St. John xvii. 3. Cf. Dean Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, 1899, p. 52.
[4] Especially in Chapter II.

of others, many of whom had no special claim upon himself,"—those three and others like them, von Hügel was convinced, experienced eternal life and help the rest of us to appreciate it better. On at least one occasion they felt that the things of this world and their own lives are subordinate to values of a higher level of unconditional obligation; they showed by their conduct, if not by their words, that nature lives and moves and has its being in a more ultimate realm of supernature. Those rare occasions proclaim that man's highest thoughts and actions are inspired by sources above the plane of the most sublime terrestrial utopia, since even at its best such a utopia will always be recognized, in spite of its inestimable worth and desirability, as but a deceptive approximation of that heavenly Jerusalem which is man's true home. As long as men feel instinctively that those rare moments of consecration to absolute ideals are examples not of folly but of truest insight and action, compared to which the bulk of life is a rich but fallow field, just so long have they believed, and just so long will they continue irresistibly to hope, that " such heroic goodness points to a Beyond, as indeed does all philosophical research, all scientific work, all artistic effort —whensoever these endeavours penetrate deeper than a certain superficial and conventional level. All such heroic, self-oblivious search and reception of Truth and Beauty, as possessing the right to such self-surrender, appear as special divine gifts rather than as mere human efforts, as glimpses of realities which, for their adequate environment and apprehension, require, not this world and this life, but another life and another world." [1]

" Ah," you may sigh, " this is all very well for those exceptional personalities of whom it has often been said, they deserved not death. But what of us? What of those for whom God and supernatural things are at best distant, impossible visions 'loved long since, and lost awhile'? The argument furnishes no ground for supposing that we are immortal, or for imagining that, if we are, we

[1] *E.* I., pp. 197–201; *M. E.* II., p. 198.

shall appreciate that other, supernatural world any better than the shepherds appreciate Arcady, who live there without knowing it."

Doubtless von Hügel believed that those exceptional people manifested most clearly the real character of human nature and the reasons for assuming—by bravely jumping from the particular to the general—the immortality of us all. Impressively they emphasize human personality's partial transcendence of time and space, which in most men is a spark of divine discontent, or an inability to cry with complete satisfaction, "Verweile doch! Du bist so schön!" to anything less than ultimate perfection. But if this cannot be said of some of us, it did not upset the Baron. In the end, not expecting demonstration in such a matter, he accepted a view of the soul similar to St. Catherine of Genoa's. Holding that we are essentially to some extent eternal rather than immortal, she thought of heaven, hell, and purgatory, as "distinct states of the soul, already effected in their essence here below, and experienced as what they are, in part and occasionally here, and fully and continuously hereafter. Thus the fundamental cleavage in the soul's life is not between things successive,—between the Now and the Then, and at the point of death; but between things simultaneous, between the This and the That, and at the point of sin and of self-seeking." [1] "Only because of the fact, and of our conviction of the fact, of the unbroken continuity and identity of God with Himself, of the human soul with itself, and of the deepest of the relations subsisting between that God and the soul, across the chasm formed by our body's death, and only in proportion as we can and do experience and achieve, during this our earthly life, certain spiritual laws and realities of a sufficiently elemental, universal, and fruitful, more or less time- and space-less character, can we (whilst ever remembering the analogical nature of such picturings even as to the soul's life here) safely and profitably forecast certain general features of the future which is thus already so largely present. But, given these

[1] *M. E.* I., pp. 238–9.

conditions in the present, we can and should [1] forecast the future, to the extent implied." [2]

The experience of purgatory has probably never been more deeply analysed than by St. Catherine of Genoa, whose teachings on this point, after he had admirably presented and probed them, von Hügel made his own. Although full repentance of iniquity usually washes away guilt, so that the repentant sinner is as much dissociated from his offence as is the new man from the old Adam, nevertheless it rarely extinguishes all the natural inward and outward effects of sin. He who has contritely ceased to gamble may have entered into a new life, but he is accompanied, externally, by depleted bank account and injured friends and, internally, by a half-suppressed gambling spirit which distorts his outlook. It ordinarily requires years of grace working slowly through his own innumerable efforts to discipline himself through the substitution of contrary thoughts, emotions, and habits, before he is restored to a state of spiritual health. The natural consequences of any sin, except for a particularly hardened sinner or for one from whom the consequences have been temporarily withheld, are generally painful. If these pains resulting from infringement of divine-natural moral laws are merely endured or frantically opposed, the sinner continues in his same condition or sinks below it. If, however, recognizing the general justness of the cause-and-effect sequence and making no cowardly claim for personal exemption from this impartial determinism, the sinner freely wills and accepts the suffering his own wickedness or thoughtlessness entails, and does this for the sake of having a right spirit renewed within him, or for the sake of returning to God, then he discovers that his woes may be transformed into dross-consuming, purgatorial fires.[3] Thus purgatory is primarily a state of soul. Whether its pains are from the external world or simply mild prickings of conscience, their value

[1] In order " to stimulate the growth of our own personalities, and, with it, further insight into these great realities."—*M. E.* II., p. 246.

[2] *M. E.* II., p. 200; cf. *M. E.* I., p. 281.

[3] Lack of space here prevents any attempt to do justice to St. Catherine's fire imagery.

depends upon the extent to which they are utilized to purify and improve the personality. By natural means external troubles may be so alleviated and internal ones so assuaged that the pains of purgatory may be slight indeed; but be they slight or almost intolerable their real sting lies in the imperfection of the person's will, which brings about his opposition to God.[1] Whether that opposition is overcome or overcomes determines whether purgatory ends in heaven or hell.[2]

Considering purgatory, thus described, as " a sheer fact for the soul in its relation to God during this life," the Baron concluded that, unless unanswerable evidence for the contrary can be produced, we must expect an analogical continuation of earthly purgatory in after-life. It is so essential to our personalities and so fundamental in our relation to God that without its counterpart in the beyond immortality would seem to be impossible for the bulk of humanity, who at death are usually fitted, as far as one can see, for neither hell nor heaven. Certain only of " the general principle of ameliorative suffering," von Hügel treated speculations and pictures pertaining to extrinsic, vindicative punishment, the particular judgment, the last day, etc., as so many symbols. But

> " Since highest truth, man e'er supplied,
> Was ever fable on outside," [3]

he regarded them as vehicles of truth, which clumsily emphasize social aspects and effects of sin, but which merit pragmatic retention in so far as they serve as means to, and expressions of, an intrinsic, ameliorative purgatory.[4]

[1] " I see," to quote St. Catherine, " the divine essence to be of such purity, that the soul which should have within it the least mote . . . of imperfection, would rather cast itself into a thousand hells, than find itself with that imperfection in the presence of God."—*M. E.* I., p. 284. Compare Newman's lines from " The Dream of Gerontius ":

> " And these two pains, so counter and so keen,—
> The longing for Him, when thou seest Him not;
> The shame of self at thought of seeing Him,—
> Will be thy veriest, sharpest purgatory."

[2] *E.* I., pp. 201–3; *M. E.* I., pp. 232, 249, 281, 284–94. For a similar treatment of purgatory, see A. E. Taylor, *Faith of a Moralist*, Series I., pp. 316 ff.

[3] R. Browning, " Easter Day."

[4] *M. E.* II., pp. 230–46.

It would be remarkable if after death the human race could be neatly sorted out and assigned to heaven, hell, or purgatory, without remainder. Here too, as in any other classification ranging from a financial statement to the border species of biology, there is need of a category for the miscellaneous, of a limbo for those who will fit nowhere else.[1] While taking the idea seriously, the Baron wasted no time in attempting to elaborate it. As heaven, hell, and purgatory, are possible states only for the supernaturally awake, what is to be done with those who die before attaining the age of reason, or with those who, like Anthony Trollope, have never become aware of anything beyond nature? As by hypothesis all men are immortal, these particular human beings must continue in some sort of natural, rather than supernatural, state, since they are fitted only for the former. But what about baptised infants? The Baron admitted them to heaven, "yet to a far less degree of the supernatural beatitude than" that enjoyed by "souls which have struggled long and much in and for the supernatural life here below, and which have died substantially fit for heaven at last, even though they be in need of a long purgatory first." If one urges that it is not fair that the mere accident of baptism should make all the difference between a low grade of supernatural happiness and a high grade of natural happiness, the Baron has two replies. First, he wonders how, remembering that among acorns, insects, fishes, birds, and mammals only a relatively small number ever reach maturity, one can imagine that mankind should be exempt from this same general law, or naïvely suppose that every individual man reaches the fullness of his "natural and supernatural call." Secondly, he assures one that those in the natural limbo have all the happiness they can stand; indeed, they can conceive nothing better, for they have never known "the solicitations of the supernatural." "A man with much salt in his mouth requires much more drink to slake his thirst than does the man who has never tasted salt; the thirst of the man untouched by salt is slaked

[1] Cf. "A Great Apologist," a review of *E.* I., London *Times Literary Supplement*, Dec. 15, 1921, and von Hügel's answer, *ibid.*, Dec. 22, 1921.

by a small glassful of water, the thirst of the man aroused by salt is not appeased by less liquid than a bucketful. And if we take the difference between the two classes of souls objectively, we find that the two calls and ends are largely balanced by the fact that the supernatural call and end usually involves spiritual struggles, sacrifices, dangers, profound alternatives, whilst the natural call and end is always devoid of all supernatural pains and perils." [1]

It is strange in an age like this, familiar with the devastations of war, prosperity, and depression, that, with so much of the raw material of hell around and within us, we should smile whenever the word is mentioned. For some people, like John Scotus Erigena, Giordano Bruno, Spinoza, and Schleiermacher, hell was too inconsistent with their pondered pantheism to appear as anything more than a vulgar superstition. Most of us, however, have no better excuse to offer for our indifference in this matter than that of " the prevalent easy-going, slipshod thinking, feeling and living with regard to our free will and responsibility, our moral weakness and the reality of sin." [2] Unconsciously we try to disguise our cheapness from ourselves and others by a sentimental humanitarianism [3] and a voluble mouthing of naturalistic phrases the import, the applicability, and the limitations of which we have never bothered to ascertain. In the end the difficulty lies not in a squeamishness, which rejects the horrid notion of hell and reaches for heaven as eagerly as for " sugar and spice and everything nice," but in a choice between a naturalistic, humanitarian world and a spiritual world with " abiding consequences." Is man, as the strict naturalists in philosophy, morality, literature, and art have portrayed him, merely " a superior animal, which projects its own largely fantastic wishes on to the void or the unknown, and which then fishes them back as objective realities distinct from itself, their true creator "? Or is he, in addition to that and at his best, a creature truly aware of transcendent spiritual realities (ideals, God, Platonic Forms—call them

[1] *E.* I., p. 205. [2] *Ibid.*, I., pp. 220–1.

[3] " We are so fond of men, we can't keep God. The most subtle enemy of religion is humanitarianism."—*L. N.*, p. xxxiv.

what you will) towards which he feels an intrinsic obligation, an essential affinity, far more profound than personal convenience, social expediency, or anything else entirely natural can account for? On this point, in accordance with the central trend of philosophy and religion, von Hügel shared Christ's conviction "that the spiritual life is a great, all-important alternative and choice—a choice once for all, with consequences final and immense." [1]

The choice, as we have seen, is a result of our imperfect liberty.[2] In so far as we are true to our original nature, we long for God, good, and happiness, which we usually find to some degree in spite of sin. But if through countless forms of self-deceit and indulgent negligence we stray too long half-heartedly looking for God where (as at bottom we suspect) He cannot be found, we gradually promote "a deliberate orientation of character" towards evil, which may lead to the soul's spiritual destruction.[3] But the "orientation," one might protest, was not deliberate, although each step leading to it may have been. If excusable ignorance or invincible prejudice prevented a man from seeing where he was going, the Baron was sure that such a person would not be tried too harshly when he arrived. Experience, however, teaches most people how responsible they are for their deliberate thinkings as well as for their "deliberate feelings, willings, or visible acts," so that with fair warning they receive the opportunity to choose their destination. It is true that many people, "over impressed as to the range and depth" of recent discoveries and revolutions, profess belief in various sorts of "experimental animalisms" and fatalisms with which current popular science and economic circumstances have clouded those "ultimate facts and laws of the spiritual life," which, like human nature, remain through the ages substantially the same. But the pleasant inconsistency between the sophisticated professions of these people

[1] *E.* I., pp. 209–12, 138–9; *M. E.* II., p. 219. Cf. A. E. Taylor, *op. cit.*, Series I., pp. 324 ff.
[2] *E.* I., p. 221; *L. N.*, p. xxxv.
[3] *M. E.* I., p. 282; *M. E.* II., pp. 78, 221.

and their generally thoughtful, honourable conduct, shows again that " it matters not so much what a man thinks he thinks, as what he thinks in actual reality." [1]

Hell, whether now or hereafter, lies in the incompatibility felt by a rational creature between its actual contingent condition and its indestructible ideal.[2] It is a pain everywhere consequent upon deliberate acts of will, whereby a person finally so alters himself that he becomes, and knows himself to be, incapable of approaching to any satisfactory extent that personal ideal for himself of which he, as an " amphibious " being, can never be rid. Happily such despairing people are probably relatively few and of those few doubtless most can still be saved by a combination of their own, others', and God's action inextricably intermingled. But daily observation of ourselves and others is sufficient to persuade us that, if wilful and persistent moral, spiritual, and intellectual laxity leads to ruin in this life, it would be maudlin to imagine it not to continue to do so in the Beyond.

This does not imply that there is not a certain amount of goodness and mitigation of suffering even in hell. Whereas in purgatory the will is fundamentally good though weakened by sin, in hell it is fundamentally bad without being utterly deprived of some unregeneratively good impulses. We are so accustomed on earth to this feeble reflection of goodness—as manifested in ineffective vows to return a book, or to answer mail promptly, or to attend to something which we " never get around to doing "—that the world hereafter would be intolerably unhomelike and discontinuous were not that characteristic of this life preserved at least in hell. What prevents von Hügel from considering hell only a longer, more severe purgatory leading at last to a romantic apocatastasis is the impotence of the goodness of the lost, which complacently cheers and deludes without improving. Since,

[1] *E.* I., pp. 222–3.

[2] Cf.: " ' The human soul can never cease to yearn and thirst after God; ' and the greatest pain ' of the lost ' is that this longing can never be satisfied.' "—Tauler, quoted by W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 185.

in a universe where God is ultimate reality, evil cannot be as substantial as goodness, the sufferings of hell are not as full and concentrated as are the joys of heaven. But the anguish of hell is unique in its irrevocability. Unless one's own experience has led one to believe that there is no ultimate difference in the consequences of right and wrong, one seems driven to conclude that, if sin is deliberately fostered, one will finally reach a point whence return is impossible. Nobody may have reached that point; but that does not mean that nobody will reach it, nor does it justify the statement, so plausibly philanthropic yet actually so corrupting and unfounded, that regardless of how one thinks, feels, and acts, one will live happily ever afterwards in this life or the next.[1]

The fact that what one sows here one reaps in the beyond is, as regards the structure of this essay, fortunate, because the flowering in heaven of von Hügel's favourite trends and teachings helps one to see in summary fashion how the principal aspects of his thought are related. As, like purgatory and hell, heaven is primarily a state of consciousness, it transcends space. (Yet even though, as Kant has shown, space is less essential to our consciousness than time, never-

[1] *M. E.* I., pp. 232, 283; *M. E.* II., pp. 224–8; *E.* I., pp. 214–15, 221. Admitting that most of the imagery that has grown up about hell is misleading on account of its vindictiveness and lack of religious or ethical significance, the Baron nevertheless realized the necessity of using the resources of a tempered imagination as much in this field as in any other belonging to thought or conduct.

He found more truth in the doctrine of conditional immortality than in any theory of a final restitution of all things in such a manner as to wipe out abiding consequences of spiritual life. Conditional immortality attempts to be fair to ethical causation by allowing those mortal souls who are worthy of it to put on immortality; those who fail to rise from animal individuality to personality simply perish.

But of conditional immortality von Hügel could not accept the jump from mortality to immortality. How can something essentially mortal become immortal? If we are to have immortality at all, he preferred to assume it for everybody, but—following the clue of the conditionalists —with a lesser consciousness for the lost than for the saved. "Whilst the joyful life of the Saved would range, in harmonious intensity, beyond all that we can experience here, the painful consciousness of the Lost would be, in various degrees, indefinitely less. The Saved would thus not be only *other* than the Lost, they would actually be *more*: for God is Life supreme, and, where there is more affinity with God, there is more life, and more consciousness."—*M. E.* II., pp. 228–30.

theless it is so basic a factor in the perceptual side of human experience, upon which much depends, that one might expect the Baron to grant it some sort of " analogical " substitute in the hereafter.) Since heaven alone provides the ideal and norm of experience, von Hügel did not consider the retention of time in purgatory and hell to prejudge the question of its presence in heaven. A few days away from the scheduled activities of civilization is enough so to convince one of the artificiality of clock-time in this life that one would neither desire nor anticipate it after the passing of terrestrial accidents. Duration, however, does not seem to be an accident of this phase of existence but rather an inescapable quality of our thought. It ranges from the almost pure succession of vacant, disconnected, semi-conscious day-dreaming to the quasi-simultaneity of our most fruitful experiences. Hence, with the disappearance of the earthly convention of clock-time, one would expect in the saved an increasing enrichment of duration moving towards God's simultaneity; and in the lost, " according to the degree of their permanent self-willed defection from their supernatural call, . . . the all but mere changingness, scatteredness, distractedness, variously characteristic of their self-selected earthly life." As those in hell are still feebly conscious of their supernatural vocation, " they will feel the unsatisfactoriness of this their permanent non-recollection more than they felt it upon earth." The very distractedness of their condition, however, " if unaccompanied by any keen memory or prevision," may mitigate their sufferings, as often a stupor dulls the edge of physical misery.[1]

The quasi-simultaneity of heaven accords with the Baron's desire for the soul to become like God by living ever more fully God's abundant life. His dissatisfaction with accepting as sufficient anything less than the whole makes this clear. " The diminution of vitality in the trance " and " the inattention to more than one thing at a time in Contemplation "—

[1] *M. E.* II., pp. 230, 247–9; *E.* I., pp. 215–16. On human quasi-simultaneity see A. E. Taylor, *op. cit.*, Series I., p. 230; Series II., p. 309. Cf. pp. 81 ff. above.

to recall a few examples—he regarded as defects in themselves and at best " the price paid for certain gains " not otherwise to be had. Hence the need of supplementing mysticism with institutional religion and mundane interests. The " tired business man," the " nervous " woman, the acrimonious theologian, suggest how dangerous it is to overexercise the shrewd, intellectual, outgoing, worldly factors of personality without sufficient spiritual rest, incubation, passive abandonment to God,—suggest the necessity of alternation to blend the multiplicity of activity into the unity of Action. The soul, then, advances towards simultaneity in proportion as it assimilates in its own unique way the harmonious Action and full personality of God.[1]

As in this life the growth of personality is inconceivable without social intercourse, and as Christ's two great commandments, with their sequacious beliefs in His Church, the Kingdom of God, and the Communion of Saints, are inseparable, von Hügel concluded that ultimate beatitude must involve communion with God and " fellow souls." Thus whatever relationships provided good and necessary material for the building of one's character on earth would continue (if their importance were not already outworn) in duly improved form as " the essential natural substratum " of one's " full supernatural life in heaven." [2]

With the intensification of celestial strains, even the Baron's critical realism seems ready to don angels' garb —to become ever less critical and more realistic—; yet in heaven too its predominant pattern abides. As the best of our knowledge here is that love and faith which vividly possess their object even before understanding it, so likewise in heaven mystical devotion will fly more swiftly to greet realities than will the critical intellect. In this the joy of the saved will be enhanced by a greater zest of objectivity resulting from the fact that their subjective and individual natures will become ever more means of union with other realities rather than sources of division from them. As long, however, as man remains man—which for von Hügel

[1] *M. E.* II., pp. 249–255.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 254–5; *E.* I., pp. 214, 216–18.

meant for ever—, his increasing joy in heaven will always be whetted by pain. Accepting in his first sketches a large amount of clumsiness as more or less inevitable, at the commencement of his career an artist may be proud of a mediocre creation. But as he progresses, every slightest divergence from his ideal hurts him more than far worse blunders which he made before he was aware of the possibility of his aspiring to a higher standard. So the truly greater joys of heaven will involve more refined but no less real pains than those of earth. Because supernature perfects nature without abolishing it, every soul will endure with its own individuality, which will still remain largely incomprehensible to itself and other souls, in spite of fuller intercommunion. As the finite, dependent, durational creature approaches his infinite, perfect, eternal Creator, his happiness, increasing like the spreading darkness of the moon eclipsing the sun, causes his pain, though less than on earth, to become ever more piercing, like the remaining uneclipsed solar segment or rim. But, as man is man and God is God, the identification, the union, or the eclipse, is never total. On account of the corona, as it were, of individuality, intercourse with God and other souls, though ever more satisfactory, will always involve the trying element of doubt in faith, the necessity of heroic venture, and free self-donation. Thus the tensions of this life are immortalized by the pain of contraction in hell, and in heaven by the pain of expansion in the joy of the Lord.[1]

[1] *M. E.* II., pp. 255–8; *E.* I., pp. 218–19.

EXCERPTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE

OF

BARON FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL

WITH

THE REVEREND CANON GEORGE E. NEWSOM

late Master of Selwyn College, Cambridge

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS. VONHUGEL. LONDON

13, VICARAGE GATE, KENSINGTON, W.

13th Jan. 1908.

My dear Newsom, I think this is the point I have got to, with you; but may forgive me, if it is not!) —
we are having Fr Tyrrell living close to us here for a bit now, and he takes his two chief meals with us regularly, walking out with me of an afternoon — I know that he would much enjoy that promenading with the Professor of Pastoral Theology, King's College. Will then the said Professor come on Friday next, 17th, to the Queen's Road Tube station end of the Broad walk, at 3 p.m.; and then Fr T. and I would be there, as would thank the Professor for an hour or so in the Gardens? — we would have much to hear and to say.

Yours very sincerely
Fr. von Hügel.

FACSIMILE OF A LETTER

WRITTEN BY BARON FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL

ERRATUM

Page 257, line 1, *for* "I have got" *read* "I have got to"

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Yours very sincerely,
FR. VON HÜGEL.

13, *Vicarage Gate,*
Kensington, W.
23rd Feb., 1909.

MY DEAR NEWSOM,

I am truly obliged for your sending on that very cheering bit from your Swedish Theologian's letter. It is, of course, this kind of testimony from people unknown to us, that cheers us, poor toilers, up, more than any amount of kindness from those who know us well, though *that* is pleasant too, and more helpful, in other ways, perhaps.—

I write this also to put two little questions to you.

For one thing, I should like you to let me come some day to tea with you, when I could see yourself and Mrs. Newsom. I can promise that the empire of that 'organized hypocrisy', civilization, over me is so great, as to ensure my perfectly polite silence should I find the niece and grand-niece of Bishops *very* trying, *very* antipathetic! But it always remains possible that I might not find her thus; and, anyhow, I should like to be allowed to come and judge for myself.

I could come any day next week, except Monday and Tuesday, say, at 4.30 or 5. If Wednesday or Thursday would fit you both,—*that* would suit me best.

Then too (but this is a more shy-making proposal) I feel somehow inclined to give you my book (alas, it is a *very* long one, and hard reading!) as my poor wedding-present. You see you went and won and wedded your wife, and I knew nothing whatever about it all,—thinking you absorbed in a defence of Ritschlianism or what not. And yet I feel you quite a friend, and you need never read all that long affair, and it can stand (for all that) as a testimony to my warm regard and sincere sympathy.—So, if you will let me, I will bring a copy with me when I come to tea with you,—if indeed your wife will thus let me turn up. With my fine *Acousticon* I can hear all beautifully now.

Yours ever sincerely,
FR. VON HÜGEL.

13, *Vicarage Gate*,
Kensington, W.
Oct. 26, 1909.

MY DEAR NEWSOM,

. . . 2. As to Rinnovamento, your remarks that pleasant evening at your house, set my mind a-working, and on Monday early I sent a proposal to one of the chief Milanese contributors, which, if accepted, will keep the Review going for at least another three years. It will involve Casati's undertaking to continue to find money,—but not, necessarily, more than £200 a year,—and entrusting the effectual, supreme Editorship, during that time, to a man against whom he cannot allege immaturity. . . . They promise to let me have a definite answer promptly, as to whether they can undertake the share of work, responsibility, etc. required of them, and as to if there is a good chance of getting C. to accept and as to how to approach him. Let me, meanwhile, thank you *most* cordially for your offer of £20 a year, for two years running. That with the £50 a year which I already knew assured from England, would bring us near the £100 a year from this side the Channel, which I have guaranteed, supposing the proposed plan is accepted. I am very sure, that all men who love religion, and yet who *see* the present problems and acute crisis *everywhere*, could not but wish 'R.' to live on. You shall, of course, know, as soon as I do myself. I trust to your absolute discretion. . . .

One little prick of conscience pursued me, after my visit to you,—that I did not tell that most winning wife of yours how truly I was feeling for her brother's loss. Still, I said so in my previous note to you. I *did* like to see you two together; and you must let the battered elderly one come again some day.

Yours most sincerely,
FR. VON HÜGEL.

I was so glad too about what you told me concerning your attitude towards Loisy. We must not simply give him up. He is incomplete and contracting religiously; but a great scholar, a great, courageous soul.

13, *Vicarage Gate,*
Kensington, W.
14*th Dec.*, 1909.

MY DEAR NEWSOM,

I believe myself to be now fairly free, of an afternoon till December 16th, to-morrow fortnight, exclusively. And I shall be glad if you and your wife are free and kindly disposed to have me, once more, in your cheering company. Since I saw you *four* big disappointments and anxieties have added themselves on to those that were trying me, when I came and you two braced me up. Hence I feel as though I had some reason to hope for some change and refreshment of mind now.

I do not know whether you still care for your idea that I should speak for twenty minutes to a group of the men and women you are trying to help. I should be most glad to come, simply to see you two. I only refer to that idea of yours, because I shall have, after now a fortnight's rest, really to begin my Papers for Dr. Hastings,—and, once those are on, I may find it more difficult to turn up in your regions. Still, I am tired now, and only if the thing were quite unlearned, quite straight from the heart, could I manage it on my little present strength. I understood from you that these are not fully settled, cheerily comfortable Church-people. You will understand how much I would wish to be sure as to the kind of people I was addressing, since nothing is more distressing, I find, than, unwittingly, to unsettle settled souls, instead of helping the other way on. You will also readily guess that by this I do not refer to any confessional differences, but to the critical problems and

difficulties which, unbeknown to so many, really beset us all. . . . It is plain that I cannot tell you of my woes, if these semi-settled ones are to be about; and yet I must not think of two visits, during this spell of time, to your house.—If I spoke to that group, perhaps a little address on the inexhaustible *youth-feelings* of Xtianity would be in place. . . .

13, *Vicarage Gate,*
Kensington, W.
8th Nov., 1912.

MY DEAR NEWSOM,

It is indeed kind of you to invite me to address those 30 or more men reading for Holy Orders, for you know well how highly I prize the honour of even the distant chance of serving minds and souls that are starting on life's work and journey. My only difficulty in accepting lies in the date proposed. For I am doubly and trebly engaged to my old and now feeble Mother at Cambridge for the 15th inst., and indeed several days around that date. You say that Friday evenings are your usual times for the meetings. If you can, and care to, put off my little address to another Friday, *that* would suit me—all except the following Friday, 22nd, when I have to attend the dinner to Lilley. Should Friday November 29th suit you, *that* would fit me perfectly. But we can talk about this when I come to you to-morrow at four—I interpret your silence to mean that this will suit you.

Let me already, *quite between ourselves*, tell you how much I hope that dinner to Lilley is either going to be a quite private, informal affair, or that, if both speeches are reported, I shall not find myself the only not-wild R.C. present, or, at least, that of the Churchmen who come and who speak, some of them will do so quite emphatically along the lines of Transcendence (with Immanence), ontology and Facts. Perhaps you are hardly aware how keen and fully awake is the conflict on this absolutely fundamental matter now, abroad. But you realize, I am sure, how deep my concern and great my commitment is on the side just mentioned which, I need not point out, not only does not sever me from the majority of at all religious-minded Churchmen, but keeps me in full touch with the most fundamental of their instincts and traditions. . . .

13, *Vicarage Gate,*
Kensington, W.
19*th Dec.*, 1912.

MY DEAR NEWSOM,

You are only too kind; and I must take your praise not, thank God, as insincere, but as either given me for things which have their sources in God and in other, greater human souls, or as proffered me as a merciful counter-weight to such troubles as may be coming to me, or as I may already have to experience.—Your generous sympathy is, however, none the less precious, none the less useful, for that. Thank you much.—As to the proposed address to "The Religious Thought Society" I am, of course, fully sensible of the honour and advantage involved in the offer you make to try to arrange for me to address it, even though its ordinary meetings are all full up—evidently for some time to come. The difficulty on my side is solely one concerning my time and strength. I am pledged, several times over, to have a difficult paper ready,—on Troeltsch—for reading at Oxford on May 3rd; with another one on May 22nd. And my feeling was that I had better abstain from all further speaking to meetings between now and the latter date, because such speaking requires, I find, a good deal of incubation and, somehow, takes out of one. Then, if I do *not* speak, I ensure for myself a fine long spell of unbroken work at my much-loved Troeltsch.—On the other hand, I continue to feel that you may very really be right in thinking it would be a good thing if I met Dean Inge, in some dignified, appropriate way, now, soon, whilst he is thus friendly and sympathetic. And I admit that I do not *see* any other means as apt as the one you now so kindly propose.—I suppose you do not know him well enough to ask him to luncheon some day alone with your kind wife, yourself and me at your house. And again this might be going too fast (altho' I *have* been introduced to him, some 4 years ago, at some friends' house in London). I had thought of suggesting to these latter friends to repeat their former kindness; but there are reasons, long to relate tho' perfectly harmless, why this could hardly be proposed.

If, then, I am not asking too much, or (at least) if the thing would not thus be a forced, a somewhat undignified move, you would perhaps consider it. Or we could wait for some other combination to turn up. But such a meeting, I feel, *if it is worth planning, had probably better be before my*

May dates, since, by that time, the Dean may be quite cool and crusty again! . . .

13, *Vicarage Gate*,
Kensington, W.
23rd Dec., 1914.

MY DEAR NEWSOM,

. . . I now venture to send you six copies of my second Troeltsch article, since I see that I sent you as many of the first. And certainly, the placing of copies at all appropriately has not grown easier since last March.—You will note that only the little half-page peroration was written since the outbreak of the War.—I fear the whole thing is tough reading; and yet, surely, T. shows here often very magnificently! . . .

In some notes probably written about 1912 to the Reverend George E. Newsom, Baron von Hügel recommends the following books:

The Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius of Loyola. "The *Rules for the Discernment of Spirits* is here; every word here springs from life and demands and deserves a long life of practice."

Manuel des Ames Intérieures, by Jean Nicolas Grou. "I have come to feel that Grou was, by natural bent, Jansenistic, and that he exaggerates the necessity, range and authority of the Director. But, in all else, he is a master in Israel."

Grou's two volumes, *L'École de Jésus Christ*. "Grou's last, in some ways maturest, spiritual book. Volume I contains dry, somewhat *hard*, chapters. But Volume II is almost entirely the purest gold."

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